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
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
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A Soviet View



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
**НАРОД,
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ПОЛКОВОДЕЦ**

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The People, the Army, the Commander

A Soviet View,



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AMERICAN EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

The People, the Army, the Commander is the fourteenth volume in the "Soviet Military Thought" series translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force. The Soviet edition was published in 1970 in 16,500 copies and was described as being "of interest to officers and generals." It was also "recommended to students attending officer-commissioning schools and university extension courses in Marxism-Leninism."

The author, Colonel M. P. Skirdo, is a Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and has earned the title of Professor. In the 1960's he held the chair of Marxism-Leninism at the Military Engineering Academy named in honor of V. V. Kuybyshev and later was assigned as senior instructor at the Soviet Union's highest military educational institution, the General Staff Academy. Upon retirement from active duty in 1972, he joined Moscow University's Institute of the Economy named in honor of G. V. Plekhanov. Skirdo thus wrote this book while teaching at the General Staff Academy and probably incorporated into it some of the material he was presenting to the future leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Russian title of Skirdo's work is "Narod, Armiya, Polkovodets." The first two terms can be translated simply as "People, Army," but the third term is more ambiguous. Skirdo defines "polkovodets" as a "military figure who combines thorough theoretical knowledge with combat experience and who contributes to the development of military science and practice" (p. 141). As historical examples, he cites Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great, Napoleon, Alexander Nevskiy, Peter the Great, A. V. Suvorov, and M. I. Kutuzov. All these examples as well as the definition suggest that the best translation of the term should be "great captain of history." However, such a construction would have been unwieldy not only in the title but also in the text. It is for this reason that the term "commander" was chosen. Whenever it appears, it stands for the Russian word "polkovodets." In contrast, the term "military leader" was chosen to convey the Russian expressions "voyenachal'nik" and "voyenny rukovoditel'."

In addition to presenting translation difficulties, the title is deceptive, for it suggests a strictly ideological treatise on the indestructible unity of the Soviet people and its leadership or, at best, an historical review of the civilian population's growing involvement in military actions. Actually, the real subject of the book is an examination of the political, economic, moral, administrative, and leadership factors that, according to the author, bring victory in a thermonuclear war.

To be sure, the author does not advocate war. On the contrary, he is convinced that the socialist system will prevail "under conditions of peaceful coexistence and economic competition" (p. 43). However, since the danger of war will exist as long as imperialism exists, he stresses that the Soviet Union must be prepared to wage a thermonuclear war, "if the imperialists unleash it." Should such a war come, it will still represent a continuation of politics and will be "the extreme means of deciding the question 'Who-whom?' in the historical struggle between capitalism and socialism" (p. 9).

A thermonuclear war would embrace the entire territories of the combatants, would entail unprecedented losses, and could be won only by the side which is thoroughly prepared for the conflict. Some of the essential elements of this preparation are the possession of a large army (p. 29), the creation of massive manpower reserves (p. 31), the ability rapidly to place the entire economy on a war footing (p. 48) and to implement civil defense measures (p. 102), centralized leadership (p. 84), "scientific planning and control of the economy of the entire country" (p. 101), and, of course, effective leadership by commanders.

Skirido ascribes superiority to the Soviet Union on all counts: scientific leadership (p. 107), better economic planning (p. 48), higher moral-political qualities (p. 52), and "indisputable advantage in the creation of the military-economic and scientific-technical potential necessary for victory. . . ." (p. 13), a large population (p. 14), and a larger territory offering better opportunities for dispersal (p. 19). Only these last two factors, of course, are measurable and can be accepted as objective facts. Nevertheless, Skirido is confident that, in case of war, "victory will go to the coalition of socialist states, . . ." (p. 74).

Skirido's treatise, then, is an analysis of those factors that he feels would be decisive in a thermonuclear war. Taken as a whole, his work provides the theoretical underpinning for a strategy that appears to reflect an intention to maximize war-fighting and damage-limiting capabilities so as to enable the USSR to wage an intercontinental nuclear war, should one occur, and survive it with resources sufficient to dominate the postwar period.

*The translation and publication of **The People, the Army, the Commander** does not constitute approval by any U.S. Government organization of the inferences, findings and conclusions contained therein. Publication is solely for the exchange and stimulation of ideas.*

SYNOPSIS

ABSTRACT

The characteristic features of modern warfare are examined, and the decisive role of the general populace in the course and outcome of a war is demonstrated. An important place is accorded to the problems of leadership in modern warfare and to the role of the commander in armed struggle. While elucidating all these questions, cognizance is taken of the current radical transformation in military affairs. The book will undoubtedly be of interest to officers. It may also be recommended to students attending officer-commissioning schools and to those attending university extension courses in Marxism-Leninism.

ABSTRACT

FOREWORD

The roles of the general populace and of political and military leaders in war are of great interest to personnel studying Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army, military science, methods of waging armed struggle under modern conditions, and ways to attain victory over a strong enemy.

This highly topical and complex problem has long attracted the attention of theorists and major military figures. However, in the past the majority of them, as a rule, underestimated the influence of the general populace on the course and outcome of a war and overestimated the role played by commanders and monarchs. Napoleon used to impress on his marshals that he who places his hopes in the people is misguided. Similarly, the French general F. K hlman* stated categorically, "War is primarily . . . a contest between two commanders, and armies are merely the weapons of the two opposing wills."¹

As wars began to drag many nations into their orbit and as the attainment of victory over the enemy began to require the concerted efforts of the entire country and of larger armies, military theorists could no longer ignore the role of the general populace in war. Russian military-theoretical thinkers of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century enunciated a number of profound ideas along these lines. For example, in his study entitled *Plan for War*, A. Neznamov wrote that an indispensable condition for victory in war is the population's support of the army and government.² We find that similar views were held by N. Mikhnevich. He noted that "the great technical inventions of our century have given rise to armies which are many millions strong."³ Mikhnevich emphasized that it has become impossible to achieve military goals without the utmost "exertion of the physical and moral strength of the troops and their leaders, such exertion being the touchstone for their energy, and for that of the nation from which they emerged."⁴

* [Spelling of author's name is conjectural—U.S. Ed.]

As early as 1886, the German general von der Goltz was obliged to admit that the era of armchair wars had passed. He noted that future wars would not be confined to regular troops alone, but would involve many nations and the entire populations of the belligerent states.⁵

In contemporary bourgeois military literature persistent attention is given to the relative role of the peoples, the military masses, and commanders in war. Bourgeois authors are tending increasingly toward the view that the role of the general populace in military affairs is growing. For example, the French military theorist Pierre M. Gallois, in his book *Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, notes that the advent of nuclear weapons not only "does not diminish the role of resistance offered by the people of a given country to invaders, but, on the contrary, increases that role."⁶

At the same time, bourgeois theorists, who can no longer ignore the enormous role of the civilian and military masses in warfare, are alarmed by this objective fact. Many of these theorists fear that the general populace will hardly be enthusiastic about fighting for goals which are not in its interest. In their studies such theorists therefore make recommendations to their governments, or to political or military leaders in their countries, as to how the people and the rank and file of the armed forces can be inveigled into aggressive wars, and how their morale can be maintained at a sufficiently high level.

The classics of Marxism-Leninism established the real importance of the general populace and the personality in warfare, and showed the importance of those social conditions which create the prerequisites for victory. They recognized, at the outset, the decisive role of peoples in the historical process. Developing the ideas of Marx and Engels in accordance with new historical conditions, Lenin brought to light the increased role of the general populace in the wars of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, which encompassed, in one way or another, the entire populations of the belligerent states. Lenin showed that the time when wars were waged by mercenaries, or by castes semi-alienated from the people, had receded irrevocably into the past. Wars are now waged by the people.

In Lenin's works, the role of the general populace in the armed defense of their socialist homeland is revealed in depth. Lenin proved convincingly that the outcome of a modern war, as never before, is determined not simply by the numerical strength of those participating in it, but by the attitude of the general populace toward the goals and missions of the war, and toward the country's political and military leadership. In a number of his works, Lenin saw the basic wartime role of the general populace in strengthening the rear of a country at war, and

building up the military-economic potential and moral strength of a socialist state.

Emphasizing that in war, as in the entire historical process, a decisive role belongs to the general populace, the classics of Marxism-Leninism never contrasted them with individual personalities, i.e., political leaders, military leaders, or commanders. On the contrary, they always regarded the roles of the masses and the personality as complementary, and in dialectic unity.

In many of their works, Marx, Engels and Lenin showed that victory in war requires experienced political leaders and talented commanders who know their job, and that success is achieved where the will of the many is subordinated to the will of an authoritative leader with a gift for uniting the masses, the ability to use new forms and methods of combat, and a faculty for making the right decisions in complex situations.

The problem of the respective roles of the people, the political and military leadership and the personality in modern warfare has been profoundly elucidated in documents issued by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and in the writings and addresses of CPSU and Soviet government leaders and our distinguished military leaders. Important aspects of this problem are also considered in the works of eminent figures in the world communist movement.

The problem of correlating the role of the general populace in war with that of the political and military leadership has been dealt with in one way or another by Soviet authors of works devoted to warfare and the army. Such authors consider important situations which have some bearing on the problem of interest to us and pose a number of questions requiring further special, more thorough research.

In the present work the author has striven to examine, within definite limits, certain important aspects of the role of the general populace in modern warfare; to show the dependence of rear support strength, the state of the economy, moral-political potential, and military potential proper of the belligerent parties on the attitude of the civilian and combatant personnel toward the goals of the war and government policy; and to demonstrate the increased role of the general populace in nuclear warfare, in preparing to repel aggression, and in creating and maintaining a high level of combat capability in the massive armies and vast human reserves without which the waging of a modern war would be unthinkable.

An attempt is made in this book to examine certain fundamental questions pertaining to leadership in a war by governments, political parties,

and the supreme military command, with a view to eliciting the principles which should be followed in such leadership in order to ensure victory over the enemy. An attempt is also made to indicate the role of the individual in modern warfare, i.e., the role of the commander and the military leader in leading troops to victory.

The author does not pretend to have dealt thoroughly with the quite extensive and complex problem chosen. This would require the joint efforts of theorists and practical workers, i.e., teams of scholars and military leaders with rich experience in troop leadership.

FOOTNOTES

1. F. Kühlman, *Obshchaya taktika po opytu mirovoy voyny* [General Tactics Based on World War Experience] (Moscow-Leningrad, 1928), p. 27. [This is one of several works cited throughout this book which are obviously translations from another language, but which are not explicitly described as translations. They will be identified as such only where the footnotes in the Russian original so state—U.S. Ed.]
2. *Russkaya voyenno-teoreticheskaya mysl' XIX i nachala XX vekov* [Russian Military-Theoretical Thought of the Nineteenth and the Beginning of the Twentieth Centuries] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960), p. 697.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 415.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 514.
5. See Colmar von der Goltz, *Vooruzhenny narod* [An Armed People] (St. Petersburg, 1886), pp. 7, 428.
6. P. Gallois, *Strategiya v yadernyy vek* [Strategy in the Nuclear Age] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962), p. 195.

Chapter 1. The Distinctive Features of Modern Warfare

Neither the essence of modern warfare, nor its causes, can be understood without taking into account the nature of our epoch, which is basically characterized by the transition from capitalism to socialism. It began with the Great October Socialist Revolution and is an epoch of struggle between two opposite social systems, an epoch of socialist and national liberation revolutions, an epoch that is seeing the collapse of imperialism and liquidation of the colonial system, an epoch in which all new nations are shifting to socialism, and an epoch distinguished by the triumph of socialism and communism on a worldwide scale.

Surrounding the problems of war and peace in the international arena there is acute ideological struggle. Apologists for the monopolistic bourgeoisie are doing their utmost to conceal the aggressive essence of the policy of the imperialist states, thus hoping to render the general populace incapable of effective action in their struggle against the predatory aspirations of the imperialists, and in their endeavor to preserve and strengthen peace on earth.

Adherents of Marxism-Leninism hold that war is inseparable from politics, and proceed from the assumption that this tenet remains true even with the advent of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, it may be said that the connection between war and politics has become closer and more obvious. "Every war," wrote Lenin, "is inseparably associated with the political system from which it emerges. A given world power, or a given class within that power, will inevitably continue in wartime the policy to which it has been adhering for a long time prior to the war, changing only the form of its action."¹ Elsewhere, Lenin emphasized that "war is part of a whole, and the whole is politics."² Consequently, war occupies a subordinate position with respect to politics, is determined by it, depends on it, and is a means of its fulfillment.

The specific feature of war is its violent nature. It is politics accomplished by means of armed struggle. Lenin wrote, "When applied to

wars, the fundamental tenet of dialectics . . . becomes 'war is simply a continuation of politics by other' [i.e., violent] 'means.'"³

However, while remaining a continuation of politics, a world nuclear missile war, if it occurs, will have its own essential features, distinguishing it in many ways from former wars. Recourse to the latest means of armed violence for political purposes may result in the loss of tens or even hundreds of millions of human lives, and whole states may be swept off the face of the earth. All this puts a different complexion on the problem as to the role of armed force in the accomplishment of political goals. This does not alter in the slightest, however, the fact that war in its essence will remain none other than a continuation of the politics of the belligerent states and certain classes within them.

1. Imperialism—The Source of the Threat of War

Lenin's definition of the essence of war as a continuation by violent means of the domestic and foreign policy of a state permits insight into the causes of any war at all, including those of a possible new war between the imperialist powers and the countries of socialism.

The causes of wars are rooted in the socioeconomic structure of an antagonistic society and in the interests of the exploiting classes, which find their most concentrated expression in the policy pursued by such classes. Wars are caused by antagonistic contradictions between classes, between states, and between coalitions of states. They do not occur spontaneously nor apart from the will of ruling classes, governments, or governing political parties of an antagonistic society. Wars are unleashed by aggressive states when they do not encounter the necessary resistance on the part of peace-loving peoples and countries.

A thorough analysis of the contemporary international situation and its most characteristic features and tendencies is given in the CPSU program, in the resolutions of the 23rd Party Congress and subsequent plenums of the Central Committee, in materials devoted to the fiftieth anniversary of the Great October, and in documents issued or ratified by international Conferences of Communist and Workers' Parties. The present stage is characterized by an acute historical antagonism between the forces of progress and reaction, i.e., between those of socialism and imperialism. The world revolutionary movement continues its advance. At the present time, as was noted at the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, favorable conditions exist for the solution of important contemporary problems in the interests of peace, democracy and socialism, and for fresh attacks on imperialism. At the same time, imperialism continues to be a real and dangerous enemy. It is striving, by every available means, to weaken the position of socialism, to suppress the national liberation movement, to hinder the struggle of

the workers in capitalist countries, and to delay the irreversible process of the fall of capitalism. Imperialism has not abstained even from direct armed struggle against socialism.

The principal organizer and inspirer of imperialist aggression is the U.S. **American imperialism constitutes the principal threat to peace in the entire world.** It is preparing to commit the most terrible crime against mankind, i.e., a thermonuclear world war.

Preparing for another world war, the U.S. has formed a number of aggressive military blocs, drawing dozens of states into them. Together with their partners in these aggressive blocs, the American imperialists are preparing likely theaters of military operations. They have encircled the socialist states with a ring of military bases. The American military commentator H. Baldwin writes quite frankly, "In military parlance, we need lines of advanced posts abroad to be able to wage war with a hope of success. We need overseas bases as a springboard for an attack on central Russia."

Beyond the frontiers of the U.S., the Pentagon has created more than 2200 naval bases, air bases, army bases, and other military installations, on which the total numerical troop strength is constantly maintained at more than a million men. American nuclear submarines armed with "Polaris" missiles and American carrier formations are patrolling the World's Ocean continuously.

Striving to strengthen their strategic positions in the world arena, the imperialists of the U.S. have taken upon themselves the role of international gendarme, and interfere impudently in the domestic affairs of other states. They organize political upheavals, and resort to all possible forms of blackmail. In order to suppress democratic systems and to establish reactionary regimes, the U.S. does not stop short of direct military intervention. This over and over again confirms Lenin's characterization of American imperialism as most avaricious, predatory, bloodthirsty, savage and hateful toward all nations.

An ever more sinister role in the heightening of international tension is being played by the chief partner of the U.S. in Europe, namely, West German imperialism. The Karlovy Vary [Karlsbad] Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties says, in its official statement, that "Bonn has become the main support in Europe for American global strategy. The growth in the forces of the Bundeswehr, which is commanded by former Hitlerite officers, testifies to the increased scale of military preparations." ⁴

The "emergency laws" which raise the use of terror and violence against the workers of West Germany to the level of government policy,

and the preaching of *revanche* by Bonn reactionary forces, are symptomatic of the dangerous situation which is developing in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The imperialists are also preparing for a future war on the ideological front. Ideological diversions against socialist countries and other freedom-loving peoples are being intensified, as is rabid anticommunist propaganda.

The April 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union noted an acute intensification of ideological strife between capitalism and socialism at the present stage of historical development. "The whole enormous anticommunist propaganda apparatus," says the Plenum Resolution, "is at present directed toward weakening the unity of the socialist countries and of the international communist movement, toward disuniting the progressive forces of the day, and toward disrupting socialist society from within." Recent events in Czechoslovakia served as convincing evidence of such a trend in the ideological subversions by imperialism.

In the U.S. and other imperialist states there is an extensive network of establishments such as the Institute for Communist Affairs, Institute for Communist Strategy and Propaganda, etc., which work out the strategy and tactics of subversive activities against peace-loving peoples and are directly engaged in the performance of such activities. Especially active in this sense is the United States Information Agency (USIA); which has a generous budget and a huge staff, and stretches its tentacles into dozens of countries of the world.

The imperialist bourgeoisie and its ideological headquarters and centers all slander the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, distorting their foreign policy in the most shameless manner. All of this is being done in order to frighten the peoples of the world with the imaginary danger of an armed attack, supposedly being prepared by the USSR, and in order to justify the arms race and the existence of aggressive blocs.

Ideological preparations for a new world war are in full swing in West Germany. Meetings, demonstrations and torch-light processions reminiscent of the Fascist gatherings of the thirties are being held in many towns of the Federal Republic. *Revanchists* are publishing numerous "research papers" on Hitler, Goering and Goebbels, as well as letters written by Hess and diaries kept by Ribbentrop, etc., in which the Fascist leaders who plunged nations into World War II are eulogized.

The imperialists are feverishly preparing for a new world war. Such a war could cause mankind incalculable harm and suffering. And the more the peoples of the world become aware of the brigandlike nature

of the policies of the imperialist ringleaders, the greater will be their solidarity, will and resolution in their struggle to thwart the aggressive intentions of the modern cannibals. The real danger that there will be another world war imposes a special responsibility upon the peoples and governments of socialist states, and upon communist and workers' parties. It is their mission to work tirelessly to enhance the defensive power of their own countries and that of the socialist commonwealth as a whole.

2. War Between Two Radically Opposed Coalitions

Another world war, if the imperialists unleash it, will be an encounter between two radically opposed social systems, as far as its class essence is concerned. Such a war will be the extreme means of deciding the question "Who—whom?"* in the historical struggle between capitalism and socialism. It will therefore be distinguished by the resoluteness of the goals of the two belligerent parties.

With the world divided into two sociopolitical systems, two coalitions, imperialist and socialist, will confront one another in the international arena.

The imperialist coalition is headed by the United States of America, stronghold of world imperialism, originator and inspirer of preparation for war against the socialist states. The governing circles of the U.S. are taking all possible steps to strengthen their coalition and to include in it primarily those countries of Western Europe which are strongest from the economic and military viewpoints. The U.S. plays a leading role in the OAS [Organization of American States], which is an antidemocratic alliance of Latin American states under the influence of Washington.

The American imperialists attach great importance to Europe for the purpose of accomplishing their aggressive plans. According to the strategic concepts of American political and military figures and theorists, Europe continues to be a key position for the U.S. within the framework of global conflict with the USSR and other socialist states.

Political and military figures in imperialist states make no secret of the fact that in the war planned by them against the Soviet Union and other socialist states they will do their utmost to destroy the world system of socialism, to liquidate the great gains won by the nations comprising that system, and to suppress the world communist and workers' movement. Besides, they are counting on this war helping them to suppress the national liberation movement among the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and to restore the colonial yoke.

* [The Smirnitskiy *Russian-English Dictionary* translates this as "Who will win?" There is a somewhat broader interpretation of this concept by Nathan Leites in *A Study of Bolshevism*, Project Rand Report R239, May 1, 1953—U.S. Ed.]

The forces of the imperialist military coalition are opposed by the coalition of socialist states. The socialist countries of Europe are united by a defensive alliance ratified in the Warsaw Pact. This alliance is based on the unity of goals and tasks of the socialist states and expresses the interests of the people at large. Besides, the Soviet Union and the other socialist states are bound by bilateral agreements pledging friendship, alliance, and mutual aid.

The joint defense system employed by the socialist states is based on collective action. According to Article 4 of the Warsaw Pact, in the event of an armed attack in Europe by any state or group of states on one or more of the states that are signatories of this pact, each signatory state will render prompt aid by all means which seem to it to be required to the state or states which have sustained such an attack.

The communist and workers' parties and governments of Warsaw Pact countries are paying particular attention, within the framework of the pact, to perfecting a permanent operative mechanism for the discussion and practical solution of pressing problems. For example, armament is being standardized and combat training experience is being exchanged. Moreover, joint exercises and maneuvers are being conducted, in the course of which the effectiveness of new weapons and combat equipment is verified, and the comradeship-in-arms of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries is strengthened. In the Summary Report of the Central Committee to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU it was emphasized that "In case of need, the closely united family of participants in this pact will rise with formidable strength in defense of the socialist order and of the free life of our peoples, dealing a crushing blow to any aggressor." ^a

During the time of its existence, the Warsaw Pact organization has proven its strength and vitality in practice. The energetic joint actions of the fraternal countries have repeatedly obliged imperialist aggressors to abandon their brigandlike intentions. Gone forever are the days when imperialism could impose its will on peoples and go unpunished for its aggressive actions.

The objective fact of the occurrence of two military-political alliances confronting each other in the international arena necessarily predetermines the coalitional character of a possible future world war. As is well known, there have been coalitional wars in the past. Among them, in particular, are the first and second world wars. The history of these wars shows that coalitions may be made up of states differing not only in geographic position, surface area, population, economic and military resources and moral-political potentials, but also in the ultimate goals pursued in the given war. Furthermore, the anti-Hitler coalition of World War II included states with different sociopolitical systems.

However, besides the common military goals which unite them, the members of imperialist coalitions also have their own special goals, which they frequently conceal even from each other. This situation is organically inherent in exploiter state coalitions, in which there is not, and cannot be, genuine unity or equality between the members. Their relationship depends only on their relative strength and is based on the principle of domination and subordination.

What the members of present-day imperialist coalitions do have in common are class hatred toward socialism and communism, fear for the future of capitalism, and a compulsive urge to postpone the breakdown of the capitalist system.

The unity of the countries of the socialist commonwealth has a quite different basis. These countries are united by what they have in common, namely: their Marxist-Leninist ideology; their sociopolitical system; and their common goals as peoples who are striving to build socialism and communism, and who are firmly resolved to hold their epoch-making gains by thwarting the aggressive schemes of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

The above characterization of the causes which polarize states into hostile coalitions already contains the answer to the extremely important question: Which of the two camps will possess greater internal unity and strength?

Historical experience teaches that the unity and strength of any military coalition are determined primarily by the goals in the name of which the member states are allied, by the popular support accorded to these goals, and by the degree to which the political leadership and the military leadership are unified.

When analyzing the situation in an imperialist coalition, one must, of course, bear in mind imperialism's very nature, which is fraught with internal contradictions. Competition continues to intensify between the U.S. and its partners for markets, sources of raw material, and influence in countries liberated from colonial dependence.

Although the U.S. is still superior in industrial output and in the production of weapons, especially nuclear missiles, the capitalist countries of Western Europe have in recent years overtaken the U.S. in foreign trade, gold reserves, and a number of other areas. Supported by their growing economic strength, such countries are offering resistance to many political actions of the U.S., and in some cases are starting to take an independent line in international affairs. Most striking in this regard is the posture of France, which has withdrawn from NATO. This has led to a serious crisis within the North Atlantic bloc.

The European partners of the U.S. are expressing dissatisfaction more and more often with her adventurist course, which is directed toward the unleashing of a new war. The peoples and governments of Western Europe are becoming increasingly convinced by the events of recent years that the U.S., by its provocative actions toward the countries of socialism and other peace-loving states, may draw its NATO partners into a nuclear war without even consulting them. It is therefore not by chance that the ruling circles of certain Western countries are questioning the expediency of a military alliance with the U.S. or participation in the combined armed forces of NATO, which threatens to involve their countries in a war having nothing in common with their national interests. There has been a growing tendency in European capitalist countries toward liberation from the political and military tutelage of the United States.

The weaknesses of coalitions of imperialist states are due in part to the fact that the peoples of such states condemn the aggressive policy of their governments. The people of a given aggressive military bloc country are alarmed by the endeavor of the U.S. to turn their territory into a base or springboard for submarines or planes, or a missile-launching site. The growing public indignation at the adventuristic foreign policy of the U.S. is having a noticeable effect on the governments of a number of countries, obliging them to abandon their policy of unreserved support of the aggressive plans of the American imperialists.

The experience of history shows that coalitions of states which do not enjoy popular support, cannot endure trials, especially in moments of military setback, and that such coalitions disintegrate and their armies are defeated. So it was, in particular, with Hitler's coalition of World War II.

In the imperialist camp there are two intertwining objective tendencies: one, toward uniting all its forces against socialism; and the other, toward the growth of contradictions between the imperialist powers themselves. The U.S. has not succeeded, nor will it succeed, in overcoming the contradictions within the imperialist coalition, which are undermining the unity of the capitalist countries that are united into aggressive alliances and blocs. Moreover, the possibility is not excluded that in some interval of historical development, aggravation of the fundamental economic and political contradictions of capitalism may even lead to armed conflict between large capitalist states.

However, due allowance should be made for the fact that the imperialist coalition is a real force. It possesses great economic, scientific, technological and military potential, and much manpower. The member states of NATO alone have peacetime armed forces more than six million

strong, and they have tens of thousands of first-line aircraft, tanks, and a considerable number of warships in commission. The U.S. is gaining war potential especially rapidly. American aggressive circles are building up reserves of nuclear weapons, and at the present time have at their disposal several tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. The U.S. has a large number of intercontinental ballistic missiles of the "Minuteman" and "Titan" types, missiles of the "Polaris" type mounted on submarines, as well as hundreds of strategic bombers.

In contrast to the aggressive blocs of the imperialist powers, the union of the countries of the socialist commonwealth and their close military alliance have a firm objective basis for monolithic solidarity. This union was formed and is developing in accordance with the principles of socialist internationalism, full equality of the member states, strict observance of their sovereignty, national and international interests, and unselfish fraternal mutual aid. A world war, should the imperialists unleash one, would be the severest test of the sociopolitical foundations of the two hostile coalitions. We are convinced that in such a test the socialist commonwealth would prove its indisputable superiority. Underlying the strength and invincibility of the peoples and armies of the socialist commonwealth are their progressive social order and state system, the solidarity of their peoples and armies, and the just policies of the communist and workers' parties.

The world socialist system enjoys an indisputable advantage in the creation of the military-economic and scientific-technical potential necessary for victory in a modern war. The economy, science, and technology of the socialist states are developing more rapidly than the economy of the imperialist powers. At the present time the socialist countries on the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA) alone account for approximately one-third of the world's industrial output. The rapid tempo of development of the economy in the socialist countries is due to the socialist system of production management, international socialist division of labor, coordination of national economic plans, specialization and coordination of production, and close cooperation and mutual aid in the development of science and technology.

The world system of socialism possesses immense military power, capable of dealing a devastating blow to any aggressor. Soviet nuclear weapons, the latest missiles for all purposes, other forms of modern combat equipment, the corresponding organization and technical equipping of the troops, all vouch for our military might.

The fraternal armies of the socialist countries not only have first-class armament and combat equipment, but excellent personnel also. The officer corps, mature and seasoned, originated from the people. It is

well trained and quite capable of resolving the tasks confronting it. The rank and file are dedicated to the cause of socialism and communism, are united by common goals and ideals, and are deeply conscious of their patriotic and international duty.

The Warsaw Pact countries have evolved a scientifically-based military doctrine; they adhere to common strategic views in the sphere of their countries' defense and in repulsing possible enemy aggression. Unified views on the nature of a future war and methods of waging it are reflected in the regulations and instructions underlying the combat training of troops. This facilitates the preparation of the armed forces to repulse any aggression.

A circumstance of no little importance is the fact that the socialist states cover a huge territory. In addition, the majority of them are compactly situated, have common boundaries, and possess an extensive network of internal communications. This ensures that reserves and resources may be maneuvered effectively, and facilitates the organization of defense, including air defense, supply of materiel, and troop movement. The principal partners of the imperialist coalition are at a considerable distance from one another on different continents, so that their lines of communication are very long, which is a serious strategic disadvantage.

The socialist countries have abundant human resources, an important factor for victory, especially in modern warfare, with its massive armies and huge numbers of people employed in the rear supporting the war.

The unsurpassable strength of the socialist countries consists in their moral-political superiority over the capitalist states. The general populace and the armed forces personnel of the socialist countries are well aware of the justness of the goals of a war waged in defense of their homelands and their revolutionary gains. In addition, the socialist countries enjoy the political and moral support of the people of many young nations.

A potent source of strength for the socialist countries and their armies is the leadership given by the communist and workers' parties. On the scientific basis of Marxism-Leninism, these parties are working out genuinely revolutionary strategy and tactics, i.e., the guidelines for the struggle of the working masses with the enemies of socialism. Indeed, the leadership given by the Marxist-Leninist parties is a most important subjective condition for the realization of all the objective advantages of the socialist system for attaining victory over an aggressor.

The communist and workers' parties, as the parties in power in the socialist states, and the governments of these states, are constantly

endeavoring to reinforce the strength and unity of the socialist commonwealth. The Summary Report of the Central Committee to the 23rd Party Congress reads: "Collaboration and solidarity are among the principal sources of the strength of the socialist system. The development and deepening of such collaboration is in the fundamental interest of each country individually, and of the world socialist system as a whole, and promotes the cohesion of our ranks in our conflict with imperialism." ⁷

Occasional difficulties and contradictions may arise in the relations between socialist countries. Such contradictions, however, are not antagonistic. The possibility of surmounting them is inherent in the very nature of socialism. These contradictions are eliminated by adopting coordinated decisions that are in the interest of each country and of the socialist commonwealth as a whole.

Diverse points of view and even contradictions may arise in the relations between socialist countries because the evolution of a world socialist system is a complex, many-faceted process associated with the surmounting of both objective and subjective difficulties. It should be noted that fraternal relations and collaboration can be achieved between countries having economic levels, historical and cultural traditions, communications, and social structures, that are far from identical.

A particular danger for the unity, solidarity and coordinated action of the socialist countries is the ideology of right and "left" revisionism.

In the Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU dedicated to the centennial of Lenin's birth it is said that "Experience testifies to the fact that petty bourgeois elements, wherever they can exert their influence, try to hinder the normal course of socialist transformations, to set socialist countries against one another, and to arouse the opportunist, revisionist and nationalist sentiments on which imperialism plays. This danger grows where deviation from Marxist-Leninist principles is tolerated." ⁸

"Left" revisionism attacks the theory and practice of scientific communism, striving subversively to substitute reactionary-Utopian or army barrack "socialism." Its petty bourgeois and nationalist essence is exhibited in sermons on the messianic role of certain countries and in the mass processing of minds in the spirit of hegemonism, chauvinism and militant antisovietism.

Great harm is being done to the cause of socialism by right revisionists, who are advocating the concept of so-called "liberalized" socialism, denying the leadership role of the Marxist-Leninist parties, and substituting the political liberalism of bourgeois doctrine for socialist democracy.

While promoting the power and potential of the countries of the socialist commonwealth and reinforcing their unity, collaboration and mutual aid, the Marxist-Leninist parties are conducting a resolute struggle against all attempts to weaken the position of the new order or to counteract the new trend in international relations, and advocate that all difficulties and disagreements on any question be resolved by the fraternal parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.

In his speech to the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow on 7 June 1969 the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, said, "To be firm, after the manner of Lenin, in defending and upholding the principles of socialism: such is the lesson which life is teaching us." ⁹

The peoples of our state and of the other fraternal socialist countries are filled with the resolution to uphold and strengthen the position of the world socialist system, the invincible stronghold of peace, social progress, freedom, and independence of peoples. Convincing proof of this was afforded by the joint actions of five socialist states in defense of the revolutionary gains of socialism in Czechoslovakia, where these gains were really threatened by internal and external reaction.

The countries of the socialist system are in the advance guard of all revolutionary anti-imperialist forces. Deriving support from its ever-growing economic and defensive strength, the world socialist system shackles imperialism, thus limiting its ability to export counterrevolution. Fulfilling its international duty, it is rendering progressively more aid to nations fighting for freedom and independence, and is strengthening peace and international security.

3. Nuclear Missile Warfare

As has already been said, war is a continuation of politics by other, namely violent, means, the means of armed struggle. Just what are these means which the antagonistic parties have at their disposal, how are they used, and what demands does their existence make on the government, the supreme command and the general populace of a belligerent state?

During World War II, ground troops played the leading role in this armed struggle. Artillery and aviation were the principal means of exerting firepower. This, of necessity, led to the presence of continuous fronts, a powerful, deeply echeloned defense, concentration of huge troop formations in the main sectors, etc. The impact on the enemy's extreme rear area was not great at that time, and therefore did not play a decisive role in the attainment of victory.

A fundamentally new weapon, the nuclear weapon, appeared during the final stage of World War II, and in the postwar years it has under-

gone rapid development. New means have been invented for delivering nuclear warheads to the target, namely, missiles of various types and for different purposes. The advent of nuclear missiles has necessitated widespread introduction of radioelectronics, automatic systems and telemechanics into all Services of the Armed Forces and has created a need for automation and mechanization of troop control.

The appearance of new means of waging war would be unthinkable without the scientific-technological revolution which is taking place at present. Indeed, it is precisely this revolution, with its rapid qualitative changes in all branches of science and technology, that has served as a basis for improvements and changes in the means of armed struggle and has led to a genuine revolution in military affairs.

The current transformation in military affairs is by no means a matter of mere qualitative changes in the material base of contemporary warfare. It has brought about fundamental changes in the forms of war and the methods of waging it, in the structure of the armed forces, in officer training, and in the training and indoctrination of enlisted men. In connection with the foregoing, the need has arisen for a critical review of many fundamental questions of military theory and practice.

In the light of the foregoing, can we form a mental picture of a war between the two opposed sociopolitical systems, assuming that the imperialists manage to unleash one, and can we foresee its peculiarities from the viewpoint of methods and means of military operations? We not only can, but we must, because on this depends the strengthening of the country's defensive might by the Communist Party and the Soviet government, as well as the military leadership's practical implementation of this policy insofar as the performance of the Soviet Armed Forces is concerned.

Of course, it is difficult to foresee in every detail and with great accuracy the probable nature of a war long before it breaks out. However, the essence of a future war, the conditions under which it will occur, and the nature of military operations, may be determined using Marxist-Leninist methodology and an understanding of the trend of political events on an international scale, and especially an awareness of the depth of the contradictions between imperialism and socialism, as well as a knowledge of the trends in the development of means of armed struggle, based on general scientific-technical progress. So important is the timely disclosure and comprehension of the nature of a war which may be unleashed by world imperialism, and of the methods of waging it, that this question has acquired great theoretical and practical significance.

What is the importance of correct scientific foresight as to the **nature of a possible future world war?**

First of all, such foresight permits purposeful preparation of the country for war and makes possible correct solutions to problems of structuring of the Armed Forces, namely, their total numerical strength in peacetime and wartime, the relative strength of the Services, and the relative strength of the branches of each Service. An understanding of the nature of a possible future war also permits a correct determination to be made of the forms, content and methods of armed struggle at all levels, namely, strategic, operational and tactical, which in turn permits the determination of moral and political education requirements for the Armed Forces, the definition of appropriate psychological qualities in the troops, and, finally, the specification of the level of operational and combat training for the troops, staffs, and all links in the chain of command.

Of course, the importance of scientific foresight as to the nature of a future war is not confined to the foregoing, but enough has been said to enable one to understand how important such foresight is for strengthening the power of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces.

It is not enough, however, to visualize the general nature of a modern war. It is also necessary to answer a number of highly pertinent theoretical and practical questions, primarily questions concerning how an aggressor will unleash the war, its duration, the role and importance of the surprise factor, the first retaliatory blow by strategic nuclear forces against the most important enemy installations, possible casualties, the numerical strength of armed forces and human reserves needed to achieve victory, the behavior of the general populace in a nuclear missile war, the role of leadership in the war, etc.

No matter how complicated these questions are, they must be answered immediately. The readiness of the country, the people as a whole, and the armed forces, to repel aggression, in other words, the course and outcome of the war, will largely depend on the correctness and timeliness of the answers given.

Of course, it would hardly be possible for anyone to visualize and accurately reproduce the picture of a possible nuclear missile war. It is not difficult, however, to postulate that the belligerent parties will sustain losses without precedent in the history of warfare. The losses will not be confined to the armed forces, but will be distributed throughout the entire territory of the belligerent states. It will suffice to say that one 10-megaton nuclear blast will raze all city-type buildings within a radius of more than 20 kilometers, and that the area of radioactive contamination will cover an area exceeding 80,000 square kilometers.

Obviously, most large towns in the theaters of military operations will be destroyed. Fires will break out, and forests and crops will burn. Dam-

age will be sustained by power stations, industrial complexes, railroads, bridges, communications media, and hydraulic installations. Huge tracts of land will be contaminated by radioactive fallout.

Even this very incomplete picture of a future world war already obliges the political and military leadership to prepare the people and the armed forces of their country for unprecedented hardships and for unusually severe and destructive combat activities.

Besides, the political and military leadership cannot fail to take into account such a characteristic feature of a nuclear missile war as its spatial scope. This is due in part to the large number of states on various continents which may be drawn into the nuclear war because they belong to one of the hostile coalitions, but is due mainly to the fact that super-powerful nuclear warheads may be delivered to any distance and to any point on the earth's surface. Therefore, the war will be intercontinental and will encompass the entire terrestrial globe.

Consequently, a future world war will differ from previous ones in yet another respect. Neither in the first world war, nor in the second, were the territories of certain participants (the U.S., Canada, and a number of others) subjected to the direct impact of enemy action. Under present conditions, no one will be able to sit out a war on the far side of an ocean. The imperialists themselves are aware of this. In the hope of warding off retaliatory blows, the U.S. is establishing its military bases in many other countries, thus exposing such countries to the danger of complete annihilation. The U.S. is also planning to use the vast expanses of the oceans as well as the Arctic in waging war against the socialist states.

In a nuclear missile war, countries with extensive territory will turn out to be in the most favorable situation. They will be able to distribute their population, industry and armed forces in the proper manner, to have a deeply echeloned air defense, to disperse strategic weapons, and to maneuver reserves. Such prospects are enjoyed primarily by the Soviet Union.

With regard to the **methods of waging nuclear warfare**, it is particularly important to single out certain fundamental propositions which cannot be ignored by the political and military leadership of socialist states when preparing the people and the armed forces for a possible future war, nor by military leaders and those in command at all ranks when they are organizing the training and education of armed forces personnel.

It is obvious that in a future war, should the imperialists manage to unleash one, wide use will be made of massed nuclear strikes, which will be regarded as the principal method of attaining the goals of the

war. Apologists for the American imperialist bourgeoisie declare openly that the U.S. will use just such blows against the Soviet Union. In Bernard Brodie's well-known book *Strategy in the Missile Age*, it is stated directly that "a preventive war, a pre-emptive attack . . . [are concepts which] reflect an idea characteristic of contemporary military thinking, namely, the idea of seizing the initiative and transferring military operations to enemy territory. . . . Costly operations are justified, because a malignant enemy will be annihilated, and it will no longer be necessary to live with him on the same planet. For his annihilation it is worth paying almost any price."^{10*} Such are the misanthropic views of the more shameless representatives of imperialist reaction. For the sake of their narrow class interests and antipopular goals, they are prepared to destroy half of mankind, to undo all that has been created by peoples through the ages, and to take away all that has been won by them in the revolutionary struggle.

The possibility is not excluded that the enemy may start a new world war without the traditional period of the threat of war, by the surprise use of long-range missiles armed with powerful nuclear warheads. The danger of such an attack on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries emerges from the aggressive designs of the American imperialists. It is most important to visualize distinctly the onset of a world nuclear missile war. The correct solution to this problem is by no means of theoretical interest only: it is of immense practical importance. A surprise attack has always given certain advantages to the attacking party. There is no doubt that these advantages will be especially great when massed nuclear attacks are used.

The beginning of a future world war will be governed largely by the combined military and political situation which precedes it. Depending on this situation, war may break out with sudden, unrestricted use of strategic nuclear weapons. However, as noted by foreign military figures, it is possible that only conventional weapons will be used at the outset.

A nuclear missile war will serve as a harsh, merciless test of the economic, military, moral and political potential of the belligerent states. Moreover, it will be a test of the ability of the political and military leadership to wage a modern war, and a test of the validity of current military doctrines, military science and military art. It may be said with confidence that the course and outcome of an armed struggle will be strongly affected not only by such factors as the suddenness of the attack

* [The reader should not try to find exact counterparts of this sort of material in the original publications. It is frequently the case that the Soviets do not quote exactly, but rather paraphrase, the passages that they are citing. No attempt has been made in this book to check the language of the original. The quoted passages are simply translations of the Russian version—U.S. Ed.]

and force of the first nuclear strike, but also by the shift of the economy to a wartime footing, by the preparation of the theaters of military operations, and by the degree of readiness of the armed forces and the populace for war under the new conditions.

Present-day conditions give a special significance to V. I. Lenin's assertion that a world war "cannot but arouse the stormiest feelings in the masses, . . ." and that the main current of these feelings in an exploiter society will be horror and despair, as well as hatred toward the government, the perpetrator of hostilities. Quite otherwise will be the war-inspired "stormy feelings" in the people and the armed forces of a socialist state, protecting their revolutionary gains and fighting for a just cause. In their case, such feelings will engender steadfastness, fortitude, and fearlessness in combat.

In the struggle to avert a world nuclear missile war, Marxist-Leninists have always condemned, and will continue to condemn, each and every imperialist war. At the same time, communists have always supported, and will continue to support, wars in defense of socialist gains, just national liberation wars, and uprisings of peoples against imperialist oppression. Peoples waging a just war against internal and international reaction, or for social and national liberation, always have the support of the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, and all progressive mankind.

An example of such a war was the war of liberation waged by the Korean people against the South Korean puppets and their master, namely, American imperialism. The just struggle of the Korean People's Democratic Republic was actively supported by the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. As a result, the predatory plans of the American imperialists failed.

In recent years, the imperialists have repeatedly had recourse to such wars, called "local" in their literature. With their aid, the Western powers, primarily the U.S., have striven and are striving to suppress the movement of peoples toward national and social liberation and to acquire strategically important positions for conducting further aggression against the USSR, the other socialist states, and all peace-loving countries. This is exceptionally well illustrated by American aggression in Southeast Asia.

In recent years, much attention has been devoted by Western military theorists to the question of **local wars**. What calls such attention to local wars? The fact is that the strength of our Armed Forces, and the results achieved by the Soviet people in strengthening the defensive capability of their country, have obliged the governing circles of the imperialist states to ponder the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war. It has

become clear that should the U.S. attack the USSR, unleashing a world war, it would unavoidably suffer the full impact of nuclear missile counterattacks. This has compelled the Western powers to alter their approach to the problem of attaining their political goals by means of unleashing a world war.

Now bourgeois theorists, political and military leaders are counting on local wars, hoping that by such a means it will be possible to achieve partial political goals. At the same time, they believe that by unleashing a local war, imperialist governments can gain time, weigh all the circumstances, and select a propitious moment to start a world nuclear missile war. These Western views arise from the following: first, the notorious escalation theory devised by Herman Kahn at the bidding of American imperialist circles; and second, General Maxwell D. Taylor's doctrine of "flexible response." The imperialists are relying on these concepts to deceive other peoples, to dull their vigilance, and to paralyze their will to resist aggression.

The imperialists use the most varied methods to initiate local wars: they interfere in the domestic affairs of small states, sending troops there "to maintain order"; they render armed aid to reactionary governments which are themselves unable to deal with the indignation of the masses; and they set one nation against another.

Inasmuch as the imperialist aggressors have set their hopes on surprise attacks on the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, it follows that the peoples and armies of the socialist countries must constantly exercise the utmost vigilance with regard to the imperialists' intentions. The unity of the peoples of the socialist states must be enhanced in every possible way, as must the comradeship-in-arms and combat readiness of their armed forces. Moreover, there is a need to educate the socialist nations in the spirit of patriotism and socialist internationalism and to expand and enrich their mutual aid and support. Any weakening of the solidarity of the socialist camp, self-isolation of individual socialist countries, or lack of coordination of their efforts, will play straight into the hands of the enemies of socialism.

The peoples of all countries must be constantly on the alert as to what the aggressive states and internal reactionary forces are doing and must expose and disrupt their plans. The history of local wars of our time shows that peoples fighting courageously for national independence and social progress, having the active support of peace-loving countries, primarily socialist countries, are able to repel an aggressor decisively and to extinguish dangerous hotbeds of war.

This, in particular, is confirmed by the experience of the war in Vietnam. The heroic Vietnamese people, supported by the Soviet Union

and by the other socialist states, are confidently defending their national freedom and independence. The patriotic forces of Vietnam, skillfully combining partisan activities with those of the regular troops of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, are inflicting powerful blows on the enemy. A characteristic feature of this war of liberation is the close support given to the patriotic forces by large segments of the population.

The American imperialists are disturbed by the fact that the numerous patriotic forces, firmly holding a large territory and delivering blows to the enemy, are improving the morale of the Vietnamese people, instilling in them the assurance of ultimate victory. The U.S. has ended up in a long military and political blind alley.

4. The Army as an Instrument for Waging War

"An army," noted F. Engels, "is an organized association of armed men maintained by a state for the purpose of waging offensive or defensive warfare."¹² It is an indispensable attribute of a state and a most important component part of its apparatus.

The purpose and missions of any army are determined by the social order and state system whose instrument it is, and by the policy of the ruling classes. **In an imperialist state, the army is an instrument used to accomplish, by force, the antipopular policies of the governing exploiter class.** On the subject of imperialist armies, Lenin said, "Regular armies everywhere have become the instrument of reaction, the servant of capital in its conflict with labor, and the executioner of the freedom of the people."¹³

Today, a brigandlike, misanthropic and criminal character is what especially distinguishes the U.S. Army, an instrument for fulfilling the aggressive antipopular policies of American imperialism. A brief but expressive characterization of the U.S. Army is given by Tristram Coffin in his book *The Passion of the Hawks*. He writes, "We have taken all that we wanted by force. . . . Our soldiers fought Mexico and seized California;* engaged in a savage Civil War; fought in Cuba and the Philippines; staged our own "revolution" in Hawaii against the native queen; kept gunboats and Marines in China; and invented and used the great horror weapon, the nuclear bomb, in World War II. Through it all we have maintained a righteous air, contending that we have committed mayhem and felony with the purest motives."

The aggressive, antipopular character of the U.S. Army was seen most distinctly after World War II, when it was used to organize armed con-

*[The following phrase, which occurs here in the cited passage, has been omitted by the author of the present work: "with as little ceremony as the Russians grabbing the Baltic states."—U.S. Ed.]

flicts and provocations, and to wage war in Korea, Lebanon, Jordan, the Congo, Laos, the Dominican Republic, and in Vietnam. At the present time the U.S. maintains overseas more than a million servicemen, about forty percent of its strategic air force, more than half of its tactical air force, and more than two thirds of its navy.

The main purpose of the U.S. Army, like that of the armies of the other imperialist states, consists in the waging of aggressive, marauding wars. This purpose is defined quite clearly in the U.S. Army field service regulations. According to these regulations, the U.S. armed forces are responsible for fulfillment of the following missions: to be ready to mount a surprise nuclear attack on the enemy, thereupon using all other means; to wage local wars with limited use of nuclear weapons; to wage so-called "special wars"; to suppress the national liberation movement; and to suppress action by the general populace against reactionary forces in their own country.

The class essence, functions and purpose of the armies of imperialist states predetermine the system existing in such states for building up, training and indoctrinating the armed forces. V. I. Lenin himself noted that the governments of exploiter states, fearing a heavy influx of urban and agricultural laborers into the armed forces, had begun to use all possible means to set up "troop units especially recruited from the bourgeoisie, and specially equipped technically."¹⁴ This is distinctly manifested at the present time in the recruiting of officers, missile troops, special air force units, parachute assault troops, etc. The governments of imperialist countries pay special attention to the manning of military units and formations designated to perform punitive or other functions such as diversions, suppression of popular uprisings, rendering aid to counterrevolutionary antipopular forces in other countries, or starting local wars. Just such marauding functions are performed, for example, by the U.S. Marine Corps, which is manned by morally corrupt and even criminal elements, ready to perpetrate any atrocity. Other imperialist countries have analogous special units.

The creation of massive armies in the imperialist states has given rise to an acute contradiction between the social composition of such armies and their antipopular essence. Conscious of this, the governments and supreme commands of such states take all possible precautions to isolate the rank and file of the army from the people, from the socially conscious elements of the working class, and from the communist and workers' parties. To this end, volunteer armies and short-term enlistments have become widespread in a number of imperialist states. In England, compulsory military service was abolished completely in January 1961, and recruitment into the British armed forces is now done on a voluntary basis for a period of 3-22 years' duration. In the United States, although

universal compulsory military service still exists in principle, the majority of enlisted men, especially those serving abroad, are volunteers. Short-term enlistment for a period of 3-12 years' duration is the rule in West Germany, where 90 percent of naval personnel are serving on this basis.

In order to induce service personnel to fight for ideals which are not those of the people, intensified ideological indoctrinations of enlisted men and noncommissioned officers is being conducted in imperialist states. Use is made of all possible means for their moral corruption, namely: bribery; incitement to personal gain, violence and looting; stirring up chauvinism; exposure to anticommunist propaganda, etc. The school, church, radio, press, television, cinema and theater are all made to serve these ends.

Thus the imperialists have recourse to the most diversified means of ideological and other kinds of influence on military personnel so that the army in which they serve will be an obedient instrument for safeguarding the supremacy of the exploiters and attaining their aggressive goals.

With the victory of the socialist revolution, a new type of state arises, and together with it is born a new type of army, dedicated to defending the revolutionary gains of its people and to guarding the peace and security of the peoples of all countries. **The army of a socialist state**, differing radically in character and historical role from imperialist armies, has **potent sources of strength which no exploiter state has or could possibly have**. These sources are a socialist social order, a socialist state system, the inviolable unity of army and people, the internal solidarity of the armed forces, an awareness of the justness of wars fought in defense of a socialist homeland, and the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party.

Under the socialist system an army is no longer an instrument used to impose the will of the ruling classes on the people. On the contrary, an army emerges here as the instrument of the power of the people and as the defender of their fundamental interests.

With the liquidation of antagonistic classes and with the complete victory of socialism, the army of a socialist state concludes its internal function, namely, suppression of the residual resistance of exploiters within the country. It is retained merely as an instrument for protecting the socialist homeland from external enemies. Adherents of Marxism-Leninism have always regarded the creation and buildup of the armed forces of a socialist state as one of the most important factors contributing to the success of labor's revolutionary struggle, and as a vital necessity for protecting the achievements of socialism.

As far as internal conditions are concerned, the Soviet Union no longer needs an army. However, inasmuch as world imperialism does constitute a military threat, the CPSU and the Soviet government are doing everything they can to increase the strength of their Armed Forces so as to be ready at any moment to put to rout any enemy who tries to attack our own country or any other socialist country. The Soviet Armed Forces, like those of the other socialist states, exist in order that our nations may proceed unhindered with the building of socialism and communism. The 23rd Congress of the CPSU emphasized the importance of military collaboration between the socialist states. Such collaboration is regarded by our Party as an expression of the absolute unity of the national and international tasks of the peoples and armies of other socialist countries and as the fulfillment of an international duty. The armies of the socialist countries, protecting the socialist homelands of working people, are armies of friendship between peoples.

The international character of the defense of the socialist homelands and the requirement for joint action against the imperialist aggressors demand constant strengthening of the comradeship-in-arms of the armed forces of the socialist states, which has become one of the most important conditions for their military might.

Of considerable importance under present-day conditions are the ever-strengthening ties that join the Soviet people and their Armed Forces to the peoples and armies of young national states which still have to wage a campaign against colonialists for their freedom and independence, and for the development of their countries on the road to progress. The very existence of the powerful Soviet Armed Forces is a most important factor for the preservation of peace among peoples.

The distinguishing features of the army of a socialist country are determined on the one hand by the nature of the social order and the state system, and on the other by the army's own historical role. These features are its revolutionary character, its popular makeup, its embodiment of society's moral-political unity, its incarnation of the friendship between fraternal peoples, and its liberating mission.

Historically, it has turned out that of all the armed forces of the socialist states, those of the Soviet Union are the strongest. In recent years, the Soviet Armed Forces have undergone radical qualitative changes, which are inseparably associated with the revolution in military affairs. Now, as always, they continue unwaveringly to develop and grow strong, as is reflected in their growing combat capability, in the higher level at which they are equipped technically, and in the skill and deeper political consciousness of the personnel.

For his role in the founding and development of the Soviet army, V. I. Lenin deserves the utmost credit. V. I. Lenin himself was the first to substantiate the principles of Soviet military development, in a profoundly scientific manner. He indicated repeatedly that the army of a socialist state may be created only under the guidance of the Communist Party, which directs the entire life and activity of the armed forces on a day-to-day basis. Lenin taught that the army of a socialist state must be an army of a new type: it must not stand over the people like an alien force but must always be in close touch with its people. V. I. Lenin devoted much attention to the organizational principles of forming an army and to the arming and training of ground troops. Moreover, he constantly concerned himself with the moral-combat qualities of servicemen and with the selection, training and placing of officers.

In their daily preoccupation with increasing the Soviet Union's defensive capability and the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces, the CPSU and the Soviet government are unswervingly guided by the Leninist principles of military development. These principles encompass a complex assemblage of interrelated problems pertaining to the Armed Forces in such areas as organization, buildup to prescribed strength, technical outfitting, training, education, and increasing combat readiness, i.e., practically all problem areas in the life and activity of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In our military literature the principles of Soviet military development are usually divided into three groups: sociopolitical, organizational and training-indoctrination, corresponding to the main aspects of this complex and many-sided process. As these principles are a scientific reflection of the real and necessary processes of Soviet military development, and a reflection of real ties and relationships between the Soviet system, the Communist Party and the people, on the one hand, and the Soviet Armed Forces, on the other, they are constantly developing, improving, and becoming enriched with new content.

This is happening because the above-mentioned principles are under the direct influence of the continual process of change in the development of war materiel, and the related process of change in the nature of wars and the methods of waging them. Strict conformity of all these principles to the demands of modern warfare, and to the missions which must be fulfilled by troops engaged in such warfare, is an inherently logical condition for proper development of a new type of army.

Under contemporary conditions, a strong impact has been made on the development of the Soviet Armed Forces by the current scientific and technological revolution, which has led, in turn, to a radical change in military affairs. This has found concrete expression in the creation of

nuclear missile weapons and in the inclusion of such weapons in the armament of the forces.

In accordance with the foregoing, the very structure of the Armed Forces has changed, the Strategic Rocket Forces now constituting the chief Service. Substantial changes have taken place in the other Services and in their branches. In recent years their technical materiel, maneuverability, and mobility have improved immeasurably, and so, consequently, has their combat capability.

The Soviet Armed Forces are being developed in accordance with the principle that an absolute necessity for the defense of the socialist homeland is a regular army capable of repelling an aggressor at any time and under any conditions, without preliminary mobilization. Besides, only where there is a regular army are there enough trained specialists to master the new types of weapons, combat equipment and guidance systems which are continually being introduced into arsenals of the armed forces.

Parallel with the changes which have taken place in the structure, organization and armament of the Soviet Armed Forces, and in the means and methods of conducting combat operations, the principles of personnel training and indoctrination have also become more sophisticated. Moreover, the principle of unity of command was fully developed. Undeviating implementation of this principle ensures singleness of purpose and concerted action on the part of the military leaders, those in command at all levels, and all the troop personnel, besides ensuring efficient leadership and troop control, both in day-to-day training and in armed conflict.

The principles that should govern the development of the Soviet Armed Forces have been legally formalized in the legislation which regulates the life, customs and all activity of our Armed Forces personnel. The Universal Military Service Law, enacted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 12 October 1967 signifies an important stage in the development and strengthening of the Armed Forces of the Soviet socialist state. The provisions of this statute express the will of the Soviet people and their striving to strengthen still further the defensive capability of the USSR.

One of the principal sources of the strength and invincibility of the Soviet Armed Forces is the direction provided by the Communist Party. In the CPSU Program it says: "Soviet military development is based ultimately on the Communist Party's direction of the Armed Forces and on the intensified role and influence of party organizations in the Armed Forces."¹⁵ The principle of party direction of the Armed Forces has been applied unswervingly throughout their entire history. The life

and combat activity of our Armed Forces, their glorious record, and the growth of their strength, are inseparably associated with the direction of the Communist Party, and with the party's concern about the strength and development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Constant and unrelenting attention is devoted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government to strengthening the defensive might of our state. The Soviet Armed Forces, born of the Great October and raised by the Communist Party, may be relied upon to preserve the peace and security of our nation.

The development of the Soviet Armed Forces and strengthening of their combat might are being accomplished on a strictly scientific basis, taking into account the nature of modern warfare, all factors determining the quantitative and qualitative aspects and organizational structure of the forces, and the forms and methods of training for officers and other ranks throughout the Armed Forces. These complex and difficult tasks are being performed under the direct guidance of our Party.

While directing the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, the CPSU and the Soviet government are taking into account the fact that a modern war will require **massive armies and the training of vast human reserves** even if nuclear weapons and other new, ultra powerful war materiel are used.

Analysis of the two previous world wars shows that the total numerical strength of troops and human reserves of the belligerent states increased with the passage of time. Whereas approximately 70,000,000 men were mobilized in World War I, the corresponding figure for World War II was 110,000,000. There is no doubt that a future world war would involve an incomparably greater number of people due to its nature and peculiarities.

The fact that modern wars are waged with massive armies of many millions is one of their most important objective features. Now operations will unfold in vast theaters of military operations encompassing many lands and whole continents, and this will require a large number of formations and field forces of all Services and branches of the Services. The number of casualties will increase immeasurably in comparison with the past, and it will be necessary to replace them. Due to the greater spatial extent of a future war, more personnel will be required, not only to keep the combatant units up to strength, but also to supply and service them, to keep the lines of communication open, etc.

The course and outcome of a future war will be resolved by the use of the latest war materiel, but this does not contradict the enunciated proposition to the effect that a modern war of necessity requires massive armies. One should not overestimate the role of weapons and under-

estimate the role of personnel in warfare. At the same time, it is also inadmissible to place absolute reliance on numbers. The side which places its hopes solely on the numerical strength of its army dooms the general populace to destruction in a conflict with an enemy possessing modern means of conducting military operations.

In order to achieve their political and military goals in a nuclear war, the belligerent parties will strive to destroy the enemy's means of nuclear attack, to disorganize his rear areas, and to inflict on him as many casualties as possible. The armed forces of the belligerent parties will apply their greatest efforts to the following priorities: first, to obtain control of strategically important regions, staging areas, and bases; second, to repel invasions of their own territory, or that of member states of their coalition by enemy ground troops and enemy airborne or amphibious assault forces; and third, to safeguard their homeland against subversive enemy activities. To perform these tasks it is not enough to have strategic rocket forces: one must also have ground troops in large numbers. These troops, in coordination with the strategic forces, will conduct vigorous and decisive combat operations on extensive ground troop fronts. Such troops, with their tanks, motorized rifle and airborne assault formations, will put the enemy's armed forces to rout, will crush his resistance, and will seize and hold important positions.

To wage a modern war successfully would be unthinkable without air defense troops dedicated to the task of safeguarding their country and its armed forces from enemy air attack.

Naval and air forces each have a vital role to play in warfare as component parts of the military organism of a socialist state.

Widespread introduction of the latest war materiel based on the most recent achievements of science and technology has led to a redistribution of personnel between combat units and the units which service them and between the operational and technical components of units and formations.

The need for massive armies in the waging of modern war is further substantiated by the principle that the better the weapons used by the belligerent parties, the more casualties they will have. For example, in World War I, 20,000,000 men were killed or died of wounds, pestilence or famine, and as many were maimed, whereas in World War II, those who were killed or who died of wounds numbered 54,800,000, and 90,000,000 more were wounded or maimed.

In World War II, Germany lost 13,600,000 men, 10,000,000 of whom perished on the Soviet-German front (78% of all fatal casualties), and Japan lost about 2,000,000 men.

Great as former losses of personnel were, they are not to be compared with the casualties which will be sustained in the event of a future nuclear missile war. The number of victims among armed forces personnel and the civilian population will increase to a level that can hardly be imagined at the present time. The need to replace huge losses is a cogent reason for increasing the total numerical strength of the armed forces and for creating massive human reserves.

In order to satisfy the manpower requirements of their armies, countries at war must possess a large population with a certain level of general education, culture, and technical knowledge. Not every country is in this position. During World War II the manpower problem embarrassed even such a strong country as Germany. In order to meet the manning requirements of the Wehrmacht and to make up for heavy losses, Hitler's government was obliged to introduce the so-called total and super-total mobilizations, calling up men in the 55-60 age group, and youths only 16-17 years old. Men employed in war industries were also called up, being replaced by women and prisoners of war.

Besides, a future world war would necessitate huge numbers of people working directly on war requirements in rear areas. The need for a large work force to service the army was obvious even in World War II. In England, for example, the number of people so employed was 320% of the numerical strength of the armed forces. In Germany at the beginning of the war, 19,000,000 people were employed in the war industry. The need to replace army casualties resulted in this number being reduced considerably. The Nazi leadership compensated for the deficiency by bringing millions of workers into Germany from occupied countries.

At the present time, due to the rapid development of military equipment and the increased demand for weapons to arm the massive armies of the capitalist countries, about 100,000,000 people are employed in the sphere of defense production. Besides, several million more workers are engaged in the construction of airfields, army bases, firing ranges, barracks, missile-launching sites, etc.

The Soviet Union and other states of the socialist commonwealth have an unquestionable advantage over the coalition of imperialist states in regard to the quantity and quality of human reserves for armed forces buildup and replenishment, and for defense production purposes in the event of a large-scale war. Our principal advantage consists in the high level of social consciousness, solidarity and self-discipline of our peoples, in their devotion to their socialist Motherland and international duty, and in their readiness to surmount any difficulty whatever on the road to victory over the imperialist aggressors.

Thus, to wage a modern war successfully would be unthinkable without a massive, technically equipped and well-trained army. However,

this is still not enough to ensure victory. It is also necessary that the people themselves participate actively in the war. This is an objective principle of modern warfare. Its investigation from the standpoints of Marxism-Leninism and mastery of the mechanism of its manifestation are of great theoretical and practical importance.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, *Poln. sobr. soch.* [Complete Collected Works], XXXII, 79. [Hereafter cited as Lenin.]
2. *Leninskiy sbornik* [Lenin Collection], XII, 433.
3. Lenin, XXVI, 224.
4. *Pravda*, 27 April 1967.
5. *Pravda*, 11 April 1968.
6. *Materialy XXIII s'yezda KPSS* [Materials of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1966), p. 8.
7. Ibid.
8. *Pravda*, 23 December 1969.
9. *Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy. Dokumenty i materialy* [International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties: Documents and Materials] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1969), p. 54.
10. Bernard Brodie, *Strategiya v vek raketnogo oruzhiya* [Strategy in the Missile Age]. Translated from English (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1961), p. 289.
11. Lenin, XXVI, 290.
12. F. Engels, *Izbrannyye voyennyye proizvedeniya* [Selected Military Works] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1956), p. 135.
13. Lenin, XII, 113.
14. Lenin, XLI, 195.
15. *Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz* [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (Moscow: Izd-vo Pravda, 1961), p. 112.

Chapter 2. The General Populace: A Decisive Force in Modern Warfare

1. The General Populace's Increased Role in Solving the Problems of War and Peace

The general populace makes history. It is the principal productive force of society. By its work it creates all material values, that is, everything without which social life and the very existence of people would be unthinkable. The creativity of the masses in the most diverse aspects of social life creates the prerequisites for the development of science, technology and culture.

The general populace also plays a decisive role in the political life of society. Without its creative activity, social progress would be unthinkable. The people make history, moving it forward not in some arbitrary way, but in accordance with objective necessity. They create those real conditions under which the objective laws of social development operate.

A people is a historically changing community of the social groups of a class society at various stages of its development. The concept "people" encompasses those social classes and strata which, by virtue of their objective position, are capable of participating in the progressive development of society. During the epoch of the primitive communal system, when there were still no classes, the concepts "population" and "people" coincided. In a society with antagonistic classes, these concepts are no longer identical. Exploiting classes emerged from the masses as social strata superimposed over the general populace. However, at all stages of social development, the nucleus of a people has always been and remains the working classes.

In his day, Engels drew attention to this. "No matter what changes take place in the upper, unproductive strata of society," he wrote, "society cannot exist without a producer class. Consequently, such a class is necessary under any circumstances, although it will no longer be a class when it encompasses all of society."¹

It would be wrong, however, to identify the concept "people" completely with any of the concepts "producers of material necessities," "workers," or "exploited classes." At various stages in the development of society a nation contained diverse social strata, including the labor-exploiting strata, which had not yet exhausted their potentialities for progress in the historical process. In 1905 V. I. Lenin wrote of the Russian reality of the period, "A laborer who is at all socially conscious knows perfectly well that a people struggling against an autocracy consists of a bourgeoisie and a proletariat."²

In our own country, the concept of "people" changed after the overthrow of the autocracy in 1917, when the process of historical development triggered the socialist revolution and the proletariat came to power, while the bourgeoisie went over to the counterrevolutionary camp and had a braking effect on social progress. Hence, the concept of "people" no longer included the bourgeoisie, which had set itself in opposition to the great majority of the population, striving by any and all means to halt the development of society and to turn it back, thus impeding the solution of pressing historical problems.

In many Asian, African and Latin American countries presently struggling for freedom, independence and social progress, the concept of "people" includes various social strata with diverse and even conflicting interests, i.e., the workers, the peasantry, the petty, the middle, and, in some instances, the upper bourgeoisie, which we call national to distinguish it from the foreign bourgeoisie, that sets itself against the general populace.

In a modern capitalist society, the people consist primarily of the working class, i.e., all the laboring masses, defending their vital interests against the encroachments of the reactionary imperialist bourgeoisie, and include all other progressive social strata striving together with the laboring masses for social progress. The true revolutionary class and a perennial champion of social progress is the working class, led by the Communist Party. In an exploiter society, this class rallies around itself all progressive social strata that are fighting for freedom and democracy and striving to liquidate the omnipotence of monopolistic capital. The ability of the working class to become the real leader of all workers in their struggle for social freedom, national independence, progress, and peace on earth, has been convincingly demonstrated by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

Our epoch is characterized by the growth of the role of the general populace in the historical process. Now more than ever, the general populace emerges as a socially conscious and active creator of history. This is due to a radical change in the correlation of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism, which is having a decisive impact on the

entire course of universal social development. Now the ideas of socialism reign over the minds of hundreds of millions of people. All this imparts organization and solidarity to the general populace, which is thus inspired to combat the forces of reaction, aggression and warfare with renewed vigor.

Not only does socialism elicit and facilitate the objective process constituting the growth of the role of the general populace in historical development, but it also ensures a wide scope for the subjective factor, since the current rise in the masses' social consciousness, organization, culture, and sense of responsibility to society, is unprecedented. The people, having attained power, are becoming the sole masters of their societal life, and are vitally interested in defending their revolutionary gains and their socialist homeland.

The activity of the peoples of the socialist states is directed and inspired by the communist and workers' parties. Armed with a knowledge of the laws governing social development, these parties disclose to the general populace scientifically substantiated ways whereby society may move forward to the victory of socialism and communism, also arousing in the masses a gigantic creative energy.

Implicit in the foregoing is one of the main sources of the socialist commonwealth's military superiority over the imperialist coalition of aggressive states. The high principles, patriotism and internationalism of the masses, together with their organization and solidarity, permit the political and military leadership of a socialist state to mobilize the physical and spiritual strength of its people with the greatest effectiveness in defense of the socialist commonwealth against the aggressive intrigues of its enemies.

We must always remember that, if a world nuclear missile war is unleashed by the imperialists, hundreds of millions of people will be dragged into its orbit. Victory in such a war will be attained not only by the operations of massive armed forces, but also by the vigorous activities of the people as a whole, who, in the final analysis, have the last word in matters of war and peace. One of the most important principles of modern warfare is the growth of the role of the general populace in it.

The growth of the role of the general populace is especially evident in wars waged in defense of a socialist homeland. In such wars, the peoples of socialist countries are defending their revolutionary gains and their great future. In Lenin's words, "They are fighting for a cause which, when won, will permit them and their children to enjoy all the blessings of culture and all the creations of human labor."³ All this engenders a gigantic creativity among the masses.

A war waged in defense of a socialist homeland is a genuine people's war, inasmuch as its goals coincide completely with the interests of all classes and social groups of society, i.e., of all the people. The fact that a war waged in defense of a socialist homeland involves all the people is demonstrated by the transformation of the country into a unified armed camp, by exhibitions of mass heroism both at the fronts and in the rear, and by a unified, selfless impulse on the part of the general populace to uphold the right and to secure the enemy's utter defeat. It should also be borne in mind that wars waged in defense of a socialist homeland acquire an international character. The peoples of a socialist state receive support and aid from the working people of other countries.

During the Civil War and the years of foreign military intervention, workers in capitalist states organized strikes and demonstrations of protest and refused to load arms or munitions destined to be used against Soviet Russia. "One of the reasons for our victory," said Lenin, "was that war can be made against us only by a large force, which can be assembled only by recruiting workers and peasants. But these workers in the West don't want to fight us. That is to say, we won not because we were stronger, but because the workers of the Entente countries turned out to be closer to us than to their own governments." ⁴

A gross political and strategic error was made by Fascist Germany when its political and military leadership, preparing for the war against the USSR, counted on international isolation of our country while waging a "crusade" against Bolshevism. However, from the first days of the Great Patriotic War, the peoples of many countries rendered earnest support to the Soviet people and their army. It is common knowledge that one of the main reasons for the emergence of the anti-Fascist coalition was the pressing demand by the people of the U.S., England, and other countries, for a united front against Fascist aggression. The armed struggle of the Soviet people against Hitler's army merged with the resistance movement conducted by the peoples of Fascist-occupied countries, namely, France, Greece, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Bulgaria, and others.

Under modern conditions, the international character of a war waged in defense of a socialist homeland will take on new traits. Such a war, if the imperialists unleash it, will be waged not only by the people and army of the socialist state under attack, but by the combined efforts of the peoples and armies of the mighty socialist commonwealth, which will undoubtedly be actively supported by all of the world's progressive forces. Moreover, the possibility is not excluded that the peoples of many nonsocialist states will side with the socialist countries, because they understand that their own independent development is inseparably associated with the defeat of imperialism.

In his day, Lenin expressed the thought that "a revolutionary war waged by oppressed peoples, provided that it can really arouse the toiling and exploited millions, has such latent possibilities that the liberation of Eastern nations is now quite within the realm of practical realization, not only from the viewpoint of the prospects for an international revolution, but also from the viewpoint of relevant military experience. . . ." ⁵ Lenin's foresight has found spectacular confirmation in the national liberation wars of the past few decades.

The victorious outcome of the national liberation wars of our epoch has shown with all cogency that the general populace played a decisive role in them. Attainment of victory in wars of this type is possible only where the entire nation rises to the occasion in the wake of the country's vanguard of progressive forces. The general populace, having risen against its oppressors, may wage a liberating war even in those cases where it does not yet have statehood, nor its own national armed forces. A necessary condition for success in such a war is that the uprising have a strong control center which organizes the masses and shows them sure ways of achieving their goals. Thus, the role of the general populace and its creative activity in attaining victory is extremely great in wars of national liberation.

As regards the possibility of a decisive military clash between the two sociopolitical systems presently confronting one another in the international arena, namely, a world nuclear missile war, in our opinion the role of the general populace in such a war would be considerably greater than in past wars. In the first place, a world nuclear missile war, if unleashed, will encompass an unprecedented number of countries, and will involve the overwhelming majority of the people on our planet. However, this is not the whole story. When we speak of a nuclear missile war, we must take cognizance not only of the number of belligerent states and their populations, but also of several other substantial factors which affect the growth of the role of the general populace in the course and outcome of a war. Successful completion of the truly enormous amount of work involved in the timely preparation of a country for a nuclear missile war is possible only with the active support of the general populace. Only the efforts of the general populace in the course of a war can ensure the fullest realization of the country's economic, moral-political, and military potential.

Because the latest weapons and diversified military equipment will be used on a massive scale, these means of combat will find their way into the hands of millions of people. Armed struggle will be waged not only on the battlefield in the old sense of the word, but also over the entire territory of the belligerent states. Consequently, the whole population will be involved in armed struggle. From the moment war breaks

out until it ends, the general populace will be extensively called upon to implement the most diversified measures organized by the country's political and military leadership for the purpose of attaining victory, including such measures as are required to nullify the effects of nuclear weapons. Also, it should not be forgotten that the general populace is politically very much more active than formerly. We may therefore expect that the peoples of aggressive states, having experienced the horrors of nuclear warfare, will no longer tolerate the regime which plunged them into a devastating war. They will sweep away and bury imperialism.

The attitude of the masses toward a war is the highly important question which occupies the minds of statesmen and military figures in various countries at the present time. Nor is this a matter of chance, since it is precisely on the people's attitude and the general populace's participation that the course and outcome of a modern war depend. Under contemporary conditions, this proposition acquires the force of a law.

The general populace may support the war, actively participating in it both at the front and in the rear, striving selflessly for victory over the enemy. The general populace may adopt a passive attitude toward the war, expressing neither a open desire to participate in it, nor an explicit protest against it. Finally, the general populace may be resolutely opposed to the war and its goals, and express open dissatisfaction with it, coming out against its initiators in an organized or a spontaneous manner.

What determines the attitude of the general populace toward a war? First of all, the goals of the war and the political programs conducted by the governments or governing parties of the belligerent states on the eve of, and in the course of, the war. History teaches that a nation actively supports only a just war, and that only such a war brings out all the people's potentialities and creative energy, and their utmost efforts in the struggle for victory over the enemy. "... A revolutionary war," said Lenin, "when it really involves and interests the oppressed laboring masses, evokes the energy and ability to work wonders." ⁶

One of the major factors determining the attitude of a people toward a war is its political maturity, i.e., its ability to comprehend the nature and the goals of a war. During recent decades, the numerical strength, organization and social consciousness of the working class have increased markedly the world over, and the influence of communist ideology has become stronger. At the top of its voice, the contemporary working class has declared itself to be a decisive political force with a strong influence on the other classes of society. Led by its vanguard, the communist and workers' parties, it is at the forefront of the campaign against the imperialist policy of war and aggression. Bourgeois ideologists must now jockey for position and seek new, more subtle methods for the

deception and ideological manipulation of the working masses, so that they will be induced to wage wars which are not in the public interest. This creates serious difficulties for the political leadership of states in which antagonistic interests exist between the working and ruling classes.

The political leadership of a socialist country is in a quite different position, because in such a country moral and political unity of society exists and is continually getting stronger. The government and governing party of a socialist country have no interests other than the people's interests, which they express and defend. This circumstance promotes successful organization of the defense of a socialist homeland, and ensures socially conscious and selfless action on the part of the general populace.

Contemplating the nature of modern warfare and the possibility of weapons of mass destruction being used in it, statesmen, politicians and the peoples of the world can hardly fail to ponder the impact which such warfare would have on the further development of society. Any war has a strong effect on the most diversified aspects of social life, but the impact of past wars on the life of society is not to be compared with what may be expected to ensue from the use of nuclear weapons.

There is a quite realistic alternative, namely, to prevent the nuclear war, thereby sparing millions of lives, preserving the tangible and intangible achievements of culture, and saving civilization. If, regardless of these considerations, such a war is unleashed, then the aggressor must be defeated promptly and with the minimum of casualties. Prevention of a nuclear world war really does depend largely on the peoples of the potentially belligerent states, and in particular, on their resolution not to allow a world war to be unleashed, and on their organized and active struggle to maintain peace.

It is precisely the general populace which plays the leading role in the prevention of a world nuclear missile war. This fact underlies the strategy adopted by the forces of socialism in their campaign to preserve peace.

"Whoever wishes to spare mankind the disaster of a worldwide nuclear missile war," says L. I. Brezhnev, "must combat with doubled and tripled energy the aggressive intrigues and inroads of the imperialists. Their actions must be opposed by a solid front of anti-imperialist forces.

"Wherever the raids of the aggressors meet with firm resistance from peace-loving forces, the imperialists do not achieve their goals."

Elimination of war and its very causes, that is, attainment of universal and perpetual peace on earth is the exalted ideal of communism, and the historic mission of the communists of all countries. The teachings of

Marxism-Leninism not only substantiate scientifically the possibility and necessity of establishing a durable peace on our planet, but they also indicate specific ways and means of realizing this eternal dream of mankind.

Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the premise that in our epoch the general populace, with growing confidence and vigor, is influencing worldwide social development, including foreign policy. In the past, foreign policy was virtually inaccessible to the people at large, who influenced it only during periods of social revolution.

The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country have promoted development of the Soviet people's creative energy and its activity in all fields of social life, including foreign policy. The socialist revolution in Russia had a profound effect on working people elsewhere, whose influence on the conduct of foreign affairs by the world bourgeoisie is in the ascendancy.

The general populace of certain Western powers, namely, Britain, France and the U.S., were decisively influential in changing World War II from an imperialistic war into a just, anti-Fascist war of liberation. The anti-Hitler coalition was born not solely as a result of diplomatic agreements between the great powers concerned, but had its roots in the anti-Fascist campaign which was already being waged by the communists, working masses, progressive intelligentsia, and best sons of all nations. This campaign expanded to encompass millions more people and turned into a movement of all peoples. It became a great political force which had to be reckoned with, even by people far from sympathetic to the ideas of communism and hostile toward the Soviet Union.

The influence of working people on the foreign policy of their government increased quantitatively and changed qualitatively with the formation of the worldwide system of socialism. Under the conditions associated with the development of socialism and communism, the scope of activity of the general populace has expanded, as have the functions of its social institutions. In a socialist state, the general populace, its interests and its aspirations determine both domestic and foreign policy. Gaining great successes in all phases of the development of socialism and communism, including national defense, the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries are exerting a strong influence on the entire international situation. In the socialist states, the peoples of the world have found a firm support in the campaign for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.

The influence of the general populace on politics also finds tangible expression in the lives of the young nation-states and in the activities

of their governments, and to a great extent determines the positive role which these states are playing in the solution of pressing problems of international life. Relying on the aid and support of the socialist system, the peoples of many countries of the world liberated from colonial or semicolonial dependence have turned their states into an important factor in world politics.

Today, the influence of the general populace on foreign policy has also become stronger in developed capitalist states. Governing circles in the U.S., Britain, France, Japan, Italy, and other countries, have had to reckon with the popular will and with the people's aspirations for peace. They are obliged to camouflage carefully the true nature of their foreign policies, which are not in the people's interest. Bourgeois politicians and sociologists are increasingly coming to the conclusion that foreign policy cannot ignore the mood of the general populace.

The communist and workers' parties of capitalist countries are mobilizing the masses to solve pressing foreign policy problems, to curb aggressors, to preserve peace, and to strengthen international security. These parties' efforts are directed toward rallying the masses and toward ensuring that they are organized, socially conscious, and activated. The influence of the general populace on the foreign policy of governing circles is directly proportional to the effectiveness of its party's efforts.

The peoples of all countries are becoming more and more imbued with a sense of responsibility for the fate of the world, because they are conscious of the fact that the problem of war and peace has become a matter of life and death for hundreds of millions of people. In our epoch, events in social developments occur objectively in such a way that peoples cannot fail to assume responsibility for the fate of the world and for the future of all mankind. Peace is a vital necessity for all peoples on the terrestrial globe.

That it is possible to prevent war in our epoch is due to the potency of the socialist camp and to the persistent pacifist campaign being conducted, on the one hand, by the peoples of the young developing states, and on the other hand, by the peoples of imperialist states, who are disrupting with increasing frequency the aggressive intrigues of the governing circles. Also opposed to nuclear missile warfare is a certain segment of the capitalist bourgeoisie, which has soberly estimated the catastrophic consequences of another world war.

A formidable obstacle in the way of a future world war is the massive pacifist movement presently in progress, which now encompasses millions of people of diverse social standing, philosophic and religious conviction, and party affiliation. This movement has achieved an organized and effective character. The main force of the movement is the working class,

which throughout its history has held high the banner of the campaign against the piratic wars that have caused so much suffering.

Under contemporary conditions, when the forces of reaction are trying to aggravate the international situation and threatening mankind with an annihilating war, the working class has a special responsibility for preserving peace. Through massive lobbying, it can have a substantial influence on the governments and parliaments of capitalist countries, thus disrupting the aggressive intrigues of the imperialist bourgeoisie. Emphasizing the eminent role of the working class, of democratic and revolutionary forces, and of peoples, in the campaign against imperialism and in the struggle to avert another war, the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, held in Moscow in 1969, noted:

"In order to put an end to the felonious acts of imperialism, which may bring down on mankind still graver calamities, the working class, democratic and revolutionary forces, and peoples, must unite and advance together. To curb aggressors and to rid mankind of imperialism: such is the mission which has fallen to the lot of the working class and all anti-imperialist forces fighting for peace, democracy, national independence and socialism."

The working class and the general populace cannot postpone their campaign to preserve peace until a nuclear missile war breaks out. They must conduct this campaign daily and hourly. A considerable contribution to this common cause of all nations is made by the World Federation of Trade Unions, uniting more than 100,000,000 persons in its ranks; by the Women's International Democratic Federation, with more than 200,000,000 members; by the World Federation of Democratic Youth, representing about 10,000,000 young men and young women; and by other mass organizations. The pacifist movement includes many outstanding scientists, writers, artists and cultural workers in capitalist countries.

The most consistent fighters for peace and for disruption of the aggressive plans of the imperialist states are the communist and workers' parties. Their historic mission, as they see it, is to rid mankind of the nightmare of another world war and to eliminate warfare from the life of society. In their campaign against war, communists do not set their hopes on verbal incantations. In order to get rid of this evil, they are strengthening the forces of the socialist commonwealth and the unity of people striving for peace.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the fraternal communist and workers' parties decisively reject the profoundly mistaken views of those who affirm that the campaign for peace is interfering with the revolutionary struggle, and of those who do not believe in the ability of the peoples of the socialist countries, or of all countries in the world, for that matter, to prevent a world war.

F. Engels long ago debunked those who hold the view that war accelerates the cause of world revolution, that the world may be rebuilt only by armed force, and that war is the bridge which mankind must cross to reach a new historical epoch. He wrote that such people "would have to be out of their mind to prefer war, in which all is wagered on a playing card, to the true victory which would be theirs if peace were preserved."⁹

Now communists are even more convinced that war is unnecessary for the transition from capitalism to socialism. In our historic epoch, when the worldwide system of socialism is demonstrating in practice its superiority to the outdated capitalist system, the victory of socialism is completely assured even under conditions of peaceful coexistence and economic competition between the two diametrically opposed social systems.

V. I. Lenin admitted not only the possibility, but also the necessity, of establishing and maintaining peaceful, businesslike relations between the countries of socialism and the capitalist world as long as socialist and capitalist states continue to exist side by side. The CPSU and the Soviet government, together with the communist and workers' parties of the fraternal socialist states, unswervingly abide by Lenin's recommendation.

While admitting the objective necessity of peaceful coexistence, Marxist-Leninists resolutely reject the fiction of "left" revisionists that peaceful coexistence implies renouncement of the revolutionary campaign to overthrow capitalism. This is a downright misrepresentation of the real views of genuine Leninist revolutionaries. The 23rd Congress of the CPSU again emphasized that there can be no question of peaceful coexistence where the internal processes of class strife and national liberation in capitalist countries and their colonies are concerned. The principle of peaceful coexistence does not apply between oppressors and oppressed, nor between colonialists and the victims of the colonialist yoke.

The campaign for peace between states does not imply denial of support to the national liberation movement of oppressed peoples, nor refusal to help them in their struggle for independence. On the contrary, communists consider one of the most important conditions for normalizing the international situation, strengthening peace, and improving relations between peoples, to be final liquidation of the colonialist yoke with all its effects, and active support of the national liberation movement.

The people are conscious of their responsibility for preserving peace. They are convinced that to avert a world war in our epoch is a quite realistic, accomplishable task. On the people themselves, on their resolution and action, depends whether there will be peace on earth or whether mankind will be plunged into the catastrophe of another world war. The communist and workers' parties are leading the masses in their campaign to avert a nuclear world war.

However, while imperialism exists, the danger of another world war remains. Great vigilance is needed, and there is a requirement not only to reinforce the solidarity of all those fighting for peace, but also to augment the military strength of the socialist commonwealth, the main bulwark of peace on earth.

2. The People: Creators of the Economic Might of a State at War

One of the most important principles of modern warfare is that victory goes to the state (or coalition of states) with the better developed economy. In other words, the national economy underlies a state's military strength, influencing the course and outcome of a war in a decisive manner. Lenin said, "In order to wage a war *as it should be waged*, a strong, organized rear is necessary. The finest army or the most dedicated revolutionaries will be promptly overpowered by the enemy in the absence of adequate armament, provisions and training."¹⁰

Meeting the army's requirements for materiel is one of the most important prerequisites for victory in a modern war. However, the heavy demands of the front can be satisfied only by a state or coalition of states having a strong, stable rear and a highly developed economy. It was not by chance that M. V. Frunze said that under contemporary conditions the center of gravity of warfare is shifting toward the rear.

Modern warfare subordinates to itself all the physical and spiritual strength of the people and the entire life and activity of the rear. From the outset, a modern war may encompass all the territory of the belligerent states. Large industrial and administrative centers, as well as strategic concentrations of troops, will be subject to enemy attack. Nuclear missile warfare will constitute an unprecedented test of the rear and of what the people are capable.

Of course, not every country, even if it has an extremely well-developed economy, may count on having a strong rear, because the reliability and stability of the rear are primarily affected by such factors as the social order and the state system. The strength of the rear, as well as the country's economic potential and its practical realization, largely depend on the attitude of the general populace toward the war. The political and military leadership of a country at war may count on successful implementation of its plans only if the people actively support the war and *conscientiously endure* its difficulties and sacrifices. This finds vivid confirmation in the experience of the recent war.

Fascist Germany, although it had attained a high level of economic development and had enslaved many European countries with considerable material and human resources, nonetheless failed to build up a strong rear. The general populace of the occupied countries was hostile to Hit-

ler's regime, and sabotaged his economic, political and military measures in every way possible. Hundreds of thousands of people, forcibly expatriated and driven into Germany, organized sabotage, diversions, and spoilage of war materiel in production.

As events unfolded on the Soviet-German front, the political situation in the German-occupied countries of Europe took shape to the detriment of Fascism. Under the influence of the Soviet Army's victories over Hitler's Wehrmacht, a popular resistance movement, directed toward liquidating the hateful "New Order," came into being. As a result of this movement, the effectiveness of the Fascist army's rear was seriously impaired. We now give two examples of this.

In March 1942 the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and other organizations participating in the resistance movement prepared and distributed among the populace a "Czechoslovakian People's Oath." It contained an appeal to disorganize the enemy's rear and to undermine his economy. The response to this appeal included strikes, sabotage in industry and on the railroads, spoilage of goods produced, and a drop in the productivity of labor, especially in Bohemia and Moravia, which constituted a large arsenal for Hitler's army, and an important transit region. As a result, Czechoslovakia's munitions output dropped forty percent as early as 1942.

Convincing testimony to the weakness of Hitler's European rear and to the precariousness of the political regimes established by him in occupied countries was provided by the situation in France, which saw the successful operation of a resistance front uniting workers, peasants, intelligentsia, women, and young people, namely, all those to whom the independence of their motherland was dear. The hard core of the resistance movement consisted of communists. The peasants refused the invaders grain, while the workers performed acts of sabotage in industrial enterprises and resisted expatriation to Germany. In 1943, Hitler demanded a million blue-collar workers and several tens of thousands of white-collar workers from the French puppet government. The Petain government passed a law mobilizing men between the ages of 16 and 60, and women between the ages of 18 and 45, with a view to sending them to Germany. However, this venture of Hitler's administration and its French underlings met with a resolute repulse from the masses. The working people formed a special committee of protest, headed by the communist Yves Farge. The invaders did not succeed in doing what they had set out to do.

Nor did the rear of Germany itself withstand the severe trials of war. In spite of the brutal Fascist dictatorship, the socially conscious element of the German people, headed by communists, valiantly resisted Hitler-

ism. This resistance grew with the defeats sustained by Hitler's troops on the Eastern Front. At first, it found expression as a passive attitude toward economic measures prescribed by Hitler's government, then it took the form of an active campaign on the part of the masses to disorganize the national economy.

During the period when mortal danger hovered over our Motherland, the Soviet people performed miracles of unprecedented fortitude and heroism. The Hitlerites were counting on the emergence of acute antagonisms between the Soviet people and their government, discord between the nationalities of the USSR, and strife between the industrial workers and the peasantry. However, these calculations proved to be completely mistaken. During the hard years of the Great Patriotic War, our people rallied still closer around the Communist Party and the Soviet government. The consensus of Soviet society in moral values and political convictions, the friendship between the nationalities of the USSR, and the union of working class and peasantry, all became stronger. Under enemy attack, the Soviet rear became even more monolithic. The country turned into a united armed camp. Toward a single goal, namely, utter defeat of a hateful enemy, the Party directed all the efforts of the Soviet people, both at the front and in the rear.

By their selfless toil, the Soviet people indeed raised their country's economic potential, thus increasing its might. In the process, benefits accrued from the decisive advantages of the socialist economic system, which permit all material resources of society to be utilized in the most rational manner. "Front and rear were clenched into one mighty fist. The country became a unified armed camp. It was hard for everyone. People got neither enough sleep nor enough to eat. Wives replaced their husbands in the workshops, and sons operated the lathes left by their fathers. However, the industrial heart of our Motherland did not stop beating for an instant. Our factories gave the Soviet Army the weapons it used to crush Hitler's Fascist war machine, which was supported by the industrial potential of almost all Europe. . . . This was a feat of the people as citizens and patriots. This was a feat of individuals who saw the meaning of their life in work done in the name of victory. And they did all they could to make their Motherland victorious."¹¹

The Soviet people's manifold creative activity in strengthening the economy was directed and inspired by the Communist Party. During the war, the Party prepared a scientifically sound plan for the reorganization and development of the national economy and succeeded in putting it into practice.

An advanced organization of society, a high level of industrial development and a large material output make successful waging of a war possi-

ble. However, this possibility does not become a reality by itself, but only through the practical activity of the general populace. Comprehending the goals of the war and being conscious of their righteousness, the general populace concentrates its efforts on fulfilling the requirements of the front and on creating the material conditions requisite for victory.

It should be borne in mind that the economic potential of a state is not equivalent to the numerical value of its industrial output at the outbreak of war. History knows many instances where a state was superior to its adversary in material resources at the outset, but lost this supremacy in the course of the war and was eventually defeated. A decisive role in the outcome of a war is played by the sociopolitical system of the given state, and also by the attitude of the general populace toward the war.

During the past war, the indisputable superiority of an economy of the socialist type was vividly illustrated. The socialist economic system permits the enthusiasm and will of the masses, and their labor creativity, to be made to serve the cause of victory in the best possible manner. This advantage is a telling one, not only in the course of a war, but also during the postwar economic restoration period.

The danger of a world nuclear missile war obliges us to take a new look at the importance of economic potential. Its role is increasing immensely. During the first and second world wars, the question was to what extent could the economy of a given country satisfy the needs of its front during hostilities. Mobilization reserves did not then play a very great role. However, where nuclear missile warfare is concerned, one must clearly understand that the national economy will determine the course and outcome of a war primarily by what it has already given to the country and its armed forces in prewar peacetime.

Allowance must be made for the fact that the buildup of war production in wartime will be attended by incredible difficulties. This also applies, in some degree, to restoration of industrial enterprises incapacitated by nuclear strikes. Victory in such a war will go to the side which has already created the necessary material conditions prior to its outbreak. Of course, in the event of a world war being prolonged, then the capability of a country to build up its war production during hostilities will become a relevant factor.

Between states of the two diametrically opposed sociopolitical systems, namely, socialism and capitalism, there is intense competition in the sphere of military-economic potential. Because the creator of such potential is the general populace, the principal productive force of society, special importance now accrues to the political consciousness of the masses, and to their attitude toward the goals of the war. Also important, and for the same reason, are the numerical strength and cultural level of

the populace (of the state or the coalition of states), and the number of scientifically and technologically trained industrial workers, their good organization and their productivity.

Relying on the preeminence of our social order and state system, and inspired by the great ideals of communism, the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, are ever enhancing the Soviet Union's economic stature and creating the necessary conditions for timely preparation of the national economy for war. By their productive activity under peacetime conditions, they are promoting the country's economic potential. This reinforces the role of the general populace and its influence on the course and outcome of a nuclear missile war.

The need for achieving military superiority over enemies, and for victory in the event of a nuclear missile war, imparts special importance to the economic flexibility of any given state (or coalition of states), which must be able to effect a rapid transition of the entire economy to a war-time footing at the onset of the critical prewar period, introducing mass production of the latest means of armed struggle at the outbreak of hostilities, and maintaining the ability to fulfill the economic needs of army and people during the war itself. Understandably, all this is highly dependent on the productivity of the general populace. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that such productivity depends, in the final analysis, on the sociopolitical structure in effect in the given country, on the popular attitude toward government policy, and on the morale of the masses.

A war will evidently involve some degree of restoration of important industrial complexes. Large segments of the populace will be required to nullify the effects of the nuclear weapons and to continue working in intact enterprises in order to support their country's economic strength, thus influencing the correlation of economic indices of the belligerent states in a favorable manner.

Thus, the material needs of a modern war will be fulfilled by the labor of the general populace in advance, i.e., prior to the war, but to a certain extent, during the war also. The degree of participation by the general populace in this process, i.e., the extent to which it is active or passive, will depend on its attitude toward the government and toward the goals of the war and on its moral-political state.

3. The Dependence of the Moral-Political Potential of a State at War on the People's Attitude Toward the War

The economic strength of a country is extremely important, but it is not the only condition necessary to ensure victory in a modern war. Marxist-Leninists believe that the course and outcome of a contemporary war depend not only on the technological and economic potential of the

belligerent states (or coalitions of states), but also on the moral-political factor.

The material conditions necessary for victory do not manifest themselves apart from the activity of people. Engels wrote that "the history of society is enacted by people endowed with consciousness, who proceed with due deliberation, or, who, driven by fervor, aspire to definite goals. Here nothing is done without conscious intent or without a desired objective."¹² So it is in war. Economic potential is realized, as was elucidated in the preceding section, through the activity of the general populace. This is one of the manifestations of the subjective factor in warfare. Consequently, **the morale of the people and the troops is one of the most important factors determining the course and outcome of a war.**

The role of the morale of the people and the army in modern warfare was worked out profoundly and comprehensively by Lenin. Having studied the wars of the new historical epoch and having generalized the Soviet people's experience of armed conflict with foreign interventionists and internal counterrevolutionaries, Lenin drew the following conclusion, which is most important from the standpoint of military theory: "In any war whatever, victory depends, in the final analysis, on the morale of the masses who are shedding their blood on the battlefield."¹³ The dependence of the course and outcome of a war on the morale of the people of the belligerent states, and on the morale of their armies, is one of the objective principles of warfare. Lenin emphasized, "He wins in war who has greater reserves, greater sources of strength, and greater self-discipline in the people as a whole."¹⁴

V. I. Lenin taught that the only states to endure the hardships of war and to attain victory are those which surpass their adversary in strength of the rear, skill, fighting spirit, endurance, and unity of army and people. The morale of the troops must not be considered apart from the morale, heroism and courage of the general populace, which also bears the burdens of war and, by its work, ensures victory. Lenin said, in particular, that the main reasons for the victory of the Soviet people during the years of Civil War and foreign intervention were "the heroism, self-sacrifice, unprecedented tenacity in combat exhibited by the Red Army men who died at the front and by the workers and peasants. . . ." ¹⁵

What contributes to the morale of the people and troops? What factors bring about a change in the moral-political potential of a belligerent state?

The moral-political potential of a state, the morale of the people and troops are determined by the social order and state system, by the mutual relationship between classes and nationalities within the state, by the policies of the ruling classes and governments, by the dominant

ideology of society, and by the military goals in whose name the people and armies go into combat.

The strongest and most direct influence on the morale of the people and army and on a state's moral potential, is exerted by the goals of the war. Centuries of military history show that the closer these goals correspond to the interests of the general populace, the more actively the masses will support the armed conflict and the greater will be the moral potential possessed by the country in question.

V. I. Lenin noted, "One cannot lead the masses into a plundering war . . . and hope for their enthusiasm."¹⁶ The governing circles of imperialist states are obliged to take this circumstance into account. It is no accident that they always try to conceal the true goals of a war from the people, and engage in intense ideological indoctrination of the masses so that they will support an unjust, predatory war.

Unleashing World War II, Hitler and his minions gave the German people to understand that its goals were to liquidate the Treaty of Versailles and to acquire needed living space by conquest. The Hitlerites promised the people that they would not suffer, because a quick and easy victory would ensue. Besides, they did all they could to kindle chauvinistic sentiments and did their best to arouse the baser instincts of officers and enlisted men of the Wehrmacht, trying to make them feel that they stood to gain personally from the war. By deception, demagogic promises and plays on base nationalistic feelings, the Hitlerites managed to pervert a considerable proportion of the populace, winning it over to their side and maintaining in it a fighting spirit.

However, the morale of the German nation and of Hitler's army remained high only as long as that army was victorious. When the Fascists sustained one defeat after another on the Eastern Front, the morale of their army deteriorated markedly. This adversely affected the German army's rear and its combat capability. Evaluating the condition of his troops during the bitter battles for Stalingrad, Field Marshal von Paulus remarked that their morale had dropped noticeably under the impact of the Soviet blows. The morale of many German officers and enlisted men who had experienced the Red Army's attacks became so low that apathy and gradual demoralization ensued.

The situation in our own country has been quite different. During the Great Patriotic War between the Soviet Union and the German Fascist usurpers, our people, rallying closely around the Communist Party and the Soviet government, unswervingly rose *en masse* to perform prodigious feats in the name of victory. The high morale of the Soviet people was manifested primarily in the successful resolution of the most difficult economic problems with which our country was faced as a result

of the German attack. Inspired by the just goals of the war, the Soviet people made a heroic work effort unparalleled in history. The Party slogan "All for the front, all for victory!" became the law of life for each Soviet person. Under the most difficult wartime conditions, the working people of the USSR, having created a well-organized war economy, provided the front with all it required. The Soviet people not only supplied the army with the material it needed for victory, but also gave it constant moral support.

The high morale of the Soviet people found expression in their unwavering certainty of victory and their boundless confidence in the Soviet government and the Communist Party. Even during the most difficult time of the war, i.e., during the period of serious failures and defeats, our people did not lose faith in ultimate victory and exhibited legendary fortitude and endurance.

An example of the valiant conduct of the Soviet people is the feat of the defenders of Leningrad, who covered themselves with immortal glory. The enemy beset Leningrad with an army 600,000 strong, armed with a thousand tanks, six thousand guns and a thousand aircraft.

For nine hundred days and nights the defenders of the besieged city stood firm, and each day was filled with their great valor, fortitude and mass heroism. The Hitlerites fired about 150,000 shells at the city and bombarded it with more than 100,000 incendiary and high explosive bombs. However, the soldiers of the Leningrad front and the inhabitants of the city held out unwaveringly, repulsing the enemy's onslaught. Nothing, neither bombing nor barrage, neither cold nor hunger, could break the will or the resolution of the hero-city's population. The defenders of Leningrad, supported by the entire country, held out and were victorious, showing time and again what a people will do in defense of its socialist Homeland. All were heroes in the epic of Leningrad's defense: officers, enlisted men, workers and members of the intelligentsia, old people, women and children. The salutation promulgated jointly by the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of the city on the Neva River, included the following passage: "The 900-day defense of the besieged city is a legendary tale of valor and heroism which evoked the wonder and admiration of contemporaries and will always remain in the memory of generations to come."¹⁷

The high morale of the Soviet Armed Forces and their moral superiority over the enemy have constantly been taken into account by the Soviet military leadership when planning and implementing strategic operations. This was vividly illustrated by the battle for Stalingrad, by

the crossing of the Dnepr, by the Jassy-Kishinev operation, and by many other events of the Great Patriotic War.

All mankind admired the superb feats of the Soviet people and its army, which played a decisive role in the victorious conclusion of World War II. This was also recognized by leaders of capitalist countries. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared, "The Red Army and the Russian people surely hastened Hitler's armed forces along the road to final defeat."¹⁸ In a letter to Stalin at the end of the war, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill, wrote, "The Red Army celebrates its twenty-seventh anniversary with a triumph which has evoked the boundless admiration of its allies, and which has sealed the fate of German militarism. Future generations will acknowledge their debt to the Red Army just as unreservedly as we who have survived to witness these splendid victories."¹⁹

We have established that the correlation of moral potential of the belligerent states is affected by such factors as the social order of the given state, the nature of the war which it is waging, and the attitude of the general populace and armed forces toward the political goals of the war. This is conclusively proven by the experience of past wars.

Moral-political superiority over the enemy will be of still greater importance in a world nuclear missile war. This is due to a number of circumstances.

Inasmuch as a nuclear missile war will be worldwide, involving the people of most countries of the world and thus acquiring a clearly manifested massive character, it naturally follows that the outcome of such a war will depend, as never before, on the morale of the participating masses, and on their attitude toward the war and its goals. Other things being equal, only the state capable of securing conscientious nationwide support of its military efforts may count on victory.

Moreover, a world nuclear missile war will be waged by armies many millions strong, and victory will depend, to a considerable degree, on troop morale. Only those whose morale is high will be able to endure all the trials and tribulations of modern combat with its use of the latest war materiel. Victory will go to the army whose officers and enlisted men, in their great numbers, believe strongly in their principles and in the righteousness of their cause, displaying valor, fortitude and the will to win.

Inasmuch as a world war will be a coalition war, mutual trust between the peoples and armed forces of the allied countries will be of great importance. The shared ideology and sociopolitical structure which unite the socialist states, as well as socialist internationalism, underlie the

socialist commonwealth's moral-political superiority over the coalition of imperialist states. Essential contradictions within the imperialist coalition, the domination-subordination relationship which characterizes its large and small member states, the chauvinistic and nationalistic indoctrination given to armies of bourgeois states: all these collectively constitute a poor basis for unity of civilian populations and combat cooperation of armed forces in a war whose goals cannot inspire the masses.

The history of wars and of military art show that new, more sophisticated weapons require top-quality human material. This principle was expressed very precisely by Engels, who emphasized that achievements in the field of science and technology, bringing into being new means of armed conflict, inevitably render more sophisticated personnel training mandatory. "When the waves of the technological revolution are surging all around," wrote Engels, "fresher and braver heads are needed. . . ." ²⁰

There is no need to prove that massive and effective use of missile mounted nuclear weapons is possible only where the troops are ready for it, not merely technically, but morally and psychologically. Cognizance must be taken of the fact that the use of novel means of armed conflict will considerably increase the stress on the morale, mind, consciousness and will of officers and men. An especially important role will be assumed by such qualities as self-possession and the ability to suppress the feeling of fear, to display endurance and composure, and to control one's actions and behavior.

However complicated and destructive the latest means of armed struggle may be, they cannot, of their own accord, win victory over the enemy without man's knowledge and discretion. No machine, however complex, nor any cybernetic device, possesses the qualities and motives peculiar to man, such as comprehension and summation of various stimuli, adaptation to the combat situation, and a proper sense of military duty. Man possesses a will and a sense of patriotism, collectivism, and hatred for the enemy. He also possesses imagination, scientific fantasy, and foresight.

The revolution in military affairs has markedly increased the role and responsibility of the individuals who handle weapons of mass destruction, complex control devices, and the latest combat equipment. Senior non-commissioned officers or privates who skillfully and punctually launch operational or strategic missiles become to some degree directly involved in the fulfillment of the operational and strategic missions in question. Never have the actions of individual officers, enlisted men, or small teams had such important results, nor such colossal effects, as may be the case in nuclear missile warfare.

The increased role of the moral-political factor in modern warfare is also due to the new methods of conducting combat operations. Future operations will be characterized by a clearly manifested offensive nature, with the use of huge quantities of all kinds of war materiel. Military operations will become not only very intense, but also very mobile, with rapid troop movement. Military operations may also be of short duration. The most frequent form of ground-troop combat activity may be the meeting encounter. All this puts high demands on moral-political training and psychological preparation of troops. Officers and enlisted men must display the ability to endure fierce battles and encounters, carrying out precisely and punctually the combat orders and instructions, and displaying a high standard of discipline, organization, mutual aid and mutual rescue in combat.

Massive employment of missile-mounted nuclear weapons, together with wide use of modern aircraft, tanks, rocket artillery, conventional artillery, and airborne assault forces, will demand of Soviet officers and enlisted men a high level of technical knowledge, military skill, combat seasoning, and initiative in battles and encounters. Besides, officers and men alike must be highly conscientious, must have a deep understanding of the justness of the war's goals, and must be ready to make any sacrifice for the sake of victory. "The masses," said Lenin, "must know that they are going into an armed, bloody, desperate conflict. Contempt for death must spread among the masses, thus ensuring victory."²¹ Today, the moral-political factor is inseparably associated with the moral-psychological preparation of army personnel.

Lenin emphasized that "the element of warfare is danger. In war, there is not a minute when you are not surrounded by dangers."²² The use of weapons of mass destruction increases this danger many fold. However, the presence of mortal danger activates the instinct of self-preservation, one of whose outward manifestations is a feeling of fear. A feeling of fear may be experienced in dangerous situations even by brave, resolute individuals. ". . . There are no *calm* people," wrote D. A. Furmanov. "It is mere chivalrous chatter to say that there are *completely calm people in battle, under fire*, because there are no such blockheads in the human race. One may become accustomed to *appear calm*, one may behave with dignity, and one may *hold oneself in check*, *not giving way* quickly to the impact of external circumstances, but this is another matter. However, *no one is calm in combat* or in the moments immediately prior to battle, nor could there be such people."²³

A study of human conduct in mortally dangerous situations of past wars, and also during periods of catastrophic natural calamities such as earthquakes, hurricanes and volcanic eruptions, convinces one that resolute, disciplined individuals conscientiously fulfilling their civil or

military duty are quite capable of acting rationally, and of comprehending and knowledgeably implementing the orders of superiors.

An especially pernicious effect on personnel is produced by panic. Underlying it are sudden and acute emotional experiences caused by fear for one's life. Defining the essence of this adverse phenomenon, Academician V. M. Bekhterev wrote that panic "is an overwhelming effect which is initiated by any sudden impression of a threatening nature, and with unusual rapidity spreads by psychological influence to a great number of people. It is something which, like an acute infection, almost instantly gives a whole mass of people a feeling of unavoidable danger."²⁴

Such a factor as the use of a new, previously unknown, weapon may often become a cause of panic. For example, the unexpected use of rocket-launching artillery ("Katyushas") by the Soviet command during the Great Patriotic War had a strong psychological effect on the morale of Hitler's officers and other ranks. Marshal of the Soviet Union A. I. Yeremenko recalls this:

On 15 July 1941 during the second half of the day, the unusual roar of rocket mortar shells rent the air. Like red-tailed comets, the mortar shells sped upward. The frequent and powerful bursts struck the hearing and vision with a loud roar and a blinding flash.

The effect of 320 mortar shells bursting in 26 seconds exceeded all expectations. In panic, the enemy soldiers fled to the rear. Our own soldiers who were on the forward edge near the bursts also moved backward (for security reasons, no one had been warned about the tests).²⁵

In a future war, the enemy may not use nuclear missile weapons alone, but may also use other powerful means of combat. Panic, and the catastrophic consequences associated with it, can be avoided only by ideologically and psychologically seasoned courageous soldiers led by steadfast, resolute officers.

Thus, the importance of morale and other psychological factors in nuclear missile warfare is exceptionally great. The only states or coalitions which will be able to endure the severe trials of war are those having the objective and subjective conditions for the buildup of moral potential in both peacetime and wartime. In the socialist states, these conditions are fulfilled.

With regard to the coalition of imperialist powers, there are organic defects in its moral and political potential. The reasons for this are inherent in the very social order of the states constituting the coalition, and in the antipolar goals of the wars which it wages. Whereas the peoples and armies of the socialist countries have inspiring ideals which underlie their high morale and mobilize them for fighting the enemy, the statesmen and military figures of the Western countries have no such ideals with which to motivate their civilians and servicemen.

Ideologists and politicians of the imperialist countries know that the morale of civilians and servicemen largely determines their attitude toward the war, and that the countries of socialism have an indisputable superiority where moral values, political convictions and ideology are concerned. This is precisely why the imperialists are using all possible means to raise the morale of their own peoples and armies. A powerful ideological machine is making a continuous impression on the public consciousness in imperialist countries. At the same time, the Western powers are stretching their tentacles into the socialist countries in order to influence our people in a spirit calculated to further their own interests.

Statesmen and military figures of the imperialist coalition are not confining themselves to attempts to subvert the morale of peoples of the socialist states; they are also trying to win over the governments and peoples of neutral countries to their side. With this objective in view, the ideologists of imperialism have intensified their campaign "for the souls and hearts of people." They are using anticommunism as their principal ideological weapon. Contemporary anticommunism has been elevated to the level of government policy in imperialist countries. A campaign against socialist ideology and against socialist commonwealth politics is being conducted by war ministries, professional intelligence agencies, bourgeois ideologists, and by statesmen and military figures of imperialist countries. Anticommunism, which approximates to Fascism, is closely linked with the CIA and the U.S. State Department.

One of the characteristic traits of contemporary anticommunism is antisovietism, i.e., a campaign against the Soviet regime, against the politics of the CPSU and the Soviet government, and against our ideology and morality. The enemies of the USSR are doing their utmost to give a distorted impression of the situation in our country, to conceal from their people our successes in the building of communism, and to belittle the authority and growing influence of the USSR in the international arena, and its perennial campaign for the peace and security of nations.

Under the flag of anticommunism the imperialist bourgeoisie has instituted ideological indoctrination of its own people and armed forces personnel. Enemies of the Soviet Union portray our country as a source of aggression, as an exporter of revolution, and as a suppressor of democracy. Such assertions were ridiculed by Lenin in his day. He said, "There are stupid people who rant about Red militarism. They are nothing but political tricksters who pretend to believe this stupidity, and who cast aspersions right and left, using their forensic ability to invent false arguments, thus slinging sand into the eyes of the masses." ²⁶

In its ideological and political diversions, the imperialist bourgeoisie is acting in diverse directions. First, the enemies of communism are

doing their utmost to rupture the unity of the socialist states and of all progressive forces which advocate pacifism. Second, propaganda in favor of nationalism is being intensified with a view to undermining trust between peoples. Third, more malicious attacks are being made on the leadership role of the communist parties in order to weaken their prestige among their electorates. Fourth, the imperialist bourgeoisie is trying its best to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist countries in order to discredit socialism. The imperialists are doing their utmost, with all means at their disposal, to influence the Soviet public and the armed forces personnel of the USSR and other socialist states. All this is being done to undermine the moral-political potential of the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

The peoples of socialist states have countered the imperialists' ideological onslaught with their own moral-political steadfastness, with the courage of their convictions, with their unwavering faith in the ideals of socialism and of proletarian internationalism, and with their determination to defend their socialist homeland. The foregoing underlies the strong morale manifested by the peoples and armed forces of the socialist countries, and constitutes an inexhaustible source of moral-political potential for the socialist coalition.

We must always remember that imperialism is our class enemy. Our struggle against the ideology of the imperialist bourgeoisie must be uncompromising, because it is a class struggle, a struggle for humanity, and a struggle to strengthen the position of socialism.

Further growth of the moral strength and potential of socialist states must await exposure of "left" and right revisionaries. The CPSU and the communist and workers' parties of the other fraternal socialist countries are resolutely against any attempt to erode the foundations of the new order, and are firmly opposed to an opportunistic approach to problems associated with the building of socialism or its armed defense.

4. The Influence of the General Populace on Army Combat Effectiveness and on Changes in Methods and Forms of Military Operations

The only state or coalition which may count on success in modern warfare is one which possesses, besides morale and materiel, the required military potential. The military potential of one or another state is determined not merely by the condition of its armed forces at a given moment, but also by its ability to maintain and augment their strength throughout the course of the war. Such an ability, however, depends on a number of factors, not the least among which is the attitude of the people, and hence of the army's rank and file, toward the war.

The country with a stronger national economy and a preponderance of forces and resources may, on the eve of war, have certain advantages over its probable enemy. However, this does not in the least mean that it will keep its advantages for the duration of hostilities, especially if the war turns out to be a long one.

This may be illustrated by an example from the last war. The superiority in forces and resources which the political and military leadership of Fascist Germany managed to mobilize at the moment of its attack on the USSR, as well as the major setbacks and heavy losses which we sustained during the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, strengthened the Hitlerites' expectation of a rapid victory on the Eastern Front. Many leaders of Western powers then shared this expectation. Alexander Werth, the historian, writes, "The British military were almost unanimous in believing that Russia would be defeated in a very short time. Even at press conferences given during the first days of the war at the Ministry of Information in London, War Office spokesmen made no secret of it."²⁷

However, this did not and could not happen. The Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, manifested magnificent creative vigor, performed a prodigious feat of labor and expertise, and managed, during the course of the war, to change the correlation of military strength and potential in our favor.

It is generally recognized that the strength of armed forces depends primarily on how well equipped they are technically, that is, on their having a sufficiency of the latest weapons and combat equipment. But weapons and combat equipment are, of course, produced by the work of people. Consequently, it follows that the standard to which an army is equipped technically bears a direct relationship to the productivity of the working masses, and depends on it.

By its work in producing weapons, combat equipment, and all else that is needed by the armed forces, the general populace exerts, in the final analysis, an influence on troop organization and on ways and methods of troop employment in combat, as well as on the methods of conducting armed struggle generally. The greater the people's vested interest in the attainment of the war's political goals, and the better the general populace supports the army in its contest with the enemy, the more perceptibly will the results of the above-mentioned influence of the populace be manifested.

The huge quantity of first-class weapons and combat equipment produced by the selfless toil of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War markedly improved the combat capability of our Armed Forces, and led to changes in their structure and organization. This war saw the

advent of large formations of tanks, mechanized troops and artillery, including "guards mortar" units, and creation of the Supreme High Command's second line reserve corps. Due to the efforts of workers in the rear, it was possible to form several tank armies, a considerable number of mechanized corps and artillery divisions, and air armies on all fronts.

This led to a marked improvement in the Soviet Armed Forces' strike capability and firepower, which in turn led to improvements in methods and forms of troop combat operations, permitting our military command to plan and achieve high concentrations of firepower. For example, at certain stages in the Battle of Stalingrad, our artillery numbered 26,000 guns and mortars. In the defensive encounter at Kursk, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts had 20,000 guns and 920 rocket-artillery mounts and frames. The Soviet troops had even more firepower during the offensive operations of 1943-45, when the artillery density reached 200-260 guns and mortars per kilometer of front.

The creation of powerful formations and field forces of tanks, mechanized troops, and air forces, together with concentration of large masses of artillery in the main sectors, has led to changes in the nature of the offensive operations conducted by the Soviet Armed Forces. Such operations are now characterized by vast scope and by unprecedented rates of advance. Whereas in the 1941-42 winter campaign Soviet troops advanced on a 750-km front to a depth of 400 kilometers, during the winter and summer-autumn campaigns of the second period of the Great Patriotic War their advance spanned a 2000-km front and penetrated 600-700 kilometers in depth. In 1944-45, the Soviet Armed Forces' basic method of combat operations was to sever the enemy's front into separate sections, and to surround his main groupings.

Thanks to the prodigious productive activity of our people, the Soviet Union was able to render substantial aid in weapons and combat equipment to other nations fighting a common enemy. The Soviet Union made arms available to Polish, Czechoslovakian and French units created on Soviet soil. For example, 700,000 rifles, 1000 tanks, 1200 aircraft and 18,000 motor vehicles were placed at the disposal of Polish troops during the war, as well as large quantities of ammunition, fuels and equipment. During the year 1944 and 5 months of 1945 only, the Soviet government supplied the national liberation army of Yugoslavia with 96,515 rifles and carbines, 68,423 light and heavy machine guns and pistols, 3364 trench mortars, 1065 artillery pieces, 491 aircraft, and 1324 radio sets.

Such is the influence of the general populace on the war potential of a country and on the strength of its armed forces. This circumstance

must always be taken into account by military theory. Today, war potential is of still greater importance. In order to attain victory in a modern war, one must have a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them to the target. One must also have a strong navy with an especially strong submarine service, as well as a large reserve of aircraft, tanks, guns, ammunition, provisions, etc. And all this can be ensured only by the productivity of the masses.

However, the influence of the general populace on the army's combat capability is not confined to its productive activity. History teaches that the decisive role of the general populace is most clearly exhibited at the sharp turns on the road of national life, i.e., in acute class conflicts, social revolutions, and wars. So it was in the Great Patriotic War. The striving of the Soviet people to stave off Hitler's invasion and to smash the enemy manifested itself in the most diversified forms of aid to the Red Army. It was expressed, in particular, in the creation of the **People's Home Guard**. Hundreds and thousands of Soviet citizens voluntarily entered its ranks. In only five days of July 1941, 120,000 Muscovites took up arms, permitting eleven divisions to be formed. At the time of the defensive combat actions for Stalingrad, the residents of the town formed eighty assault battalions. In response to the appeal made by the Leningrad Regional Committee of the Party on 21 August 1941 the residents of Leningrad formed eight People's Home Guard divisions, fifteen artillery and machine gun battalions, six assault regiments, and about two hundred partisan detachments. The fighters of the voluntary military organizations displayed great fortitude and valor. They fought heroically against the Hitlerite invaders.

The war potential of a state and the combat capability of its armed forces depend to a conspicuous degree on the **command personnel of the armed forces**, on the level to which they are trained, and on their administrative ability. Everyone knows that in a future war the belligerent parties will suffer heavy casualties among the command personnel. A large reserve of officers is therefore needed to replace these casualties and meet the officer requirements of the armed forces.

During the prewar years the Communist Party was able to solve this problem successfully. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, there were dozens of new military schools, in which the sons of workers, peasants and members of the Soviet intelligentsia were instructed. The number of military schools rose from 75 in 1938 to 203 in 1941. On the eve of the war our country had nineteen military academies, ten military departments in civil higher educational institutions, and seven higher naval academies, whereas in 1937 there had been only thirteen military academies and five military departments in civilian higher educational institutions.

With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, the consequent increase in the numerical strength of our Armed Forces and the subsequent change in their structure during the war, there was a requirement for considerably greater numbers of military cadres. The Party devoted unremitting attention to this problem. By the beginning of 1944, the network of military training institutions consisted of 30 institutions of higher learning, 220 schools, and more than 200 different courses, which gave the Armed Forces as many as 500,000 officers annually.²⁸

During the war, replenishment of command personnel was effected to a considerable extent by promoting sergeants, petty officers, private soldiers, and able seamen with demonstrated administrative ability and professional knowledge, and a record of distinguished service in combat with the enemy.

The general populace affects the growth of war potential not merely by its contribution to war production *per se*, but also by its impact on the development of science and technology. This is manifested primarily in the circumstance that technological progress occurs as a by-product of efforts of the general populace to put scientific discoveries into practice when producing the latest combat equipment, weapons, guidance systems, means of communication, etc.

The creative activity of the Soviet people in the development of science and technology also finds expression in the wide scope of the movement for innovation and scientific management. By participating in this movement, millions of Soviet citizens are having a direct effect on the improvement of our combat equipment, thereby making the Soviet Armed Forces more formidable. This was noted, in his day, by the eminent Soviet military commander S. S. Kamenev. He indicated that talented workers, especially blue-collar workers, cannot remain indifferent to the combat capability of their army, and must strive to contribute, by means of their myriad inventions and suggestions for scientific management, to the buildup of its combat might.²⁹

The influence of the general populace on a state's war potential and on the combat capability of its armed forces is most clearly manifested in its **military creativity**, especially in wartime. By the military creativity of the masses is meant their conscious, purposeful activity directed toward the improvement and skillful application of weapons, their inquiry into the most rational ways of waging war, and their quest for new methods and means of attaining victory over the enemy.

The military creativity of the masses has a long and instructive history. It is most intensely and vividly exhibited when the masses advance, arms in hand, inspired by the just goals of the armed struggle. During

precisely such periods, new means and methods of combat activity are engendered, and novel forms of military organization are born.

Without delving deeply into the past, we shall merely cite convincing examples of the masses' military creativity from the period of the first Russian revolution. It was at the onset of the December armed uprising in Moscow that the workers, at the bidding of the Bolshevik Party, began to set up *boyevyye druzhiny* * at local industrial enterprises. In Lenin's opinion, this was "the Russian revolution's supreme historical innovation, realized in December, 1905, . . ." ³⁰ In their conflict with the tsarist troops, the Moscow *druzhinniki* † were the first in history to use street-fighting tactics, combining guerilla warfare with barricade engagements. Making use of the fact that the tsarist troops tended to accumulate at the road blocks which detained them, the *druzhinniki* split up into small groups which directed well-aimed fire at the troops from attics and rooftops, promptly disappearing. The flexible, mobile tactics of the elusive *druzhinniki* led to demoralization in the tsarist ranks.

Even earlier than the armed uprising of the Moscow proletariat, Lenin, characterizing the armed forces of revolution, indicated that they must consist of detachments of forward-looking workers and peasants, militarily organized, and trained to conduct armed combat. Soldiers and sailors who are in a revolutionary frame of mind must be induced to join these detachments, which, consisting of the bravest, most heroic, and most steadfast members of the proletariat, must be capable of using new methods and forms of armed struggle. Lenin also enunciated a number of recommendations concerning the composition and missions of the *boyevyye druzhiny* and the tactics which they should employ.

As is well known, the December armed uprising failed. Analyzing the causes of its failure, Lenin indicated that the Bolsheviks were not well enough versed in Marx's proposition that to revolt is an art, and that the main rule of this art is to mount a desperately daring and undeviating attack. Lenin emphasized, "This art, and this rule to attack at all costs, have neither been learned well enough by ourselves nor taught adequately to the masses. We must now make good this omission with all our energy." ³¹ Criticizing those who had not mastered the new means of armed struggle engendered by the military creativity of the

* [*boyevaya druzhina*—an armed detachment of volunteer workers established during the December 1905 revolution. Such detachments, which had elected command personnel, took upon themselves the defense of their factory, plant, street, etc. Their overall effectiveness was blunted due to the absence of coordinated leadership or direction—U.S. Ed.]

† [*druzhinniki*—members of a *boyevaya druzhina*. In contemporary usage members of various voluntary organizations for keeping public order are known as *druzhinniki*—U.S. Ed.]

masses, Lenin pointed out the need to learn from the experience of the proletariat, and to develop its initiative and spontaneity of action.

One expression of the military creativity of the masses was the founding of the Red Guard in 1917 on the workers' initiative, and on that of Petrograd workers in particular. Red Guard detachments constituted the basis of the military strength of the October armed uprising.

It is well known that the advent of novel weapons and combat equipment has a marked effect on the form of warfare and on the methods of waging it. This dialectic connection, which has the force of a law, was disclosed for the first time by Engels in his work *Anti-Dühring*. Moreover, he proved that the influence of new weapons and combat equipment on changes in methods of armed struggle does not occur spontaneously, but through the personnel who use the weapons and equipment in question. Novel weapons and combat equipment are merely an objective potential for the emergence of new methods of armed struggle. This potential becomes a reality through the actions of personnel, i.e., the people who set the new weapons and combat equipment in operation. For this very reason, people emerge as the decisive factor in determining changes in methods of armed struggle. Elaborating this thought, Engels discovered a law to the effect that methods of armed struggle and development of the military art depend on "change in soldier material," i.e., on the moral-combat qualities of army personnel.

The history of wars and of the military art fully confirms the truth of this proposition. New methods of conducting military operations, and the development of military art, are inseparably linked with the military creativity of the troops. Moreover, the higher their conscientiousness and aspiration to victory, the greater will be their influence on military art. It was not by chance that Lenin said that the conscientiousness, energy, and creative initiative of a revolutionary army's soldiers and command personnel and their aspirations to achieve the exalted goals of the struggle, would of necessity create an entirely new system of strategy and tactics, breaking with the old customs of warfare, and devising new forms and methods of conducting armed struggle.³² This finds its manifestation, in particular, in rapid mastery of new weapons systems and combat equipment and their skillful application in combat. The higher the morale of the troops, the quicker their combat skill improves, the more rapidly they master the most expedient methods of armed struggle, and the more efficiently they carry out the orders of their superiors, displaying resourcefulness, initiative and quick-wittedness.

Soviet military science proceeds from Lenin's premise that for all the great importance of novel weapons and combat equipment, "without a conscientious soldier or sailor who takes the initiative, there can be no

success in modern warfare,"³³ and that new weapons and combat equipment are useless "in the absence of individuals having the relevant knowledge and ability to utilize the latest improvements of military technology."³⁴ No matter how complex and destructive new means of waging war may be, they cannot of themselves, without man and his knowledge, attain victory.

Military creativity of the masses is especially characteristic of wars waged in defense of a socialist society. This is attributable to the fact that in such wars the gains of socialism are defended by people of a new type, who possess acute social consciousness and are capable of mass heroism. Where there is socialism, popular military creativity can rise to unprecedented levels because the masses are fighting for high revolutionary ideals.

Explaining the successes of the young and poorly armed Red Army in its conflict with foreign interventionists and the White Guards, M. V. Frunze noted that these successes were attributable to a manifestation of spontaneous activity on the part of the mass of workers and peasants, some of whom managed to become elevated to the status of organizers in dangerous situations, often without any directive or guidance whatever from higher authority. S. S. Kamenev wrote that spontaneous activity, in the sense of military creativity, was a characteristic feature of the young and impulsive Red Army, and that this creativity of the rank and file was welcomed and supported by the command personnel.³⁵

Splendid examples of creative initiative were shown by Soviet soldiers during the Great Patriotic War. Our soldiers persistently sought and found new methods of combating the enemy. This led to continuous improvement in the methods and forms of combat operations.

The defense of the stronghold at Brest-Litovsk, the Hanko Peninsula, Moscow, Sevastopol, and Stalingrad, are epics which not only testify to the high morale of the Soviet troops, but also express their creative initiative and combat skill, and the development of Soviet military art. Alternatively, let us take as an example the crossing of the Dnepr. When it made its decision that we should take the river from the march, the Supreme High Command counted heavily on the Soviet soldier's consummate military skill, resourcefulness, combat initiative, and indomitable will to win. It was precisely these qualities which permitted the successful conclusion of an operation without precedent in the history of warfare.

During the battles for large cities, the creativity of the rank and file engendered assault-group tactics. The small assault groups, having maximal flexibility and maneuverability, and not infrequently fighting surrounded, inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, thus facilitating successful fulfillment of combat orders.

New methods of combat were discovered by Soviet officers and enlisted men in battles by night, under severe winter conditions, and during the season of bad roads. Also serving as an expression of military creativity were our surprise raids on the enemy's rear, our audacious artillery onslaughts, and our destruction of hostile tanks with bunches of hand grenades or with Molotov cocktails. A remarkable page in the annals of the Great Patriotic War was provided by the exploits of our snipers, combat engineers, and signalmen. Soviet aircrews covered themselves with immortal glory. During the last war, our ground-attack aviation used aerial antitank bombs successfully for the first time. Soviet aces courageously rammed enemy aircraft.

Here is yet another example of the remarkable resourcefulness of our Soviet soldiers. During the battles for Berlin, our tanks, advancing as components of shock groups, sustained considerable damage from the enemy's bazooka-type weapons. In order to minimize such damage, one of our soldiers suggested mounting tin or iron sheets on our tanks and self-propelled guns at some distance from the armor as an improvised screen. This expedient proved to be most effective. The panzerfaust's fuse was actuated by the screen, so that the shaped charge, exploding prematurely, did not pierce the armor of our vehicles.

Display of military creativity, zeal and initiative in combat has acquired a special importance under contemporary conditions. In encounters and engagements involving use of the latest means of armed struggle, where events on the battlefield are distinguished not only by extraordinary complexity and mobility, but by every kind of unforeseen contingency and abrupt changes in the combat situation, victory will go to the belligerent party whose armed forces personnel have had the best battle training and exhibit the highest level of resourcefulness, aggressiveness, and initiative in the most complex combat situations.

New weapons and combat equipment make new and greater demands on generals, other commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers and private soldiers, on their moral-combat qualities, and on their military and technical knowledge. Widespread introduction of nuclear weapons, and of radioelectronic and automated facilities, presupposes not only a high morale, but also a high level of professional knowledge, creative vigor and initiative.

The current revolution in military affairs has given rise to new forms and methods of troop combat operations. However, these do not appear automatically, but are evolved on the basis of experimentation, generalization of the results of training exercises and maneuvers, and the mass military creativity of all personnel, from generals to privates. The energetic creativity of army personnel has become one of the characteristic features of the contemporary stage in the development of military affairs.

Moreover, this process encompasses the Armed Forces from top to bottom. The military creativity of Soviet soldiers and officers is favorably affected by the upward trend in the level of their education, general culture, and technical training.

Improvements in the modes and methods of armed struggle find their manifestation in the troop training and indoctrination process. Here is a typical example. In a particular training exercise, it was noted that the attackers conducted their offensive without dismounting from their armored personnel carriers, following directly behind the tanks in the battle line and firing their machine guns and submachine guns through the embrasures of their moving vehicles. The idea, which originated in the given unit, being fully compatible with nuclear warfare conditions, was adopted as viable.

The military creativity of Soviet officers and enlisted men was vividly exhibited in the huge *Dnepr* training exercise conducted in 1967. Summing up, the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, noted that during the exercise there were instances of creative initiative and resourcefulness in the use of weapons and combat equipment and in the mastery of new methods of armed struggle, urging that everything of value be introduced into troop training and education.

Ample opportunities have been created in all countries of the socialist commonwealth for exercise of military creativity by all ranks, for improvement in forms and methods of troop combat activities, and for development of military art. During the exercises and maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact forces, the troops exchange personal experiences and master advanced methods of action in complex conditions of modern warfare. All of this serves to strengthen combat cooperation of the fraternal armies and to increase the military might of the socialist nations.

The general populace exerts a decisive influence on changes in the methods of waging war. This influence begins with the circumstance that the general populace mass-produces novel weapons and combat equipment, thereby directly bringing about changes in methods of armed struggle. Besides, the rank and file of the forces put into motion the novel means of armed struggle, using them on the battlefield. At the same time, the rank and file are capable of conscious creativity in the course of combat operations. The military creativity of the masses is most actively manifested in wars waged in defense of a socialist homeland.

5. The Partisan Movement and Its Role in Modern Warfare

One of the forms of direct participation of the general populace in warfare is the partisan campaign in the enemy's rear. Marxism-Leninism

greatly values the partisan movement as a revolutionary method of fighting for freedom and national independence.

The partisan movement of the Soviet people assumed especially great proportions in the Great Patriotic War against Fascist Germany. This movement had a **profoundly popular and mass character**. It expressed the patriotic feelings of our people and their readiness to fight the enemy to the point of his utter defeat.

On territory taken temporarily by Fascist German troops, hundreds of thousands of people rose to the occasion. According to incomplete records, more than 260,000 partisans were active in Fascist-occupied provinces and territories of the RSFSR. In the Ukraine, there were 220,000 persons in partisan detachments, and more than 34,000 patriots worked in the underground. Partisans on Ukrainian territory made up 1807 groups, 2145 detachments and 53 formations. Belorussia had 374,000 partisans and more than 70,000 persons in the underground.³⁶ A large number of partisans were active in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Altogether, there were more than a million active fighters in partisan ranks and underground organizations.

Partisan combat operations were directed by the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement, affiliated with the Supreme High Command General Headquarters. Analogous staffs were affiliated with the military councils at the fronts.

The operations of partisan detachments and formations were painstakingly planned and were coordinated with the combat operations of Soviet troops at the front. Evaluating the importance of partisan warfare for realization of the Soviet command's strategic plans in the spring of 1942, M. I. Kalinin wrote, "The help given to the Red Army in its contest with the Germans is immense, and the blows inflicted on the Fascists by partisan detachments are acquiring ever-increasing importance in the strategy of the war."³⁷

As a rule, the Supreme High Command General Headquarters and the military councils at the fronts planned the partisans' missions, taking cognizance of the forthcoming Red Army operations. In accordance with the concept of each operation, the partisan forces were regrouped, and the form of their combat operations was determined. On the eve of the Soviet troops' offensive operations, the partisans intensified their blows against the enemy's rear and communications, and paralyzed his operational reserves. When the operation began, the partisans blocked the enemy's routes of retreat, set ambushes, and rendered the enemy's staffs ineffective. In the event of large rivers being crossed in force, partisans prepared the crossing means in advance, seized the enemy's crossings and built new ones, holding them pending the arrival of our troops.

So it was with the forced crossings of the Dnepr, the Desna and the Pripyat' rivers, and other water barriers.

In their campaign against the enemy, Soviet partisans used the most diversified methods and means. The partisan avengers organized surprise raids, ambushes and diversions. Soviet partisan activities not infrequently took the form of very large combat operations in the enemy's rear. For example, the "Railroad War" operation was conducted in the occupied areas of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk and Orlov oblasts.* In the Ukraine the renowned partisan leader S. A. Kovpak conducted this operation on a 1000-km front to a depth of 750 kilometers. Those participating in it included 95,615 partisans and tens of thousands of Soviet citizens not belonging to partisan organizations. In this operation, partisans caused 836 accidents involving enemy armored or troop trains, blew up more than 120,000 rails and 184 railroad bridges, and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.

During the fall of 1943, Belorussian and Lithuanian partisans conducted their operation "Concert," curtailing enemy rail consignments by 40 percent. The partisan division under the command of P. P. Vershigory fought its way through the Rovno, Volhynia and L'vov oblasts* during the 3 months from 5 January to April 1944. In the same year, M. I. Shukayev's formation made a raid through Pravoberezh'ye and Western Ukraine into the southern regions of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The partisans' methods of armed struggle were determined by the specific combat situation, by the assigned missions, and by the forces and resources at the partisans' and at the enemy's disposal, as well as by the nature of the terrain on which the combat operations were to take place. However, under all conditions, Soviet partisan combat was always characterized by high mobility, surprise strikes against the enemy, and close cooperation with the Red Army.

The partisans' aggressive combat operations kept the enemy in a state of constant alarm, exhausting him physically and lowering his morale. In order to combat the partisans in their rear, the Hitlerites were obliged to withdraw substantial forces from the front. For example, in the fall of 1942, at the peak of the great battle on the Volga, Hitler's command had to assign 15 field divisions, two SS security divisions, 75 special units, 27 police regiments, and 144 police battalions to this task.

The powerful army of partisan avengers, who rose voluntarily to combat the Fascist aggressors, waged a war of annihilation against them. During the first 2 years of the war alone, the partisans killed 300,000

* [An oblast is a Soviet administrative-political unit—U.S. Ed.]

Hitlerites, including 30 generals and 6336 other officers. Moreover, they destroyed 476 enemy aircraft, 378 guns, 1190 tanks and armored cars, and 14,645 motor vehicles. Furthermore, they blew up 3263 railroad and highway bridges, and caused 300 accidents involving enemy troop trains and military freight trains. Belorussian partisans, in 3 years of the war from June 1941 to June 1944 rendered about 500,000 Hitlerite invaders and their accomplices ineffective, derailed 11,128 trains, destroyed 18,700 motor vehicles, put 1355 tanks and armored cars out of action, and accounted for 305 aircraft either by shooting them down or by burning them on airfields.

The colossal casualties inflicted by Soviet partisans on the German invaders caused great alarm among the Fascist military leaders on the Eastern Front. Evidence of this is provided by the official request emanating from General Schenkendorf, commanding general of security troops and chief of the rear region supporting the "Center" group of armies, for an allocation of forces to combat the partisan movement. In his memorandum dated 24 February 1942, he gives the following assessment of the growing Soviet partisan activity: "... the growth of the partisan movement throughout the entire rear region is acquiring such menacing proportions that I must, in all seriousness, draw attention to this danger. Prompt action by large forces is necessary to ensure timely elimination of this danger. . . ." ³⁸

General Schenkendorf characterizes the growing danger to German troops arising from Soviet partisan activities as follows:

1. Key railroads for materiel supply purposes are under threat. The number of partisan raids and diversions increases daily.
2. Economic use of vast areas is hindered in the highest degree.
3. Continued utilization of key enterprises is hazardous.
4. In areas under their control, the partisans have such large units that our present forces could hardly repel a simultaneous attack by them on our rear communications and services.
5. A continuing increase in the enemy's numerical strength should be expected.
6. The population has ceased to believe in the strength of the German army, as it sees that we cannot cope with the partisans. The local inhabitants willingly help the partisans, and are entering their ranks. ³⁹

The partisans rid whole regions of invaders, restoring Soviet authority there. In the Bryansk woods, in Belorussia, and in Leningrad Oblast "partisan territories" came into being. The partisans conducted active reconnaissance on behalf of the Soviet command; they prevented the retreating Fascist troops from burning our towns and villages and destroy-

ing other things of value; and they saved Soviet citizens from slaughter by Hitler's barbarians and from being carried off into Germany.

The partisan movement of the Soviet people on enemy-occupied territory was an organized and powerful front for armed struggle in the enemy's rear. The actions of Soviet partisans made a great contribution to the attainment of final victory in the Great Patriotic War.

The organizer, leader and inspirer of the partisan movement of the Soviet people was the Communist Party. In a directive issued by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) and by the Council of People's Commissars on 29 June 1941, and in a resolution passed by the Central Committee of the Party on 18 July 1941, "Concerning the staging of a campaign in the German army's rear," a program was promulgated for the conduct of such a campaign by Soviet citizens on temporarily occupied territory. The activities of Belorussian partisans were administered directly by 9 underground oblast committees and 1113 primary Party organizations. On Ukrainian territory, 23 underground oblast committees, 63 urban committees and 564 regional committees of the Party administered partisan activities.

Communists, both partisans and members of the underground, gave many examples of unwavering fortitude, valor and resourcefulness, and a faculty for hitting the enemy. Party organizations, working under exceptionally difficult conditions, skillfully led the masses in their campaign, doing an immense amount of organizational and educational work among the partisans and the local population.

The powerful partisan movement in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, like the resistance movement in such countries as France, Italy, Belgium and Holland, played a major role in the attainment of victory over Hitlerite Germany and her satellites in World War II. The armed struggle of the peoples of Europe and Asia merged with the combat operations of the regular troops of the Soviet Union, the U.S., and Britain against the armies of the Fascist coalition.

Apropos of this, Hitler's General Rendulich wrote: "The great role which the partisan movement played in the last world war is without precedent in the history of warfare. In its scope, it was something quite new to the military art. By virtue of the colossal impact which it had on front-line troops, on supply problems, on the operation of the rear, and on the administration of occupied areas, it became part of the concept of total war. The partisan movement, which gained strength with the years in Russia, Poland, the Balkans, France and Italy, affected the character of World War II as a whole."⁴⁰

In the resistance and partisan movements of World War II, the attitude of the broad general populace toward the goals of the war was most

vividly manifested. Having a vital interest in victory over the Fascist invaders, the people of many lands rose against the enemy, thus hastening victory.

Participants in the resistance movement in many countries of Europe inflicted heavy casualties and losses in materiel on the enemy, thus disorganizing his rear. In addition, they resolutely denounced traitors to the public interest and got democratic regimes established as soon as the invaders were expelled.

The campaign against Fascism was international in nature. For example, in France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, representatives of many nationalities fought in partisan ranks. Thirty Soviet partisan detachments operated in France, and there were five thousand Soviet citizens in the Italian resistance movement. The Soviet Union helped the people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia greatly, not only by furnishing them with arms, but also by providing partisan leadership training. The valor and fortitude of the Soviet people inspired the peoples of other lands in their campaign against a common enemy.

Maurice Thorez noted that the struggle of the Soviet people and its army against Hitlerite Germany "gave a strong push to our resistance movement, and, in particular, to the organization of armed struggle. All patriots understood that a new correlation of forces was being created, and that now those in favor of freedom and the independence of peoples were assured victory." ⁴¹

The mainstay of the partisan movement was the toiling masses, primarily the working class, but the communist and workers' parties everywhere emerged as the initiators, leaders and inspirers of the campaign against the Hitlerite aggressors. The partisan movement was able to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy, and it wore him out, not only militarily, but also psychologically, and in a moral-political sense. In a number of cases, partisan activities were successfully coordinated with the combat actions of front-line troops. Being closely allied to the general populace, representing and defending its interests, the partisan movement received active support and all manner of aid from the people.

The partisan movement of World War II and the armed struggles which developed in many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America during the postwar period testify to the fact that guerilla warfare may, under certain conditions, play an extremely important role in a campaign against an aggressor or internal reactionary forces. So it was in France, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece, and elsewhere. In a number of cases, partisan detachments have been the nucleus of national liberation armies. This happened in Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Cuba and Algeria.

Considering the question of a partisan campaign by the general populace in the enemy's rear, one should dwell, even if only briefly, on the adventurist strategy of the "left" revisionists, i.e., on their so-called "theory of the people's war." They consider the decisive factor in the struggle against imperialism to be not the socialist system but the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which, in their global imagery, constitute the "good country people" in contrast to the "bad city people" of the highly developed countries of the world, the former being the basic revolutionary force confronting the latter. In accordance with this "theory," a people's war is waged only by the peasantry, which attacks and seizes the towns, then liberating the proletariat and the intelligentsia.

The concept of a revolutionary movement relying solely upon a peasantry united on the basis of a topographic criterion constitutes a deviation from Marxism-Leninism, and exemplifies the ruinous strategy of the "left" revisionists. Their staking everything on the countryside implies a denial of the progressive role of the working class and of its ability to unite around itself the peasantry and all progressive strata of society in its campaign against the forces of reaction and imperialism. This "theory" is dangerous in that it disunites the proletariat and the peasantry in their joint struggle against exploiters, inflicting a blow on their alliance, which is an indispensable condition for the victory of the revolutionary forces over the forces of imperialist reaction.

The "left" revisionists, propagandizing the pseudoscientific, anti-Leninist "theory of the people's war," are trying to impose on all nations fighting for independence those specific forms of armed struggle which were once used in civil wars in certain Asian countries, and which were dictated by special situations. Notwithstanding the requirement of dialectic logic that all phenomena be regarded from the viewpoint of the concreteness of their truth, taking into account the conditions, place and time of action, the adherents of this "theory" are trying to spread previously used methods and forms of combat to other countries, ignoring the specific character and conditions of the campaign being conducted by peoples for national and social liberation during the present period.

The "theory of the people's war" is being used by the "left" revisionists to substantiate their assertion that war is the only means of accelerating the worldwide revolutionary process, and of resolving the conflicts between imperialism and socialism.

Ideologists and military figures of the U.S., Britain, France and West Germany are devoting considerable attention to the partisan question at the present time. They are searching among all possible alternatives for effective methods of combating popular movements. Coauthors Dixon and Heilbrunn emphasize in their book *Communist Guerilla Warfare* the

West's need for a detailed plan to deal with "the threat of a partisan movement in any future war."⁴²

In the aforementioned book, much space is devoted to analysis of Soviet partisan tactics, as well as those used by the Fascists to combat them. The authors fully approve the barbarous methods used by the Hitlerites to slaughter Soviet subjects and urge that such methods be adopted by the imperialist countries. Besides, Dixon and Heilbrunn attempt to discredit the Soviet partisans and to prove the partisan movement and its tactics unlawful.

However hard military figures and theorists of aggressor states try to discredit popular armed struggle, one thing is clear: if the imperialists do unleash another war, it will evoke a massive partisan movement and other forms of armed resistance in their rear. The West also knows this. It is not by chance that in recent years there have been an increasing number of articles in the bourgeois military press devoted to the problem of the partisan campaign under nuclear warfare conditions. Conspicuous among them are: "The Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare," by Sir Fitzroy Maclean, Bart., "Changes in Our Military Policy," by U.S. General Maxwell D. Taylor, and "Do the Masses Have a Real War Doctrine?" by Lieutenant Colonel I. Jones, etc.*

Sir Fitzroy Maclean declares that the U.S. is conducting special anti-guerilla combat training. According to him, the U.S. Marine Corps is actively studying the tactics of antipartisan warfare, and in his opinion this veritable army of specially trained people will be used, first to combat partisans in occupied areas, and second to wage "guerilla warfare" in the enemy's rear. However, he is apprehensive that these "guerillas" will not receive the requisite support from the population.

Lieutenant Colonel Jones is more concerned about the fact that partisan combat subdivisions seldom present a profitable target for a nuclear weapon. He regrets that "it would take a long time, even for an army equipped with the latest combat equipment to eradicate a resistance movement completely." The French general, J. Noiret, envisaging a future nuclear war, discusses how to prevent a massive popular protest against those responsible for it.

A partisan movement by the general populace is also quite possible in a country used by an aggressor state to accommodate its troops, military bases, and combat equipment. The people of such a country will not be indifferent to the fact that their territory and material resources are being used by imperialists. Under favorable conditions, resistance by the general populace may develop into a potent armed uprising against an aggressor who has started a new world war. A partisan movement will

* [Original wording of these titles not ascertained—U.S. Ed.]

inevitably develop in a neutral country whose sovereignty has been violated by an aggressor in order to exploit its territory and its human and material resources.

Experience of the partisan movement in South Vietnam and Angola testifies to the fact that this form of campaign can be very effective in a local war, a civil war, or a national liberation war. In the case of South Vietnam, a powerful partisan movement, which has the support of the population, is now in full swing. The South Vietnamese partisans, coordinating their combat operations with those of the national armed forces and ably led by the South Vietnam People's Liberation Front, are inflicting stunning blows on the American interventionists and on their puppets in Saigon.

The efficient organization of the partisans' campaign, the combination of blows inflicted by partisans and national armed forces, and popular support of the war against the American interventionists and their South Vietnamese puppets all show that the patriotic forces represent the national interests and aspirations of the Vietnamese people, their inextinguishable spirit, and their unflagging fortitude in their fight for freedom and independence.

The possibility of a massive partisan movement arising, and the feasibility of using particular methods of partisan activity in it, must not be contemplated merely from the position of past wars. Cognizance must be taken of the fact that a partisan movement by the general populace may play a decisive role in the winning of any just war, whether it be a local conflict, a national liberation struggle, or a civil war waged against reactionary forces within the country.

Thus, the great role of the general populace in the course and outcome of an armed struggle owes its importance to the fact that the general populace determines the correlation of the belligerent parties' moral-political and military potentials, and their realization, by its activity on the battlefield and in the rear. In a future war featuring weapons of mass destruction, the role of the general populace will increase rather than decrease. Moreover, the advantage in it will go to the coalition of states whose peoples actively support their government and governing political party.

Victory will go to the coalition of socialist states, whose peoples stand solidly behind their respective communist parties and governments, and are also united by the just and noble goals pursued in their campaign waged for the great cause of socialism and communism. Contemporary conditions impart a special significance to Lenin's thesis that the winner of historically significant victories is the one who can get the mass of the population to follow him.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, *Soch.* [Works], XIX, 296. [Hereafter cited as Marx and Engels.]
2. Lenin, X, 282.
3. Lenin, XXXVIII, 315.
4. Lenin, XL, 68.
5. Lenin, XXXIX, 321.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 320.
7. L. I. Brezhnev, *50 let velikikh pobed sotsializma* [Fifty Years of Great Victories for Socialism] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1967), p. 57.
8. *Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy. Dokumenty i materialy* [International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties: Documents and Materials] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1969), p. 301.
9. Marx and Engels, XXII, 259.
10. Lenin, XXXV, 408.
11. Brezhnev, *50 let*, pp. 19-20.
12. Marx and Engels, XXI, 306.
13. Lenin, XLI, 121.
14. Lenin, XXXIX, 237.
15. Lenin, XLII, 4.
16. Lenin, XXXIV, 197.
17. *Krasnaya Zvezda* [Red Star], 23 June 1957.
18. *Perpiska Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR s Prezidentami SShA i Prem'yer-Ministrami Velikobritanii vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg.* [Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War, 1941-45] (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957), II, 57.
19. *Ibid.*, I, 310.
20. Marx and Engels, XXII, 395.
21. Lenin, XIII, 376.
22. Lenin, XLIV, 210.
23. D. A. Furmanov, *Soch.* [Works], I, 102.
24. V. M. Bekhterev, *Vnusheniye i yego rol' v obshchestvennoy zhizni* [Suggestion and Its Role in Social Life] (St. Petersburg, 1908), p. 144.
25. A. I. Yermenko, *Na zapadnom napravlenii* [In a Westerly Direction] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1959), p. 52.
26. Lenin, XXXVIII, 50.
27. Alexander Werth, *Rossiia v voyne 1941-1945 gg.* [Russia at War, 1941-1945] (Moscow: Izd-vo Progress, 1967), p. 195.
28. See *KPSS i stroitel'stvo Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil* [The CPSU and the Development of the Soviet Armed Forces] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1967), pp. 305-306.
29. See *Etapy bol'shogo puti* [Stages of a Long Journey] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), p. 37.
30. Lenin, XIII, 370-71.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 374.
32. Lenin, XXXII, 80.
33. Lenin, IX, 155.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
35. See *Etapy bol'shogo puti*, p. 37. [Footnote 29 gives the year of publication as 1964, while this one gives it as 1962—U.S. Ed.]

36. See *Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945* [The History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-45] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), VI, 255-56.
37. M. I. Kalinin, "O partizanskoy bor'be" [Partisan Warfare] *Izvestiya*, 16 May 1942.
38. As quoted in *Sovershenno sekretno! Tol'ko dlya komandovaniya!* [Top Secret! For Command Personnel Only!] (Moscow: Izd-vo Nauka, 1967), p. 397.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 399-400.
40. *Ito'gi vtoroy mirovoy voyny. Sbornik statey* [The Results of World War II: A Collection of Articles]. Translated from German (Moscow: Izd-vo inostr. liter., 1957), p. 135.
41. Maurice Thorez, *Syn naroda* [Son of the People] (Moscow: Izd-vo inostr. liter., 1950), p. 148.
42. C. A. Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn, *Kommunisticheskiye partizanskiye deystviya* [Communist Guerilla Warfare]. Abridged translation from English (Moscow: Izd-vo inostr. liter., 1957), p. 23.

Chapter 3. Leadership in Modern War

1. The Principles of Political Leadership in War

Leadership in war constitutes one of the most complex and responsible areas of human activity. The lives of hundreds of thousands and millions of persons and the fate of entire nations and the peoples inhabiting them frequently depend on the quality of this leadership. It is not surprising that this problem has long attracted the attention of philosophers, sociologists, historians, and political and military leaders of various countries.

What does it mean to be a leader in a war effort? It means to direct not only the combat operations of the armed forces but also the entire efforts of the general populace, the economy, ideology, domestic and foreign policy of the belligerent nation or coalition of states toward the objective of gaining victory over the enemy. Consequently, leadership in a war cannot be assigned solely to a state's military organs. It is the business of governments and ruling political parties. One can state with complete justification that modern war, which constitutes a severe test of the economic, moral-political and military capabilities of the countries involved, is at the same time a test of ruling parties, governments, armed forces supreme commands, and their ability to exercise intelligent leadership in the war and to secure victory.

War, as any other social phenomenon, develops on the basis of objective laws which are independent of man's volition. The general laws of war constitute an expression of substantial, essential, persistent, repeating internal links and relations which are inherent in this complex social phenomenon. Many such relations can be traced. We shall list the most important: relations between the sociopolitical system of a given state and the nature of the war which it is waging; relations between the level of development of productive forces and means of armed struggle, forms and methods of waging war; relations between the nature and goals of a war and the attitude of the general populace toward these goals; links and relations between peoples, armies, military leaders and governments of the states taking part in the war; links and relations between

the course of armed struggle and the situation in the rear of the belligerent nations, their economic, moral-political and military capabilities.

The general laws which determine the course and outcome of war will remain in force in a nuclear missile war as well, although the mechanism of their manifestation and action will possess its own specific, unique features.

Today's weapons make it possible to achieve strategic objectives very quickly. The very first nuclear attack on the enemy may inflict such immense casualties and produce such vast destruction that his economic, moral-political and military capabilities will collapse, making it impossible for him to continue the struggle, and presenting him with the fact of defeat.

The advent of nuclear missile weapons and the possibilities of their employment have changed, for example, the relationship between war and the economy of the belligerent nations. It has already been noted that today there is decisive importance not only in a nation's economic potential which can be put into action during the course of war but also in the correlation of forces and resources at the disposal of the belligerents prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In like manner the new weapons have altered the relationships between war and the moral-political as well as the military capabilities of states.

Let us examine the effect of the general law of relationship between the character, scale and methods of waging war on the one hand and the policies of the belligerent nations on the other. This law states that the policies of the belligerent nations and the political objectives which they seek to achieve by means of war determine its character, scale, methods, and forms of conduct. Lenin emphasized that the "nature of the political objective decisively influences the conduct of war. . . ." ¹ The more decisive the political aims pursued by given classes, states, and coalitions in a war, the more savage and destructive the armed struggle becomes.

Take World War II, for example. It demonstrated that as long as various nations were not pursuing resolute political aims, combat operations were conducted in a lethargic fashion, without full utilization of the most advanced war materiel. As an illustration we might mention the so-called "phony war" between Great Britain and France on the one hand and Fascist Germany on the other, which ran from September 1939 to the spring of 1940. Even later Britain and the United States long delayed the initiation of major operations, since it was their intention to drag out the war, to conserve their strength, to wait until the other belligerents wore each other out in combat, with the aim of stepping

forward at the appropriate moment and dictating their terms to the entire world.

British and U.S. leaders had no intention of inflicting total defeat on the Fascist nations. Their principal objective was to force Germany and Japan, their principal competitors, out of world markets. It was only under the pressure of the general populace, which demanded a total effort against the Fascist barbarians, and it was only after the Soviet Union had demonstrated that it was capable of crushing Fascist Germany *on its own* and liberating the peoples of Western Europe, that Britain and the United States finally opened a second front in Europe and began to prosecute the war with greater vigor.

On the other hand the Hitlerite leaders, in going to war against the USSR, aimed at destroying the Soviet State, at wiping out the socialist system in this country, and at transforming the Soviet people into their slaves. This dictated the resolute character and extreme savagery of the struggle which was conducted on the Soviet-German front from the very outbreak of hostilities.

From this we can draw an extremely important conclusion to the effect that an armed conflict between capitalist nations, nations with a common sociopolitical system, as a rule takes place with a certain restraint. On the other hand, an armed conflict between nations with different sociopolitical systems is distinguished by resoluteness of actions.

The law of the relationship between war and the methods of its conduct on the one hand and the policies and political goals of the belligerent nations on the other will definitely be manifested in a future world war if the peace forces are unable to prevent such a war from occurring. It will be a decisive clash between two opposing world social systems with the most decisive political goals.

Let us discuss another general law of war—the law of the dependence of the course and outcome of war on the correlation of military might of the belligerent nations. This law is universal in nature. Its effect is manifested with equal force on the ground, on the sea and in the air. The achievement of success in individual engagements, battles and operations, as well as the gaining of final victory over the enemy and implementation of the political objectives of the war, are determined by the action of precisely this law.

The law of relationship between the course and outcome of war and the correlation of military might of the belligerent nations enables a given country, depending on the forces and resources at its disposal, to select the most expedient methods and forms of military operations. The most important and decisive factor is the question of which side will be

able to achieve both a quantitative and qualitative preponderance of forces over those of the adversary.

The attainment of victory in war, however, is dictated not only by the simple correlation of forces of the belligerent nations (coalitions). There have been many examples in the history of warfare when a given nation was economically superior to its adversary and possessed a powerful and large army, but failed to utilize its forces and resources correctly and thus was defeated. Joseph Stalin was well aware of this fact. While assessing the correlation of forces of the belligerents during the last war to be in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition, he stated, "But the question is whether this advantage alone is sufficient to gain victory. There are cases where resources are abundant, but they are expended in such a foolish manner that the advantage is nullified. It is quite obvious that in addition to resources it is essential to have the ability to mobilize these resources and the intelligence to expend them correctly." 2

Potential superiority over the adversary in correlation of forces is brought about through intelligent leadership in the war by the ruling party, government, and military high command of the belligerent nation. If the leaders are unable to utilize existing capabilities, to transform them into reality, defeat becomes inevitable.

Leadership in war can be successful only if crucial decisions are in conformity with the demands of the laws of war; if the political party, government, and military command actively and vigorously alter to their country's advantage those conditions on the basis of which the laws of war are in effect; if political and military leaders are aware of the realistic potential for victory and intelligently transform this potential into actuality.

It is particularly important to emphasize this, because the action of the laws of war, just as the creation of the favorable conditions under which they are manifested, is effected not spontaneously, not automatically, but through conscious human activity—both of peoples and political-military leaders. Knowing the requirements of the laws and the corresponding conditions of their manifestation, political and military leaders are able to plan their actions in advance, to implement decisions purposefully, to mobilize the energy and productive activity of the general populace with the aim of achieving the desired results.

In order to ensure victory in war it is necessary to know not only its objective laws and to act in conformity with their demands, but also to observe those principles and fundamental rules of leadership in a war which derive from these laws. Political and military leaders who ignore these principles cannot count on victory by their armed forces.

What are the principles of **political leadership in war**? They are those basic principles, those fundamental guiding rules which should determine the specific actions of parties, governments and supreme military commands in the effort to achieve victory. They are those most important conclusions and recommendations which must be carried out in the process of directing the war effort. They, as it were, prescribe and teach the military leaders how they must proceed in order to achieve victory in war.

Marxism-Leninism teaches that the principles which proceed from the action and demands of any given laws and objective conditions under which they are manifested are not eternal or inalterable. Depending on changing conditions, they themselves of necessity change, become invested with new content; some lose their significance while others replace them. The same thing occurs with the principles of political leadership in a war. Under present-day conditions their forming is influenced by such factors as change in the international correlation of forces in favor of socialism, the revolution which has taken place in military affairs in connection with the development of nuclear missile weapons, etc.

We shall endeavor to define some of the most important principles of political leadership in a war which are followed by the Communist Party and Soviet government.

One of the most important Marxist-Leninist principles of political leadership in general, and this includes the area of the military, a principle which is strictly observed by the Communist Party and Soviet government, is a **close link and bond with the people, reliance on the masses, maintenance and all-out development of their creative vigor, activity and initiative**. A unity of will and action on the part of the nation's political leaders and the general populace, their total mutual trust, support of the ruling party and government on the part of the people throughout the entire war constitute an essential condition for achieving victory.

Analyzing the historic victories of the young Soviet Republic over the unified forces of the interventionists and White Guards during the Civil War, Lenin emphasized, "We won because our Party and the Soviet government appealed directly to the toiling masses, pointing out to them each difficulty and each task as it came. . . ." ³ He noted that the Party and government succeeded in "elevating the energy, heroism and enthusiasm of the masses, concentrating revolutionarily intense efforts on the most important task of the moment." ⁴

Mobilization and organization of the general populace for achieving victory over the enemy constitutes one of the most important tasks of the ruling party and government of a nation at war. But this task can

be fully accomplished only by a political leadership which maintains a continuous close bond with the people. The link between a country's political leaders and the general populace can be strong only if the leaders express the interests of the working people, are familiar with the mood of the masses, have the ability to approach them and to gain their trust. Synthesizing the experience of leadership under the conditions of Soviet society and revealing the ways to ensure a unity of will and action on the part of the masses and their leaders, Lenin emphasized the following elements:

"A bond with the masses.

Live in the *midst* of, not separate from the masses.

Know the *mood* of the masses.

Know *everything*.

Understand the masses.

Know how to approach the masses.

Gain their *absolute* trust.

Leaders should not become detached from the masses they lead, nor the vanguard from the whole of labor's army." ⁵

Lenin stated that the socialist state is strong when the masses are aware of everything, can make a judgment on everything and proceed at all times in a conscious and aware manner. The Communist Party and Soviet government spoke out to the people with Leninist straightforwardness on the ominous danger threatening our country in connection with the attack by the Fascist German invaders and openly declared the facts about the great difficulties that had to be surmounted on the road to victory. "We are not counting on an easy victory," stated a *Pravda* editorial in the 24 June 1941 issue. "We know that victory over Fascism, over the foreign hordes which have invaded our country will be difficult and will demand considerable sacrifices of us. . . ."

It was only by relying on the general populace, on their total trust and support, on their creative vigor, courage, and willingness to overcome and surmount any and all difficulties for the sake of defeating the enemy that the Communist Party and Soviet government were able to mobilize with maximum effectiveness the nation's entire economic, moral-political and military potential and to utilize it in the interest of gaining victory.

An indissoluble link between the political leadership and the people and a unity of will and action are secured by correct domestic and foreign policy. Domestic policy which is in conformity with the interests of the general populace constitutes a most important condition for practical implementation of all measures specified by the political leadership on the eve of and during a war. A correct foreign policy, which unites the masses around the political leadership, is expressed in not

responding to provocations by the aggressors, as Lenin pointed out, not allowing oneself to be drawn into war, particularly under disadvantageous conditions. If it is impossible to avoid war and war has become fact, foreign policy should be aimed at creating international conditions which ensure victory, at strengthening the coalition and enlisting new allies, at external political isolation of the enemy and the breakup of his coalition.

Not every country, however, possesses a social and governmental system which makes it possible to secure a unity of will and action in war on the part of government, people and army. Even when, due to various circumstances, bourgeois nations pursue aims comprehensible to the masses, wage war against foreign invaders, the interests of the ruling classes and the general populace in the final analysis do not coincide at all. Even when it is a matter of preserving national independence, the ruling circles continue to pursue their own selfish, narrow class, anti-popular aims. This was the case, for example, in France in the summer of 1940, when the Hitlerite hordes invaded French territory. The French government undertook certain, although very limited, measures to halt the enemy's advance and to preserve the nation's independence. In this its objectives coincided with the goals of the general populace. Expressing the interests of the capitalist monopolies and other reactionary elements, however, the French government preferred in the final analysis to surrender to the enemy, if only to prevent the war from becoming a genuinely popular war, as the masses demanded.

Strengthening the nation's defensive capability and organizing its defense against imperialist aggression, the Communist Party and Soviet government focus considerable attention on securing a **unity of political and military leadership**. They follow the instructions of Lenin, who taught us that in order to solve all military problems it is essential to approach the problem from a political standpoint, for a war's political objectives determine not only the government's activities in supervising the conduct of the war but also exercise decisive influence on military strategy.

The dependence of strategy on policy has always been obvious. But it has become particularly great under present-day conditions. The fact is that the decision to employ strategic nuclear arms must be made by the political leaders. Today politics tells strategy what means of warfare to employ at any given stage of a war.

The military high command is the executor of the will of the political leadership. The political leaders specify to the strategic leaders where and how the armed forces should be employed in order to achieve the stated military and political objectives. But even under present-day conditions there is preserved a certain independence of the supreme military leaders in accomplishing the practical tasks assigned them by

the political leadership. The military leaders possess even greater independence in matters of direct organization of combat operations.

Bourgeois governmental and military figures also understand the importance of the principle of unity of political and military leadership. But under the conditions of the capitalist system this principle is constantly violated. This is caused by many factors, including the competition between bourgeois political parties and the rivalry between monopolies, which produces conflicts in the government proper and in the military command of the bourgeois nations.

Only the socialist governmental and social system creates objective conditions for a genuine unity of political and military leadership. This is dictated by the moral-political unity of the socialist society and by the leadership role of the Marxist-Leninist party, which unifies and directs all efforts of society toward a common goal.

Concentration of leadership of the nation and the armed forces, that is political and military leadership, in the hands of the highest agency of government is dictated by the nature and features of modern wars and the increased dependence of their course and outcome on total mobilization of the economic, moral-political and military potential of the belligerent parties. Concentration of political and military leadership in a single agency also facilitates coordination of the actions of allied nations and their armies in a coalition war.

The need for unified leadership was strongly evident in World War II. Soon after Fascist Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, on 30 June 1941, a State Defense Committee was established in the USSR, under the chairmanship of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, USSR, Joseph Stalin. This body concentrated in a single entity the nation's entire political, economic and military leadership. Possessing total authority, the State Defense Committee, successfully led the struggle of the Soviet people and Armed Forces against Fascist Germany and was able to swiftly mobilize the nation's entire manpower and resources to crush the savage and powerful foe. The activities of the State Defense Committee ensured observance of unity of political and military leadership in the interest of securing victory in the armed struggle against the Fascist German invaders.

During World War II bodies incorporating a unity of political and military leadership were also established in other countries. In Great Britain this body was the War Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister (who also served as Secretary of State for Defense). Political and military leadership in the United States during World War II was concentrated in the hands of the government, headed by the President,

who was at the same time Commander in Chief of the armed forces. In Fascist Germany all governmental and military authority was concentrated in the hands of a single individual—Hitler, who was simultaneously *Reichskanzler* and supreme high commander of the armed forces.

Unity of political and military leadership constituted a most important condition for achieving the historic victory by the Soviet Union over Hitlerite Germany in the Great Patriotic War.

Unity of political and military leadership would assume even greater importance in a future potential nuclear missile war. All leadership of the people and the Armed Forces, just as in peacetime, will be exercised by the Central Committee of the CPSU. It is possible that, just as in the last war, a supreme unified executive body will be established, analogous to the State Defense Committee during the Great Patriotic War. Securing such leadership on the part of a unified supreme political agency of state control will constitute a decisive condition for the victorious outcome of a war against the imperialist aggressors.

Exercising day-by-day supervision over the Armed Forces under present conditions, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government are promptly resolving in a profoundly scientific manner the major problems of strengthening the nation's defensive capability and increasing the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Communist Party and Soviet government, proceeding on the basis of the present international situation, have *perspicaciously defined the directions of military development in the USSR applicable to the new conditions, taking into consideration the nature and features of modern warfare and the revolution in military affairs, taking into account development trends in the means and methods of armed struggle, the capabilities of our economy and technology, and the state of scientific thought.* Constant concern for the Armed Forces is expressed in the CPSU Program, in the resolutions of Party congresses and Central Committee plenums, as well as in other major Party documents.

"Our Armed Forces are equipped with all types of modern military equipment, including nuclear missile weapons. . . . The socialist revolution, as Marx and Lenin taught, must be able to defend itself, must be able to oppose the aggressiveness of the class enemy with invincible military might. The might of the Soviet Union and the socialist nations creates a realistic counterweight to the aggressive forces of imperialism and constitutes a most important factor in the struggle to prevent another world war and to preserve the peace. Matters dealing with all-out strengthening of defense and treatment of defense as a prime task constitutes one of the main lessons learned in the last 50 years." ⁶

The nation's people and armed forces can be led to victory over the enemy only by a political leadership which is capable of objectively assessing the current situation and elaborating realistic plans for prosecution of war. **Reasonableness and scientific substantiation of objectives and plans** constitute an important principle of political leadership in war.

Whether or not war aims, plans and concepts of military operations are realistic depends on the degree to which they are in conformity with the capabilities of the given nation, the extent to which they are scientific in the full sense of the word. Only genuine science, which faithfully reflects objective reality, lights the way for practical action and provides the key to attainment of the goal. A dialectical materialist approach to thorough comprehension of the processes and phenomena of war does not tolerate subjectivistic distortions of reality. Disinclination to consider the true state of affairs, a tendency to ignore the correlation of forces and one's own weaknesses, as well as underestimation of difficulties can lead to serious consequences.

At this point it is appropriate to state the following question: what can be the criterion of reasonableness of war aims and military planning?

We know that practical experience serves as a criterion of truth. In armed combat the reasonableness of objectives, aims and plans is tested in the process of execution of strategic operations, by the results of activities of the government and top military leadership of the belligerent country, and by the course and outcome of the war as a whole. At the same time one must bear in mind that the objectives, aims and plans of the one belligerent are opposed by those of the other. Therefore the following constitute a criterion in this case: the correlation of forces and capabilities of the opposing sides; the correctness and perspicacity of the political and military leaders; the generalship of the military leaders.

It is true that the experience of the last war attests to the fact that political and military leaders may state aims and formulate plans for the attainment of which they at the given moment do not possess adequate manpower and resources. Can they then be called unrealistic? We cannot give an unequivocal answer to this question. If the political and military leaders are capable of mobilizing their people and army, of harnessing the country's entire material and spiritual potential, of amassing the requisite manpower and resources to achieve the stated objective, then, consequently, the plans outlined, which on the surface appeared unrealistic, are, in fact, fully substantiated and correct, constructed on the foundation of an objective situation assessment.

For example, following the attack by Hitlerite Germany on the USSR, Soviet political leaders set for our people a great goal: to crush the aggressor, to free our territory from the enemy, and to assist other

peoples in their struggle against the Fascist invaders. One might question whether this was a realistic goal, considering that the enemy possessed superiority in number of deployed troops, in quantity and quality of certain types of weapons and combat equipment, and in combat experience.

Practical experience and the experience of history have shown that the program put forth by the Soviet leadership was definitely realistic and attainable, in spite of a seeming external discrepancy between the stated aim and the manpower and resources at their disposal. The Communist Party and Soviet government, advancing a program which called for crushing the enemy, proceeded from the inherent advantages of the socialist system. They found concrete ways to accomplish this program, mobilized the entire Soviet people with the aim of overcoming the temporary superiority of Hitlerite Germany in manpower and resources, and assigned to our enlisted men, officers and general officers the task of amassing combat experience as rapidly as possible and mastering the art of defeating a powerful adversary. As a result of implementation of these and other measures, the Hitlerite hordes were defeated and Soviet territory was liberated from the enemy. The USSR extended a helping hand to the peoples of Europe, who were groaning under the Fascist yoke, and finished off the enemy in his lair.

On the other hand the goals and objectives put forth by the leaders of Hitlerite Germany proved to be unattainable, unrealistic, in spite of a number of important advantages possessed by the Fascist German army at the moment it attacked the Soviet Union.

Operation "Barbarossa" specified objectives which were quite far from reasonable aims. "The German armed forces," the plan stated, "should be prepared to bring Soviet Russia to its knees in the course of a brief campaign, even before Britain falls. . . . The ultimate objective of the operation is the creation of a buffer zone against Asiatic Russia along a general line from Arkhangel'sk south to and along the Volga. Thus, in case of necessity, the last industrial region remaining in Russian hands, in the Urals, can be paralyzed with air strikes." ⁷ This is far from the sole instance in which the Hitlerite political leaders ignored the extremely important requirement for elaboration of realistic, scientifically substantiated plans for the war as a whole and individual strategic operations.

Elaboration of the schemes and plans of the Fascist German leaders was strongly influenced by the philosophy of German political and military leaders, particularly such reactionary philosophers as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, who denied objective truth and glorified voluntarism and the drive to conquer.

The views of Fascist Germany's leaders were permeated with reactionary ideas, nationalistic philosophy, a mystical faith in the "superman," and the cult of power. "The National Socialist ideas were borrowed from the days of old Prussia and were known to us long before the National Socialist appeared on the scene," declared Field Marshal von Rundstedt at the Nuremburg war crimes trials.⁸

Disregard of scientific, sober understanding of the phenomena of societal affairs, including war, was concretely manifested in the activities of Hitlerite Germany's political and military leaders in general, and in the activities of the Fascist generals and Hitler in particular. Erich von Manstein in his book *Lost Victories* [*Verlorene Siege*] states that Hitler so exaggerated his own abilities that he was little inclined to consider the enemy's plans, the actual correlation of forces and the current situation, on the basis of which decisions should have been made. Dr. Paul Leverkühn expresses a like view. He writes that Hitler was a willful person who was inclined to make decisions without a sober assessment of the facts obtained from intelligence sources, and insisted on seeing the situation in the way most nearly in accord with his own wishes and intentions.

The voluntarism and irrationalism, embodied in the ideology, policies and practical actions of German Fascism, have been inherited by today's Bonn political leaders. They preach the bankrupt goals of *revanchism*, hatch adventuristic, aggressive plans, and seek to acquire nuclear arms.

The sociopolitical roots of the adventurism of the U.S. political and military leadership lie in the predatory nature of imperialism, in the hatred of U.S. political and military figures toward socialism, and in their antipopular policies. Pragmatism and a variant, instrumentalism, serve as the philosophical basis for U.S. policy and military doctrine. Pragmatism views objective reality not as it is in reality but rather from the standpoint of the utility of the goals it states for itself. William James, the founder of pragmatism, claimed that reality is passively subordinate to people's goals and desires, their will and aspirations.

Many U.S. political and military figures today adhere to these views. Therefore they do not wish to take into account the real world balance of power or the will of peoples for peace and their endeavor to prevent another war. The philosophy which guides U.S. political and military figures impels them onto the path of adventurism and excludes the possibility of objective comprehension of reality.

The political and military leaders of the socialist nations naturally cannot ignore the fact that there are individuals among the leaders of the armed forces and the governments of the imperialist nations who are capable of unleashing another war. They are impelled to this by an animal hatred of socialism and by their philosophy, which ignores the

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
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truth of life and denies scientific analysis of objective reality in reaching critical decisions.

Thus a principle of and essential condition for correct political leadership is scientific substantiation of plans and their conformity with the realistic capabilities of the belligerent nation. Ignoring this vital requirement leads to failure and defeat.

The experience of history and analysis of the present situation teach us that **sober calculation of the correlation of forces between us and our adversary** constitutes an important principle of leadership in a war. Correct calculation of the correlation of forces of the warring parties enables the political and military leadership to determine what is possible and what is impossible in the course of war, to foresee the adversary's probable actions and to select the most effective methods and forms of armed struggle under various conditions.

Exaggeration of one's own and underestimation of the enemy's forces as well as ignoring the adversary's economic, moral and military potential lead to adventurism, to unrealistic war plans, and, in the final analysis, to total failure. This path is frequently taken by the governments of imperialist nations, unleashing aggressive wars against peace-loving peoples and suppressing the national liberation movement. One cannot say that they totally discount the necessity of taking into consideration the correlation of forces. Even the imperialists must take into consideration what the other side has at its disposal. But when unleashing war they usually count more on the temporary than on the permanent factors which determine its outcome.

There is no question that the gross exaggeration by Hitler and his advisers of the forces and resources at the disposal of Fascist Germany prior to the attack on the Soviet Union and their confidence in the swift collapse of the Red Army, the strength of which they clearly underestimated, in considering it, to use Hitler's phrase, "a clay giant without a head," exerted considerable influence on the decision of the Fascist German political leadership to attack the USSR. The Fascist leaders' underestimation of the resources of the Soviet Union and its army, its potential capabilities, was founded on an exaggerated feeling of military superiority, which had been engendered by the swift and easy victories over the armies of the occupied European nations.

In undertaking the attack on the Soviet Union, the political leadership of Fascist Germany attached excessive importance to attendant factors. Fascist Germany's political and military figures, as a consequence of their narrow class outlook, were unable to recognize the strength and validity of the socialist social and governmental system or to assess correctly the economic and military potential of the USSR;

they failed to see those factors which cement together the Soviet society and which give it a special monolithic character. Planning a "blitzkrieg" war against the Soviet Union, the Hitlerites were counting on intimidating, shattering, paralyzing the Soviet people and gaining an easy victory. The insane plans of the Fascist strategists suffered total failure.

Exaggeration of their own forces and underestimation of the forces and capabilities of a freedom-loving people led to the failure of the aggressive plans of U.S. ruling circles in the Korean War of 1950-53. U.S. political and military leaders were counting on a quick, easy victory over the Korean People's Army. But U.S. government figures and Pentagon generals overestimated the military superiority of the United States. They failed to take into account the indomitable will of the Korean people and their army to resist the aggressor, to fight for their freedom and independence, and the assistance which could be, and in fact was, given the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the fraternal socialist nations.

Miscalculation in U.S. political and military leadership is also evident in the war in Vietnam, which was started by the American imperialists. The enormous might of the U.S. armed forces proved unable to crush the will of the freedom-loving Vietnamese people. In a war against a people which has risen up in defense of its freedom and independence it is impossible to determine the correlation of forces proceeding solely from the number of aircraft and guns of one or the other side.

U.S. political and military leaders are making preparations for war against the USSR and the other socialist nations, counting on destroying the very system of socialism. The bankruptcy of these calculations of the U.S. imperialists is obvious. They do not correspond to the actual present world correlation of forces.

Rejecting an adventurist, antiscientific approach to political leadership and leadership in a war, the Communist Party always demands strict calculation of the actual correlation of forces, the capabilities and potential of our nation and the adversary. The CPSU and Soviet government rely on the well-known statement by Lenin: "The most dangerous thing in war is to underestimate the adversary and to be complacent in the idea that we are stronger."⁹ Organizing resistance to the enemy, our party and the Soviet government endeavored to take into consideration the enemy's actual forces and resources and in conformity with this mobilized the nation's resources. Testimony to this is the experience of the Great Patriotic War and our epoch-making victory over Hitlerite Germany.

The principle of taking into consideration the correlation of forces between us and the enemy has assumed particular importance with the

danger that the imperialists will unleash another world war. Because of this danger, the strengthening of our nation's defensive capability is also important. The particular importance of the principle of taking into account the correlation of forces under present-day conditions lies in the fact that the revolution in military affairs has exerted and continues to exert great influence on the correlation of forces between opposing coalitions; today it is important to take into consideration first of all the possession of nuclear weapons and means of delivering them to the target. The fact is that employment of mass destruction weapons can suddenly and swiftly alter the correlation of all other forces and capabilities possessed by the adversaries prior to the outbreak of hostilities. This constitutes a qualitatively new aspect in the process of fighting for victory in the war of today.

The advent of nuclear weapons and new methods of warfare occasioned by the existence of these weapons, as well as the very nature of a potential future world war, impose severe demands on the political leadership, compelling them to give particular attention to the correlation of forces with the adversary and to seek a favorable change in this balance.

The CPSU and Soviet government constantly maintain at the required level the military and economic might of the Soviet Union as well as our moral-political potential. They are constantly concerned with strengthening the Armed Forces. Faced by military preparations on the part of the imperialist powers, the Communist Party is doing everything required in order to reliably defend our homeland against imperialist aggression. "... The CPSU considers it essential," states the Party Program, "to maintain the defense might of the Soviet State and the combat readiness of its Armed Forces at a level ensuring decisive and total defeat of any enemy who dares attack the Soviet Motherland."¹⁰

One of the most important principles of political leadership elaborated by Lenin is the principle of the **basic link**. This principle is also manifested in leadership in a war.

War as a special state of society comprises a complex social phenomenon which encompasses a system of the most diversified relationships. The political and military leaders of a nation at war are faced with many interrelated tasks, successful accomplishment of which results in victory. Not all of these tasks, however, are identical in importance, although they are closely linked with one another; not every one is decisive in the overall complex of tasks facing the political and military leaders at a given moment.

This is why we attach the greatest importance to Lenin's statement that "one must have the ability to find at each specific moment that

specific link in the chain, which one must grasp with all one's might, in order to hold the entire chain and to prepare firmly for advance to the next link. . . ." ¹¹

The ability to determine promptly and correctly the main and deciding element in the interrelationship of the complex processes of war, to find during the course of the entire war or during individual phases those elements of the main task the accomplishment of which will produce victory over the enemy, constitutes an essential indication of the scientific nature and content of political and military leadership. This undoubtedly requires great experience, perspicacity and flexibility of thinking on the part of political and military figures.

Lenin provided graphic and instructive examples of such leadership during the years of Civil War and foreign military intervention. At the beginning of the armed struggle against superior enemy forces, our Party leader felt that the basic link and principal task of strategic importance was strengthening of the rear, development of the economy and supply to the young Red Army of everything necessary to defeat the enemy. He warned our Party and the whole nation that "the finest army and those persons who are totally dedicated to the cause of the revolution will be immediately destroyed by the enemy if they are inadequately armed and fed. . . ." ¹²

Analyzing the state of affairs at the fronts, Lenin skillfully and promptly determined where the Red Army's main efforts should be concentrated. When the principal danger was on the Eastern Front, he proposed a total effort against Kolchak. At other critical moments in the war, the leader of the revolution demanded that the main efforts be focused against Denikin, Yudenich, and Wrangel.

Lenin also devoted attention to major problems the solution of which determined the combat capability of the troops, their high moral-political state. The task was to raise the level of troop combat training, training of command personnel, strengthening of personnel discipline, indoctrination of a high spirit of aggressiveness in the troops, etc.

The principle of the basic link is quite multifaceted. This principle expresses the relationship between the general, the particular, and the individual. It demands that one examine the progress of a war effort from the position of concreteness of truth, solving given problems and accomplishing given tasks, taking into account conditions, e.g., place and time, as well as capabilities.

Guided by this most important principle, the CPSU, Soviet government, and Soviet Supreme High Command skillfully accomplished during the course of the Great Patriotic War both general and specific tasks and

missions, which ensured defeat of the enemy on the various fronts and the attainment of victory over Hitlerite Germany and its allies.

We shall cite a few examples illustrating the truth of this principle. At the outbreak of the war the Soviet political and military leadership defined and successfully accomplished the complex task—one involving our entire people—of swiftly reorganizing the entire country on a war footing, uniting front and rear into a single armed camp for the struggle against the Fascist German invaders. During the course of the war the Party, government and Supreme High Command focused their attention on the accomplishment of specific, highly important tasks: rapid transformation of newly organized formations into regular troops; improvement in the fighting skills of Soviet enlisted personnel and officers; establishment of guerilla operations behind enemy lines; conduct of strategic operations with the objective of encircling and destroying large enemy forces, etc.

In the area of foreign policy the Communist Party and Soviet government succeeded in accomplishing the important task of the establishment of an anti-Hitler coalition, which played an enormous role in defeating the common enemy. The CPSU and the government took guidance thereby from Lenin's statement that when engaged in struggle against a powerful adversary one must have the ability to find a "mass ally, even if he is temporary, shaky, unreliable, and provisional. He who fails to understand this understands nothing of Marxism, and understands nothing at all about scientific, modern socialism."¹³ Displaying great endurance and flexibility in relations with their allies, the Soviet political leaders exposed the sordid schemes of the Anglo-American imperialist circles aimed against the USSR and at the same time worked to strengthen the anti-Fascist coalition and to unite all forces for defeat of a common enemy.

In the postwar period the interests of ensuring our Motherland's security dictated the necessity of putting an end to the U.S. atomic weapons monopoly and blocking the insane plans of imperialist reaction to hold absolute command over the fate of mankind and to impose its will on other peoples.

Accomplishing this vitally important task, the CPSU and Soviet government supervised the development of qualitatively new, powerful weapons, the organization of their mass production and adoption by the Armed Forces. The Soviet Armed forces were radically reorganized on this basis; they were brought into conformity with the character and features of modern warfare. The system of troop training and indoctrination was radically altered, and military theory and practice received further development.

In examining this principle, one must take into consideration the fact that it is not easy to determine the basic link in the activities of the political and military leadership at every specific moment. For this it is essential to have a clear picture of the entire complex of tasks to be accomplished and to possess the ability to foresee the events of war and the development of strategic operations and individual battles. "The entire art of leadership and politics," stresses Lenin, "consists in promptly taking into consideration and knowing where to concentrate one's main forces and attention."¹⁴

An important principle of political leadership in the area of the military is the **transformation of realistic possibilities of victory into actuality**. The transformation of potential into reality in societal affairs, particularly in such a complex and diversified phenomenon as war, constitutes a very conflictive process. The possibility of victory in the course of war takes form and ripens as a result of the interaction of diverse factors which influence in a specific fashion the development of military operations.

History contains many examples where governments have overlooked workable opportunities to gain victory in war. In some cases this occurred because the ruling circles of given states, guided by selfish and narrow class aims, deliberately refused to engage in vigorous combat operations, contrary to the desire of their peoples and obligations to their allies. In other cases the political and military leadership proved unable to foresee the course of war, to take into consideration new phenomena and trends, and to mobilize the country's inner potential, the forces of the people and army to defeat the enemy.

At the beginning of World War II, for example, the governments of the Western powers possessed the realistic capability of halting the Fascist aggression. They had adequate manpower and resources to defeat Hitler's army in short order and to win the war. We should recall that when Germany invaded Poland it possessed slightly more than 100 divisions, 4400 aircraft, 100 large warships and submarines, while Great Britain, France and Poland had 165 divisions, 8300 aircraft, and more than 500 large warships. Nevertheless British and French ruling circles waged a war against Germany in 1939-40 which today is frequently called "the war of wasted opportunities." This passivity in combat against the enemy, rare in history, was dictated by the anti-Soviet policy of the imperialist circles in these countries.

Recalling the attitude of the ruling circles in the Western nations at that time, General de Gaulle stated the following in his memoirs: "... Some circles saw Stalin rather than Hitler as the enemy. They were more concerned with inflicting damage on Russia—by assisting Finland, bombing Baku, or landing troops in Istanbul—than with the question of how to deal with Germany."¹⁵

Also typical in this regard is the position of the U.S. government on the eve of World War II. William Foster, a prominent figure in the international Communist movement, subsequently commented that the President of the United States "had turned down urgent proposals by the Soviet Union to establish an international peace front and thus doomed these proposals to failure; he capitulated to the 'appeasers of Munich.'" ¹⁶ Instead of utilizing its military and economic potential to restrain the aggressor, the U.S. government in essence encouraged him. When in May 1938 the Hitlerites were preparing for their march into the Sudetenland, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull declared that the United States should not at that time take any action against Hitler. U.S. Ambassador to Britain Kennedy, in a conversation with German Ambassador Dirksen on 13 June, promised Hitlerite Germany a "free hand" in the East and Southeast.

Consumed by anti-Soviet policy, government leaders in the Western nations failed to see the immediate threat hanging over them and failed to take advantage of the practical possibility of eliminating this threat. While the Hitlerite army was intensively preparing to expand aggression, the British and French governments were taking no serious steps to prepare to repel this aggression. This played into Hitler's hands. Germany dealt with its enemies one at a time. First it crushed Poland and a number of other small countries, and then occupied France and inflicted a serious defeat on Britain.

The history of the last war has confirmed that nations and armies inevitably suffer defeat if their governments display confusion and indecisiveness, prove unable to organize resistance against the enemy and fail to take advantage of existing opportunities. Take the sad experience of France. This country was fairly strong economically; it had the fourth largest industrial output in the capitalist world. When the war broke out France had a well-equipped, well-trained army. And what was most important, the French people and army were resolved to defend their Motherland against the Fascist invasion.

France possessed a realistic capability of engaging in a long and stubborn struggle against the Fascist invaders and winning out in such a struggle. But nevertheless France was quickly defeated. Why did this happen? The blame for the defeat of France lay with the French government and the reactionary bourgeois parties in power. Instead of utilizing existing capability, instead of raising up the people and the army to repulse the Fascist invasion, they engaged in a struggle against progressive elements within the country. Precisely on the eve of the Hitlerite invasion the French Communist Party was outlawed. The government issued a decree ordering the disbanding of many labor organizations.

Fascist elements and traitors to the French people sharply stepped up their activities under these conditions.

When the Fascist German forces approached Paris, the Central Committee of the French Communist Party proposed to the government that the general populace be mobilized to defend the capital. The Communist Party demanded that the war against the German Fascists be transformed into a popular war for the liberation of France, that tens of thousands of imprisoned revolutionary workers be set free, that enemy agents in the legislature, ministries and the general staff be arrested, that the people be armed and that Paris be transformed into an impregnable fortress. But the reactionary government rejected these proposals. It feared its own people more than the Hitlerites and adopted a policy of capitulation to the enemy.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government demonstrated during World War II an example of how one should mobilize the people and army to gain victory, to utilize with maximum effectiveness a nation's military, economic, and moral-political potential. In all their activities pertaining to directing the war effort, they proceeded from Lenin's statement, ". . . If things go as far as war, then everything should be subordinated to the interests of the war; all the country's domestic affairs must be subordinated to the war effort; not the slightest vacillation in this regard should be tolerated."¹⁷

It is not our intention in this article to analyze the multifaceted activities of the Communist Party during the last war. This question has been treated in detail by Soviet literature on the subject. We must merely emphasize that the Party's enormous organizational effort and its political and ideological activities on the front and in the rear enabled our people and the Armed Forces to overcome the serious setbacks of the initial phase of the war, to halt a powerful enemy and subsequently to deliver a decisive defeat to the enemy. Thanks to the leadership of the Communist Party, the advantages of the Soviet social and governmental system, the socialist economy and our military organization were implemented, advantages which brought with them the possibility of victory over Hitlerite Germany. This victory was indeed achieved.

Thus the historic victories of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces in World War II were the result of correct political leadership and intelligent utilization of all the potentials of the socialist state.

The problem of intelligent utilization of realistic possibilities of victory over the enemy and their transformation into reality has assumed particular significance under present-day conditions. The Communist Party and Soviet government are aware of the fact that the transformation of this potential into reality must be effected under conditions of the con-

stant danger of nuclear missile war. This is why they are tirelessly concerned with the development and improvement of all kinds of war materiel, are strengthening the military and economic might of the Soviet State, are increasing the combat effectiveness and readiness of the Armed Forces, are teaching our people vigilance, and are strengthening friendship with the fraternal socialist nations and the fighting alliance with their armed forces. Jointly with the political leaders of the other socialist nations, the CPSU and Soviet government are taking all necessary steps to nip in the bud any and all aggressive schemes on the part of the imperialists.

2. The Increased Role of Political Leadership and the Necessity of Raising Its Scientific Level

The possibility of a nuclear missile world war with its serious consequences and the enormous effort of concentration of all the forces and resources which will be needed to gain victory, have increased the role of political leadership to an even greater degree. Bourgeois military theorists are also aware of this. In their scholarly studies they speak more and more frequently of the necessity of sober national political leadership and its increased role and responsibility during war.

What is the reason for the increased role of political leadership? In our opinion it is the increased complexity of the many problems political leaders must solve under present-day conditions.

In the first place, the answer to the most critical question of our day depends in large part on the political leadership: Is there or is there not to be a thermonuclear world war?

Second, the decision to employ such devastating arms as nuclear weapons has become the exclusive prerogative of the political leadership. It is primarily the political, not the military leaders who determine the necessity of employing weapons of mass destruction, who specify the principal targets and when they are to be hit.

Third, since a world war will be of a coalition nature, it becomes necessary to establish a unified political leadership of the coalition as a whole. This coalition leadership should be competent, should possess considerable power, and at the same time should be extremely flexible.

Fourth, only those states which are capable of utilizing with maximum effectiveness all their military, economic, and moral-political potential from the very beginning of the war will be able to withstand a thermonuclear war. And this, as has already been stated, requires experienced and perspicacious political leadership.

Fifth, a great deal depends on the ability and timeliness of the political leadership in discovering an aggressor's immediate preparations to attack, determining his intentions and making the decision to carry out a devastating retaliatory strike.

Sixth, during the course of a nuclear missile world war itself, the political leadership must effectively resolve problems of such immense complexity and scope as the world has never known. And, under present conditions, these problems will have to be resolved in a different way, *with different methods*, and by a different timetable than in the past.

These, then, are the major factors which dictate the objective process of increasing the role of political leadership in the military sphere.

Determination of war aims is a responsibility of the political leadership. Lenin's maxim to the effect that the nature of political objectives is of decisive importance for gaining victory in war is particularly relevant under present-day conditions. These goals should be crystal clear, convincing to the general populace, and strictly in accord with the manpower, resources and capabilities of one's own country and the countries of the coalition.

The political leaders must bear in mind the fact that the objectives of the war for which they are preparing must be clear and convincing not only to the peoples of their own country and their allies but also to the peoples and governments of neutral nations. This will make it possible to draw them over to one's side during the course of the war. The imperialists will pursue inhuman, predatory, and antipopular aims. This will determine the attitude of peoples toward the war and toward the warring coalitions. This is why political leaders of the socialist states must tirelessly and constantly expose the sinister schemes of the imperialists to the entire world.

The political leadership **formulates a military doctrine** that takes into consideration the nature of a future war, the resources and capabilities of the opposing sides, and the present level of development of military affairs. Military doctrine consists of views officially adopted in the state and in the armed forces having to do with the nature of a potential war and means of conducting it, as well as requirements stemming from these views relative to military development and preparation of the country and its armed forces for war. Its contents encompass fundamental problems of politics and economics, as well as specific problems of preparing for war and determining the methods and forms of armed struggle.

Correct, scientifically substantiated doctrine makes it possible to successfully conduct preparations for a potential war, and to gain victory

when war becomes fact. An erroneous and adventuristic military doctrine can propel a state into an abyss and lead it to destruction.

The United States, the leading nation of the capitalist world, subscribed to the doctrine of so-called "massive retaliation" up to approximately 1961. This doctrine called for the preparation and waging of a general nuclear war against the USSR and the other socialist nations, regardless of the scope and nature of the conflict. In order to conceal its aggressive nature, it was also called the doctrine of "massive retaliatory strike."

As a result of eminent success by the Soviet Union in the area of rocket engineering as well as in the development of nuclear weapons, the doctrine of "massive retaliation" was a total failure and was soon replaced by the doctrine of "flexible response." This new doctrine, which became official in 1961, expresses the same adventuristic, aggressive schemes of the U.S. imperialists which were proclaimed by them when they possessed a nuclear arms monopoly. In its political essence it is a doctrine of aggression, again aimed against the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist commonwealth.

In addition to the doctrine of "flexible response," the theory of "escalation," claimed as the "latest discovery" in the area of military theory, has gained strong influence in the United States. This theory was formulated by Herman Kahn, who wrote a book entitled *On Escalation: Metaphors and the General Picture*. He made no new discoveries. His book is a synthesis of strategic concepts already known and permeated with the aggressive aspirations of U.S. political leaders and with the U.S. imperialists' hatred of the socialist nations. The theory of "escalation" calls for the invasion of other countries by American armed forces, an increase in the scope of armed struggle, and a stepped-up offensive effort, right up to an unlimited nuclear missile war on a global scale.

The aggressive and adventuristic essence of U.S. military doctrine is obvious. The war it calls for against the USSR and the entire socialist community will not bring victory to the United States.

Also essentially fallacious is the military doctrine of the FRG, which expresses the aggressive schemes of West German ruling circles. It is constructed on the calculation of possessing nuclear missile weapons in one form or another. Obviously the lessons of history have taught German imperialism nothing. Those who survived Germany's most recent defeat have once again embraced the old doctrine, justifying and rationalizing their miscalculations and crimes in their personal memoirs. While the Schlieffen Plan brought Germany to Versailles, while the doctrine of "blitzkrieg" and "total war" proved in fact to be a path leading to

countless cemeteries containing German enlisted men and officers and to the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany, the present views of the West German politicians and generals, tending toward the unleashing of a thermonuclear world war, can lead them only to total destruction.

As regards Soviet military doctrine, its essence is defined by the character of our social and governmental system, by the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet State. The military doctrine elaborated by the Soviet political and military leadership is fundamentally different from the military doctrines of imperialist states. It is based on Marxist-Leninist principles regarding war and the army. It embodies both a dialectical materialist approach to solving the problems of war and peace as well as a comprehensive consideration of the experience of past wars and everything new provided by contemporary military theory and practice. It stems from a realistic and sober assessment of the economic, moral-political, and military potential of the Soviet State and its allies on the one hand, and of the member nations of imperialist military blocs on the other.

Our doctrine has been developed on the basis of guiding directives of the Communist Party and takes into account the latest advances in military science. It includes a comprehensive assessment of the nature of a future war and its sociopolitical essence, and determines the means and methods of reliably defending the Soviet Motherland and the other socialist states against imperialist aggression.

The CPSU and the other fraternal parties bear in mind the fact that "it is possible to defeat a powerful and cunning adversary such as imperialism only by opposing it with, in addition to resoluteness and absolute willingness to struggle, sober political calculations, coolness and self-control. The Communists oppose this adversary with a strategy which is based on a scientific analysis of the correlation of forces within the country and in the international arena."¹⁸

The activities of the political leadership in the military sphere are not limited to the elaboration of military doctrine. Preparing the nation to repel imperialist aggression, the Communist Party and Soviet government are constantly concerned with strengthening the country's **economic might**. They act on the basis of Lenin's principle that "one must prepare for war at length, seriously, beginning with building up the country economically. . . ." ¹⁹

Carrying out this behest of Lenin, our Party and the Soviet government are devoting special attention to development of the defense industry. "Based on the industrial and technological growth of the Soviet national economy, our defense industry is growing steadily in every

area," stated the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, A. N. Kosygin, in his report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU.²⁰ Instrument engineering, specialized metallurgy, the rocket industry, the jet aircraft industry, shipbuilding, nuclear power engineering, electronics, cybernetics, automation and remote control engineering are all being rapidly developed. This makes it possible to outfit the Soviet Armed Forces with the most sophisticated weapons and other combat equipment.

Today there is a new relationship between war and the national economy. At the very outbreak of a nuclear missile war the economies of the belligerent nations will be subjected to large-scale destruction. Therefore one can no longer assume that supply to the combat forces can be ensured by mobilizing the nation's economic resources as the war progresses. The course and outcome of a nuclear missile war will also be determined by stores of weapons, combat materiel, gear, ammunition, foodstuffs, strategic raw materials, etc., which had been stockpiled before the war.

The nature and features of modern war oblige the political leadership to approach a nation's economic preparations for war in a new manner. An exceptionally large and important role has been assumed by scientific planning and control of the economy of the entire country, high scientific-technological levels in the area of production of advanced war materiel, and attainment of military-technological superiority over the enemy. It is extremely important not only to make a timely provision for maintaining a high level of production when needed so that the necessary supplies can be stockpiled, but also to ensure that the economy is at its maximum stability.

To ensure the viability of a nation's economy during a nuclear missile war, the political leaders must implement a number of special measures in advance. They include duplication, dispersal and concealment of important economic installations, as well as the establishment of an effective antiaircraft and antimissile defense system.

The socialist nations possess indisputable advantages over capitalist countries with respect to the economic organization of society and the necessity of planned development of all sectors of the economy. But this does not remove responsibility from the shoulders of the political leaders of the socialist nations for utilization of the objective advantages of the socialist economic system. The better the political leadership understands how the economic laws of socialism work and the sooner the latest methods of economic management based on the latest scientific advances are adopted, the more successful will be the preparations made to ready the nation's economy to repel imperialist aggression.

The political leadership is faced with totally new problems and tasks in connection with the necessity of **organizing civil defense**, which cannot be compared in any way with the local air defense of World War II.

Civil defense today is a system of nationwide measures, carried out in peacetime by the political leadership, both with the objective of protecting the civilian population and economic installations against weapons of mass destruction or weakening the effects of these weapons, as well as ensuring normal operations and activities of the country's administrative and political centers. Civil defense tasks also include conducting rescue and emergency repair operations in centers of destruction.

Obviously there will be a mass evacuation of the population from densely populated cities, major industrial and administrative centers. It will begin at the moment a threat arises, when it becomes obvious to the political leaders that war is unlikely to be avoided. In addition to taking these measures, it becomes extremely important to train the population in methods of protection against nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons as well as in operations to neutralize the effects of an enemy attack.

Ensuring the continued operation of industrial, power, transportation and communications facilities under conditions of a nuclear missile war and organization of protection of livestock, crops, food and water supplies against radioactive, chemical and bacteriological contamination demands particularly extensive and intensive effort. To achieve this objective, during peacetime the political leaders must accomplish the tasks connected with establishing and maintaining special civil defense forces at the requisite level and organizing a warning and communications system.

Thorough and comprehensive preparation of the population for war demands an intensive effort on the part of the political leadership. This preparation and training is conducted in the most diversified areas: involvement of the population in all civil defense measures, military training, etc. But the most important task is to prepare the population for war in a moral-political and psychological sense.

All efforts by the political leadership in this area should be conducted with consideration of the fact that in a future war the enemy will employ weapons of mass destruction. This imposes exceptionally high demands on the moral-political, psychological and physical steadfastness of the population and its ability to endure a nuclear missile war and to withstand unprecedented physical and psychological stresses.

Moral-political and psychological preparation of the population for war means indoctrinating in Soviet citizens staunchness, courage, faith

in victory, a sense of collectivism, mutual assistance, skills and habits of intelligent and effective actions under the most difficult conditions of a potential nuclear war. It is these qualities that will make it possible to function with maximum effectiveness if the enemy employs weapons of mass destruction, in neutralizing the consequences of a nuclear attack, in aiding casualties, fighting fires, etc. The ability of the population to overcome the difficult trials of war is a most important condition for ensuring the stability and effectiveness of operation of the economy and of government institutions.

One must realize that in order to weaken the morale of the peoples of the socialist nations, the enemy will make extensive use of ideological diversionary activities. Vigorous psychological warfare is already being waged right now, in peacetime. This effort will assume an incomparably larger scale with the initiation of aggression. The enemy possesses extensive means and a large, special organization to achieve these ends. The United States, West Germany and England have set up a network of special-purpose radio stations along the borders of our country and other socialist nations and are waging an intensive, hostile propaganda campaign against us.

The effectiveness of the moral-psychological training of our country's population depends in large measure on fulfilling the requirements of the CPSU and Soviet government for observing strict state and Party discipline, and on a thorough understanding on the part of Soviet citizens, particularly young people, of their responsibility for meeting their obligations and carrying out their duty to the Motherland and their fellow citizens.

Examining the question of the role of political leadership in resolving major political and military problems, we should also state that the international position of a given country and its relations with other nations depend in large measure on the specific activities of governments and ruling parties. Under today's conditions it is extremely important for political leaders to pursue an intelligent foreign policy and to resolve the fundamental problems of foreign policy in a sober and highly responsible manner.

Lenin's statement that in a complex and tense situation it is essential to keep calm, to maintain self-control, to avoid succumbing to the enemy's military provocations, to avoid hasty and ill-conceived actions and not to allow oneself to be drawn into war has today acquired particular importance in the activities of the political leaders of the socialist nations. At the same time it is extremely important to promptly take the requisite effective measures to hold the forces of aggression in check.

A potential nuclear war would impose extraordinarily high demands on governments and supreme military bodies. Only those countries whose political and military leaders provide for a **genuinely scientific approach** to solving the problems of modern warfare can count on victory in such a war. Thus the problem of scientific leadership of society and the armed forces as well as strengthening of a nation's defensive might is today of primary importance.

Lenin viewed a scientific approach to societal processes as one of the fundamental tasks of the political leadership under the conditions of socialism. Development of a socialist society is effected on the basis of the dialectical interaction of objective laws and subjective factors. The essence of scientific leadership consists precisely in achieving the best correspondence between the subjective activities of leaders and the general populace on the one hand the demands of the objective laws of development of the socialist society on the other.

The scientific political leadership exercised by the Party's Central Committee and the Soviet government on a nationwide scale is an extraordinarily complex and multifaceted process. In the area of domestic policy the aim is to achieve an all-out increase in the effectiveness of all socialist production as an essential condition for building communism and mobilizing the creative vigor of the Soviet people for accomplishing the current tasks of developing communism. In the area of foreign policy the task is to secure peaceful conditions for building socialism and communism, to strengthen the unity and solidarity of the socialist nations, to support peoples fighting for their national and social liberation, and to develop solidarity and cooperation with the young independent nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, while affirming the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations with capitalist nations.

The most important thing in the activities of the political leadership consists in the following: the political leadership, scientifically determining the principal tasks facing the people and armed forces throughout an entire historical period, finds the most expedient and effective methods and means of accomplishing them, the ways to attain the stated goals. The political leaders, supported by revolutionary Marxist-Leninist theory, proceed from a sober assessment of the stage of societal development attained and the actual resources and capabilities at the disposal of our socialist state and the socialist commonwealth as a whole. This makes it possible to avoid subjectivism, to distribute manpower and resources correctly, and to guide and direct the masses in the accomplishment of specific tasks.

The increased role of scientific leadership of society, the development of communism and defense of the socialist state is advanced to the

foreground by the realities of life. The party teaches us that only on the basis of a scientific foresight of the scope, pace, and timetable of the country's economic and scientific-technological advances over an entire historical period is it possible for our socialist economy—the foundation of the military strength of the USSR—to grow and develop successfully.

Thus the necessity of raising the scientific level of political leadership constitutes objective inherent logic under present-day conditions. This has been dictated by a number of most important circumstances. We shall name a few of them.

First of all, the necessity of a scientific approach to leadership in the affairs of our society has been dictated by the very nature of socialism. It is possible to build communism only through conformity of people's conscious activities with the demands of objective laws and developing social practice—objective reality. Development of material production, culture, and strengthening of the defensive might of the USSR are not spontaneous but inherently logical processes. Therefore they demand conscious and aware leadership, a knowledge of theory and science. The Central Committee Summary Report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU states, "No society has been in such need of scientific theory as the socialist society. Therefore theory should continue in the future to pave the way for practical activity, ensuring a rigorously scientific approach to leadership in the economic and cultural affairs of the Soviet people."²¹

Second, the involvement of unprecedentedly large masses of people in social progress, their vigorous and conscious activity in the most diversified areas of societal affairs demands a higher level of scientific leadership. It is necessary to direct the activities of the masses taking part in the complex processes of societal affairs, to direct their energy, will and activity. Leading huge masses of people in the process of developing communism demands that the leaders maintain constant contact with these masses, be in their midst, be aware of and familiar with their attitudes and needs, and know the conditions under which their activities are taking place. Lenin taught Communists and officials of all agencies of the socialist state that "... we are able to govern only when we correctly express that of which the people are conscious."²²

Third, the need to raise the scientific level of political leadership is dictated by growth in the scale and increasing complexity of the tasks facing the Soviet Union, including those in the area of strengthening its military might.

Raising the scientific level of its political activities, the CPSU takes the Leninist style of leadership as a model. Lenin formulated a number of most important principles, rules, and requirements, which characterize his entire activity. They include: objectivity and knowledgeability; scien-

tific analysis of the concrete situation and concrete facts; efficiency and effectiveness of leadership; unity of word and deed, theory and practice; a sense of the new and an ability to foresee the course of events; democratic centralism, a combination of collective responsibility in reaching a decision and one-man responsibility for execution; a critical assessment of performance results. Observance of these Leninist principles of leadership constitutes a definite guarantee of successful accomplishment of all political tasks facing our people.

A rigorously scientific approach is also extremely necessary in leadership in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, development of military affairs and armed struggle. Lenin taught that "it is impossible to build a modern army without science."²³ Disregard for the demands of science, its conclusions and recommendations in the process of military leadership has serious consequences even in peacetime.

Why has the problem of scientific level of leadership in the area of the military become so important today? First and foremost because the very nature of modern warfare has changed. The armed forces will be compelled to execute unbelievably difficult and large-scale missions which impose special demands on the military leadership. In addition, scientific-technological progress and the related revolution in military affairs have required a thorough understanding of the new phenomena caused by scientific and technological advances. Military theory and practice are constantly developing, while new weapons and combat equipment, as well as the methods and forms of military operations, are continuously being perfected. All this should be rigorously taken into account by the military leadership. Finally, the need for further improvement of methods of troop leadership, methods of training and indoctrination of personnel, and training of command personnel has assumed critical importance. "Under these conditions," writes Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov, "the role of scientifically substantiated methods of leadership based on objective laws and inherent logic, in resolving all problems of military development, has grown immeasurably. Development of new types of weapons and equipment, the directions and proportions of emphasis in this growth and development, further improvement in the structure of the Armed Forces, combat training of military personnel, moral-political indoctrination of personnel and other matters should all be determined in conformity with the demands of modern warfare, the laws of our Marxist-Leninist military science, and the interests of reliably ensuring the security of the Soviet State."²⁴

To exercise scientific leadership, of all armed forces activities means to observe strictly the demands of the objective laws of warfare, to adhere to the principles deriving from these laws, and to reach decisions which are in conformity with the demands of life, the concrete situation, and

evolving practical activity. In other words scientific military leadership is expressed in knowledge of the conclusions and recommendations of military science and other sciences which are linked in one way or another with military affairs, and intelligent implementation of these conclusions and recommendations. Such leadership calls for observance of the principle of unity of theory and practice, verification of theoretical principles by experience, experiment, and all practical military activity.

Genuinely scientific military leadership is a difficult and complex matter. But only such leadership can ensure successful solution of the problems facing the Armed Forces at present. Bearing this fact in mind, our party is constantly concerned to ensure that the leadership and direction of national defense and the Armed Forces is at all times in conformity with the demands of science, which synthesizes practical military data and reveals development trends.

The entire military policy of the CPSU is based on a profound scientific analysis of the character of modern war, its causes, the relationship between war and politics, and determination of the tasks and means of defense of the socialist homeland. CPSU military policy is expressed in Soviet military doctrine.

Materialist dialectics is the methodological foundation of scientific military leadership. Only from the standpoint of materialist dialectics can one gain a profound knowledge of the laws of warfare and determine the development trends in military affairs, the means and methods of waging war. Hence the necessity for our top-level personnel to possess a thorough mastery of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and to make practical application of the laws of materialist dialectics and the principles of dialectical logic. Genuinely scientific military leadership is impossible without this.

Scientific leadership of our Armed Forces finds concrete expression in practical implementation of the principles of Soviet Armed Forces development elaborated by the Party. Lenin stated, "The development of our army led to successful results only because it was created in the spirit of general Soviet development. . . ." ²⁰ This principle is of great methodological significance. It signifies that the substantive processes and phenomena which are occurring in our society in the course of developing communism find expression in one form or another in development of the Armed Forces.

Our party's genuinely scientific approach to solving contemporary military problems and its perspicacity in the area of military development were clearly manifested in the resolution of the important problem of the change in the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces and in establishment of the Strategic Rocket Forces. The CPSU and Soviet government carried

out this important measure in strict conformity with the demands of the time, taking into consideration change in the means, methods and forms of armed struggle.

Scientific foresight is one of the most important attributes of correct political and military leadership. Only on the basis of scientific foresight is it possible to successfully prepare the nation for possible war, to direct military development, and to promptly resolve the major problems connected with strengthening the nation's defensive capability and organizing resistance against the aggressor.

Scientific foresight in the military is based on a profound knowledge of the objective laws of societal affairs in general and war in particular, a dialectical analysis of the substantial, persisting and repeating links and relationships of the reality around us. It signifies the ability to foresee the course and results of various processes in military affairs and events in the course of armed struggle. Guided by Marxist-Leninist methodology, our Party and the Soviet government, as well as the Supreme Military Command, can foresee the occurrence of various phenomena, can gain knowledge of their development trends, can reveal all new developments in military affairs, and can determine the consequences of such developments.

The Soviet Supreme High Command demonstrated many excellent examples of scientific foresight during the Great Patriotic War. It relied thereby on knowledge of the laws of warfare, a sober, cool analysis of the manpower, resources and capabilities of the belligerents, and comprehension of the just nature of the struggle by the Soviet people against the Fascist German invaders. The foresight of our military leaders was based on correct consideration of the growing combat experience of the Soviet troops, the excellent moral-combat qualities of personnel, as well as the combat experience and generalship of our military leaders. The ability to foresee the course of events in the war enabled the military leadership to elaborate strategic plans successfully and to make and execute crucial decisions.

Without the ability to foresee the character of a future world war and development trends in military affairs it is impossible to elaborate a scientifically substantiated military doctrine, to provide effective leadership in military development, to ensure continued improvement in weapons, combat equipment and methods of their employment, to train and indoctrinate military personnel, and to train command personnel.

The peoples and armies of the socialist nations would be in mortal danger if their political and military leaders were unable to foresee insidious actions by the imperialists. It is precisely this ability at foresight which makes it possible to undertake in advance requisite steps to

strengthen the defense of our countries and to purposefully prepare the armed forces and the entire people for a possible future war.

While in the past miscalculations and erroneous actions on the eve of or at the outbreak of war were in many cases corrected subsequently, in a nuclear missile war an erroneous decision by political and military leaders and the inability to foresee the course of events are fraught with irreversible consequences. This is why under present-day conditions the role of foresight has become much greater in political and military leadership.

3. The Essence of Military Leadership and Its Role in Achieving War Aims

Direct leadership of the Armed Forces both in peacetime and in war is exercised by the Supreme High Command, the General Staff, and appropriate military leaders. And we call their diversified activities military leadership. It is carried out in accordance with the general directives given by the highest state political organ. In this sense one can state that military leadership occupies a position subordinate to that of political leadership and is controlled by the latter.

Top-level organs of military leadership engage in training the Armed Forces to carry out the functions assigned to them by the political leadership in peacetime, and in case of war they ensure that war goals are achieved through armed struggle. This is the function of top-level organs of military leadership, expressed in the most general form.

The achievement of victory in war is dictated first and foremost by skilled leadership in military operations. The most important fundamental statements pertaining to this matter have been formulated in the works of Lenin. In developing the teachings of Marx and Engels on directing the armed struggle of the masses, Lenin emphasized that this leadership is a great art which must be totally mastered by the political and military figures who head the Armed Forces. He taught that warfare is subordinated to "special laws, which one must thoroughly consider,"²⁶ and that in struggle with a powerful adversary, all else being equal, victory will go to the one who displays greater skill in leadership of troops, who ensures skillful combat by his forces, and who is able to apply the most effective methods of waging war and controlling the troops. In Lenin's writings we also find instructions to the effect that "one must be able to change the methods of fighting against the enemy when circumstances change."²⁷ Lenin's works contain many specific statements on the essence of directing military operations which are of fundamental importance to us even today.

Under present-day conditions the functions of top-level organs of military leadership are extremely complex and diversified. We shall

mention only a few of them. Organs of military leadership direct the development of military science, elaborate means of conducting warfare and methods of troop control; implement training and strategic deployment of the Armed Forces; organize personnel training and maintain fighting efficiency and combat readiness of the forces at the requisite level; direct the development of new types of weapons, combat equipment and gear, and effect their adoption; prepare and implement strategic decisions and combat operations plans for the Armed Forces, etc.

All activities of top-level organs of military leadership are subordinated to the attainment of the political objectives of a war. The supreme command develops strategic and operational plans in strict conformity with these objectives and on the basis of the military doctrine of the state.

A well-balanced organizational system for directing the Soviet Armed Forces was established during the Great Patriotic War. In accordance with a decree of the State Defense Committee, which during the war years embodied both political and military leadership in this country, the **General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command** was formed; it included several members from the Politburo, the Central Committee of the Party, the Chief of the General Staff, and a number of prominent commanders. The General Headquarters became the highest organ of strategic direction of the Soviet Armed Forces. It was headed by the Chairman of the State Defense Committee and Supreme High Commander, Joseph V. Stalin.

In describing Stalin's role in this post, we should emphasize that he was fully aware of the great responsibility which lay on his shoulders. He was distinguished by firmness of will, courage and confidence in victory, as well as an extraordinary capacity for work. The Supreme High Commander was thoroughly familiar with the situation on the front and in the rear. Three times daily (including at night) he would receive reports from the Chief of the General Staff and the chief of the operations directorate, and he would personally telephone the front and army commanders in order to give them the necessary instructions.

Many famous Soviet commanders, who were well acquainted with Stalin's activities during the war years and who received important instructions directly from him pertaining to the most varied situations, agree that Stalin was an outstanding military leader who possessed an excellent broad view of strategy, the ability to see the main point in the complex and changing processes of war and the ability to determine correctly the objectives of operations, military campaigns, and axes of main attack against the enemy. The Supreme High Commander listened to and considered the persuasive and well-substantiated opinions of front commanders, commanders of Armed Forces Services and branches, as

well as his closest subordinates; he took counsel with them on problems of war strategy. Stalin knew many generals and other commanders very well, showed concern for them, boldly assigned capable individuals to responsible posts, and kept informed on their activities.

The decisions made by the General Headquarters were the result of a collective effort. Commanders of fronts and Service branches, members of military councils, and heads of People's Commissariat of Defense directorates took part in making these decisions. Major strategic plans were reviewed by the State Defense Committee and the Party Central Committee. The Communist Party exerted constant influence in all areas of strategic leadership, which determined our successes in combat.

The main operating element of Supreme High Command General Headquarters was the **General Staff**, comprised of highly qualified generals and other officers. The General Staff performed important and responsible functions pertaining to leadership in armed struggle. It collected and synthesized information on the combat situation, analyzed the situation at the fronts, drew appropriate conclusions and submitted its recommendations to General Headquarters. On instructions from General Headquarters the General Staff drafted directives and orders of the Supreme High Command and followed up on their implementation; it developed plans for strategic operations and communicated them to the implementing organizations. It also dealt with problems of Armed Forces organization, control over the establishment and restoration of major field forces and formations, execution of operational-strategic troop movements, and handled many other problems pertaining to the direction and coordination of combat activities of all Services of the Armed Forces.

According to General of the Army Shtemenko, "the Supreme High Command General Headquarters and its operating organ—the General Staff—firmly controlled both the planning of campaigns and the direction of combat operations, distributed and assigned reserves, and kept careful watch on the development of events over the enormous territory involved in the war. No front or army made a move without their knowledge. Direct contact with the troops in the field was not lost for a single moment. Representatives of General Headquarters and the General Staff were present at all times in decisive sectors with the army in the field, verifying execution of directives and orders of the Supreme High Commander and making their own recommendations as to the course of combat."²⁸

During the Great Patriotic War, General Headquarters and the Supreme High Commander skillfully coordinated their actions with those of the front commanders. General Headquarters was promptly informed of the planning concepts and opinions of front commanders, and took their requests into consideration, insofar as they corresponded with the

higher level planning of our Supreme High Command. There were, of course, cases where General Headquarters, operating on the principle of efficient utilization of reserves, did not always satisfy the requests of the front commanders and sent reserves wherever the current strategic situation required. For example, the fresh Second Guards Army was transferred not to the Don, but to the Stalingrad Front, where there was a real threat of a breakthrough by Mannstein's forces, which aimed at linking up with the encircled forces of von Paulus.

Representatives from General Headquarters very frequently planned and executed major operations jointly with front commanders. For developing operations, front commanders would frequently be summoned to General Headquarters to plan and coordinate important points. As a result of an exchange of views and opinions, General Headquarters would approve the decisions, which subsequently would be implemented by the commanding generals.

In discussing methods of Soviet strategic leadership during the war, we should point out such aspects as transmitting General Headquarters decisions to commanders of *fronts*, *armies*, *fleets* and *flotillas*, commanders in chief of Services of the Armed Forces and commanders of branches in the form of Supreme High Command directives, as well as by summoning the appropriate commanders to receive orders directly from the Supreme High Command; satisfying requests by front military councils in connection with preparing and conducting various strategic operations; sending representatives of General Headquarters into the field for coordinating the operations of several fronts.

The entire process of planning and preparing strategic operations was centralized by General Headquarters. This centralization ensured a scientific approach to the development of concepts and plans of operations in conformity with the war objectives, and made it possible to direct the requisite forces and resources for their implementation and to organize close coordination among fronts. At the same time centralization was dictated by the fact that General Headquarters had at its disposal powerful means for exploiting strategic success and intensifying strikes against the enemy.

The following were the distinguishing features of the strategic leadership of the Soviet Supreme High Command during the Great Patriotic War: decisive objectives of planned operations executed by fronts and groups of fronts; determination of specific modes of action by our troops as a whole and for each operation individually; careful selection of main axes of strike; massing of forces and resources on main axes; achievement of surprise in a strategic and operational-tactical respect; comprehensive supply and political support of planned combat operations.

In developing strategic plans, the Supreme High Command and General Staff carefully considered the capabilities of the Soviet Armed Forces and promptly specified measures to be carried out by government organs as well as commanders of Services and branches of the Armed Forces, and chiefs of services, in order to meet the requirements of the fronts and fleets with respect to forces and resources, and the transport of troops and equipment. The Supreme High Command and General Staff relied not only on available forces and resources, but also persistently conducted an intensive organizational effort to establish and restore reserve forces. They constantly worked to maintain and further improve the combat effectiveness of Soviet troops.

To the Soviet people and their Armed Forces the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff constituted the two military organs that assured the defeat of Hitler's army. Many operations planned and executed by the Soviet military leadership have become classic examples of organization and conduct of sequential offensive operations, the preparation and execution of which imposed special demands on strategic leadership.

The objective of these operations was the defeat of large enemy forces, the liberation of important economic regions and administrative-political centers, assistance to the peoples of Europe who had fallen under the Hitlerite yoke, withdrawal of Hitlerite Germany's allies from the war, and Germany's ultimate defeat. United by a common strategic concept, sequential attacks by Soviet forces, mounted on various axes, merged into a general offensive covering an enormous territory. Frequently one offensive operation would begin during the exploitation phase of a preceding operation. This prevented the enemy from restoring the combat effectiveness of his troops, from maneuvering reserves, and undermined the enemy's morale.

The consummate skill of Soviet strategic leadership was most fully manifested in the operations of the final campaign of the Great Patriotic War. It began with a simultaneous offensive by the Soviet Armed Forces along an almost 2000-kilometer front, stretching from the Baltic to the Carpathians. Of the ten fronts we had at the time, eight took part in the offensive, with the depth of operations reaching 500-600 km. Examples of correct choice of operational maneuver were demonstrated during the course of this campaign: the deep frontal attack (Vistula-Oder Operation), attack on converging axes (the Berlin and Prague Operations), a splitting attack, pushing the enemy to the sea (East Prussian Operation), and maneuver to encircle the enemy.

A study of the rich and diversified experience of our organs of military leadership shows that the Supreme High Command always correctly assessed and skillfully utilized the high **morale** of the Soviet soldiers, as

well as the morale of the enemy. We shall demonstrate this with the example of the Battle of Stalingrad.

The attention of the entire world was focused on the battle which took place at the walls of Stalingrad. The outcome of World War II was essentially decided here. The amazing psychological and moral-political steadfastness of the Soviet enlisted men and officers, their unbending will, courage and bravery were particularly vividly displayed in the battle on the Volga.

The valor of the Soviet officers and men was extensively publicized at the time by the bourgeois press: for example, the *New York Herald Tribune* stated, "At Stalingrad they are fighting with a burning hatred, with a passion not seen in London even during the worst days of the Blitz. The deeds of the men of Stalingrad defy the strategic calculations of the military command." We must take issue with this latter comment. Perhaps for the political and military leaders of the Western nations the mass heroism displayed by Soviet citizens would appear to defy strategic calculation or consideration, but the Soviet leaders were indeed counting on high morale, steadfastness and courage on the part of our fighting men. And these calculations were fully borne out.

In their planning Soviet leaders also skillfully utilized the enemy's morale, which was badly shaken as a result of the protracted, bloody and hopeless fighting at Stalingrad. In elaborating the plan for encircling and destroying the German forces, it was decided to mount the main attack on the flanks of the enemy force. Along the German flanks were the weaker and less combat-efficient units of their unreliable allies, which facilitated penetration of the front and made it possible to encircle and crush the entire enemy force. Also along the flanks were German Fascist troops whose morale had been severely undermined. One can find statements in the personal archives of Field Marshal von Paulus that the decline in the morale of his officers and men manifested itself "in apathy and signs of gradual disintegration."²⁹

Successful execution of the plans of the Soviet Supreme High Command to encircle and destroy the Hitlerite forces at Stalingrad is an example of how military leaders must especially assess and utilize the morale of their own troops and that of the enemy.

The Battle of Stalingrad displayed the outstanding skill of the Soviet military leaders. It is for good reason that U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, commenting on the enormous significance of this victory by the Soviet Armed Forces, stated, "Such achievements are possible only to an army that has skilled leadership. . . ."³⁰

The encirclement and destruction of the 300,000-man German Fascist force attested to more than just the ability of the Soviet military leaders

to plan and execute large-scale strategic operations. The Battle of Stalingrad also vividly reflected the bankruptcy of the strategic principles of Fascist Germany, the failure of the system of the Hitlerite military leadership and its lack of responsibility to the German people, as well as the barbarous attitude toward the lives of their own generals, officers and men. Hitler and those close to him were out of touch with the true state of affairs on the Eastern Front; they continued to underestimate the might of the Soviet Army and did not even suspect the intentions of the Soviet Supreme High Command.

Of course, the activities of the Soviet Supreme High Command did not constitute a chain of victories only. There were also shortcomings and isolated miscalculations, particularly in the initial phase of the war, and errors in the organization of some offensive operations. We suffered setbacks, for example, in the Kerch'-Feodosiya and Khar'kov Operations. In 1942, when we were experiencing a particularly critical shortage of trained reserves and supplies, certain offensive operations were scarcely advisable.

In analyzing shortcomings in the activities of our Supreme High Command, however, it is important to adhere to Leninist soberness of judgment and objectivity. One must realize that General Headquarters and the General Staff were directing military forces under rather complex and difficult circumstances, particularly during the first phase of the Great Patriotic War. And in spite of this fact, the Soviet Supreme High Command succeeded in accomplishing its missions and in shifting the course of the war in our favor. "One must state," noted Marshal A. A. Grechko, Minister of Defense of the USSR, "that history knows of no other examples where such an initially unfavorable development of military events was altered so decisively and abruptly, and where the adversary—after enjoying considerable initial success—ultimately was faced with the prospect of inevitable collapse."³¹

In assessing the strategic operations and military campaigns conducted by our military leaders, one should also not ignore the specific conditions at the front and should not claim without having proof that there were some kinds of unexploited possibilities. For example, those who believe that the Soviet Supreme High Command refused to take a risk and thereby lost an opportunity to take Berlin and end the war in February 1945 are absolutely wrong. The erroneous nature of such opinions is obvious. The fact is that our Supreme High Command was aware at the time that the enemy, with 40 divisions deployed in Eastern Pomerania, was planning an offensive and could attack our flank from the north, placing our forces in a precarious situation. In addition, our troops had sustained heavy casualties in fighting their way forward 500 kilometers, particularly in the Vistula-Oder Operation; they were also experiencing

difficulties in supply, since our rear services had not been able to keep up due to the rapid rate of advance. Under these conditions the Soviet military command reached the only correct decision: to destroy first of all the Eastern Pomeranian enemy force, and then carefully prepare and execute the Berlin Operation. This plan was brilliantly executed.

Under present-day conditions one of the most important tasks of military leaders is timely determination of the onset of a period of threat immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities and an enemy nuclear missile attack. While it was comparatively easy in the past to discover enemy preparations for initiating hostilities and to determine when he was planning to begin military operations, this is much more difficult today. The existence of huge stockpiles of nuclear missiles and global-range delivery systems enables the imperialist aggressors to substantially limit the entire range of preparatory measures which can be observed and evaluated.

Of course, it is not very probable that the aggressor would start a war without any preparations whatsoever. It is the task of the military leadership to detect these preparations in time. The time it takes a potential enemy to carry out appropriate measures would constitute the threat period immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities.

Consequently, the period of threat is the period of the aggressor's direct preparations for an attack. A most important task of the military leadership is prompt determination of the onset of this period and the taking of immediate effective steps to repulse a surprise enemy attack. Our military leaders are doing everything necessary to achieve the following: to maintain the Armed Forces, particularly the Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as our air defense and antimissile defense forces in a state of readiness for immediate action; to determine promptly and reliably the enemy's main forces, particularly his nuclear forces; to project the principal combat missions to be accomplished in theaters of military operations and on strategic axes; to plan the delivery of an effective retaliatory nuclear attack against the aggressor; to achieve close coordination among all Services of the Armed Forces and efficient troop control; and to be able to skillfully utilize nuclear missile weapons and strategic reserves during the course of a war.

One very complex and responsible task to be handled by organs of the military leadership will be the preparation for and execution of strategic operations in theaters of war. Faultless and prompt determination of strategic targets will be required for this purpose, as well as comprehensive support of operations; precise, clear-cut assignment of missions to Services and branches of the Armed Forces operating in a given theater; skillful employment of nuclear weapons; effective troop control during

the course of military operations; training and deployment of units designated for intensifying efforts in the course of an operation; and replacement of casualties.

Thus, even a brief, far from complete examination of the tasks of leadership in an armed struggle accomplished by the military high command indicates how important its role and its responsibility have become under present-day conditions. Naturally this requires the establishment of organs of control over the Armed Forces which would have the authority to effectively settle the most complex problems connected with preparing and implementing strategic operations.

Working out and adopting a feasible decision is today such a responsible and complex matter that it is beyond the capabilities of a single military leader, even the most outstanding one. As early as World War I the problem of creating an "integral commander" was advanced—that is, a directing organ consisting of a group of responsible individuals, which would supervise the combat operations of forces in all theaters of operations. And it is now generally acknowledged that military leadership can be effected only by a collective organ.

Collective leadership in armed struggle during a nuclear missile war has become an objective necessity. This is dictated by the fact that leadership in an armed struggle becomes increasingly complex in direct proportion to the troops' being equipped with new weapons and combat equipment, to changes in troop structure and organization, and to improvement in the methods of combat operations. In addition, one must bear in mind the enormous spatial scope of contemporary war and its individual campaigns and operations, as well as the enormous masses of people involved in it.

At the same time a high degree of centralization in the leadership of all the Services and branches of the Armed Forces has become essential. Victory over a powerful adversary in a nuclear missile war can be won only if all the Services and branches of the Armed Forces are put into action at the very outset. War will require the collection, analysis and synthesis of combat situation data extremely rapidly, for without this it would be impossible to make well-substantiated decisions. And decisions, in turn, should be communicated to the forces and implemented by them without delay.

Accomplishment of all these missions is possible only with the existence of a collective organ for leadership in a war. This organ should facilitate control of troop combat operations, activities of the rear services, and all activities on the home front. Of course, the most important element in its activities is direction of the Armed Forces and their operations

in the theaters of war. For this, the collective organ relies on the General Staff as the principal organ of troop control.

Under present-day conditions organs of strategic leadership must operate in an extremely efficient and coordinated manner. But this is possibly only if there is strict centralization of control. On this point, it is probable that during the course of a nuclear missile war it may be necessary to create main commands for leadership of armed struggle in the separate theaters. This will be required by the enormous spatial scope of a nuclear missile war and the unprecedented complexity of leadership in combat operations.

Insofar as a future world war is viewed as a coalition war, unified organs of military leadership on a coalition scale are already being established today. The content and forms of military leadership in a coalition war are particularly complex. This is why this problem greatly concerns the ruling circles of the imperialist states. During World War II conflicts were constantly arising among the political and military leaders of the allied capitalist states on such problems as determination of the main theater of operations; there was constant debate on the manpower and resources a given country should supply, who should assume overall command of the allied armed forces, as well as command of large strategic ground, naval and air forces, and the timetable, sequence and methods to be employed in a given operation.

The distrust which existed between British and U.S. military leaders during the last war reached the point of hostility at times. In many cases it was neither the overall Allied objectives in the war against Fascist Germany nor strategic considerations, but rather the prestige of one or the other country which was the determining factor in reaching and implementing decisions on distribution of forces and resources, and in determining the main axis of attack.

The conflicts and distrust existing among the member nations of today's aggressive alliances and blocs make it extremely difficult for them to utilize their forces and resources. Political and military figures in the United States, Great Britain, France and West Germany are constantly stressing the need for agreement, mutual understanding and unity of action. Field Marshal Kingston-McCloughry believes that the main problem consists in organizing an overall NATO military leadership that would also be responsive to national requirements. He is greatly disturbed by the fact that the conflicts existing between the United States and Great Britain could cause serious disagreements in the high command and that today, with 15 member nations in NATO, fast resolution of military problems is difficult. "Until political unity becomes a basic feature of Western alliances," he states, "no plans, even the most artful and clever, will have a real chance of success."³²

The real reasons for the weakness of the imperialist coalitions and discord among their military leaders lie in the very nature of capitalism. Lenin noted that groups, aggressive blocs, and unified commands established by the imperialists "can be overthrown within a few days if this is required by the interests of sacred private ownership, by sacred concession rights, etc., and perhaps the smallest spark would be sufficient to blow up the existing group of powers. . . ." ³³ It is precisely this that the imperialists fear.

The present structure of military leadership in NATO will evidently be retained in the future world war that the imperialists are preparing. It is built on European and Atlantic strategic high commands of the NATO armed forces and an English Channel zone command.* These high commands are directly subordinate to the Military Committee, which consists of representatives of the general staffs of the NATO member nations. Theater high commands have also been formed: a high command for NATO joint armed forces in Central Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, and a Mediterranean command.†

The military leadership and command system formed within the aggressive NATO bloc is faced by the well-balanced Warsaw Pact system. It reflects the international unity of the Warsaw Pact member nations in guaranteeing European security and in jointly defending the socialist achievements of the fraternal peoples.

The Warsaw Pact of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is a defensive pact of sovereign and equal socialist nations, which are resolved to frustrate any and all plans of the imperialist warmongers. The Warsaw Pact was signed on 14 May 1955 as a counterbalance to the aggressive NATO alliance, which was established in 1949 under the aegis of the U.S. The Warsaw Pact remains the principal force restraining those who would brazenly play with the fate of the European peoples.

The supreme executive body of the Warsaw Pact Organization is the Political Consultative Committee, which is comprised of the general (first) secretaries of Communist Party central committees and heads of government (state) of the socialist countries. The Warsaw Pact states have a Committee of Ministers of Defense, Joint Armed Forces, and a Joint Military Command.

The staff of the Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces includes representatives of the general staffs of all Warsaw Pact member nations. A considerable effort to strengthen the combat effectiveness and

* [Official NATO titles: Allied Command Europe, Allied Command Atlantic, and Allied Command Channel—U.S. Ed.]

† [Official NATO designations: Allied Forces Central Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, and Mediterranean—U.S. Ed.]

cooperation of the armies of these states is being conducted under the leadership of the Joint Armed Forces Command.

The Warsaw Pact member nations also coordinate their activities at the Minister of Defense and General Staff levels. They regularly coordinate military combat and political training plans and hold various joint activities in the interest of maintaining their armed forces in a constant state of combat readiness.

The Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states constitute a powerful force. Our strength and our fighting alliance with the armies of Warsaw Pact member nations are reliable guarantees of the inviolability of borders and the revolutionary gains of the socialist commonwealth, as well as a guarantee of peaceful conditions for developing socialism and communism.

Thus, an analysis of the essence of military leadership enables us to draw a number of generalizations and conclusions.

Leadership in an armed struggle constitutes an incredibly complex, multifaceted and rather difficult process, a process directed by the highest state governing body, which skillfully and intelligently utilizes all of the country's resources and potential in order to gain victory.

A most important function of the military leadership and its organs is the development and implementation of strategic war plans, able leadership of the armed forces and activities of all people, and utilization of all capabilities and potential to achieve the political objectives of a war.

The role of collective organs of leadership in an armed struggle will become even more important in a nuclear war. This is dictated by the necessity of promptly determining the immediate period of war threat, of breaking up an enemy nuclear attack and delivering retaliatory strikes.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, *Zamechaniya na sochineniya Klauzevitsa 'O voyne'* [Remarks on *On War* by Clausewitz] (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1939), p. 30.
2. J. Stalin, *O Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuz* [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union] (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1953), p. 72.
3. Lenin, XXXIX, 305.
4. Ibid.
5. *Leninskiy sbornik* [Lenin Collection], XXXVI, 389.
6. *50 let Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii. Tezisy TsK KPSS* [The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution: Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1967), p. 62.
7. *Sovershenno sekretno! Tol'ko dlya komandovaniya!* [Top Secret! For Command Personnel Only!], pp. 149-50.

8. As quoted in D. M. Proektor's *Agressiya i katastrofa* [Aggression and Catastrophe] (Moscow: Izd-vo Nauka, 1968), p. 19.
9. Lenin, XLI, 144.
10. *Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz* [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], p. 111.
11. Lenin, XXXVI, 205.
12. Lenin, XXXV, 408.
13. Lenin, XLI, 55.
14. Lenin, XL, 85.
15. Charles de Gaulle, *Voyennyye memuary. Prizyv. 1940-1942 gody* [War Memoirs: The Appeal, 1940-42] (Moscow: Izd-vo inostr. liter., 1957), p. 61.
16. William Foster, *Ocherk politicheskoy istorii Ameriki* [Essay on American Political History] (Moscow: Izd-vo inostr. liter., 1955), p. 580.
17. Lenin, XLI, 117.
18. L. I. Brezhnev, *50 let velikikh pobed sotsializma* [Fifty Years of Great Victories for Socialism], p. 46.
19. Lenin, XXXV, 395.
20. *Materialy XXIII s"yezda KPSS* [Materials of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU], p. 118.
21. Ibid., p. 85.
22. Lenin, XLV, 112.
23. Lenin, XL, 183.
24. M. V. Zakharov, *O nauchnom podkhode k rukovodstvu voyskami* [Scientific Approach to Troop Leadership] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1967), p. 11.
25. Lenin, XL, 76-77.
26. Lenin, XXXIV, 382-83.
27. Lenin, XXXVI, 178.
28. S. M. Shtemenko, *General'nyy shtab v gody voyny* [The General Staff During the War Years] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), p. 3.
29. *Sovershenno sekretno! Tol'ko dlya komandovaniya!* [Top Secret! For Command Personnel Only!], p. 483.
30. *Perepiska Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR s Prezidentami SShA i Prem'yer-Ministrami Velikobritanii vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg.* [Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War, 1941-45] (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957), II, 57.
31. A. A. Grechko, *Pyat'desyat let na strazhe zavoyevaniy Velikogo Oktyabrya* [Fifty Years Guarding the Achievements of the Great October Revolution] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), p. 19.
32. Edgar J. Kingston-McCloughry, *Voyennaya politika i strategiya* [Military Policy and Strategy]. Translated from English (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), p. 237.
33. Lenin, XXXVI, 330.

Chapter 4. The Commander and War

1. The Military Leader: Organizer of the Armed Struggle of the Masses

The Marxist-Leninist teaching that the general populace plays an important role in the history of society also assigns an important place to the activity of outstanding individuals, including military leaders, who organize and direct the activities of hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of people. "Marxism," wrote Lenin, "differs from all other socialist theories in that it features a remarkable combination of complete scientific sobriety in the analysis of the objective state of affairs and the objective course of evolution with a most decisive recognition of the importance of the revolutionary energy, revolutionary creativity, and revolutionary initiative of the masses, and also, of course, of individuals. . . ."

The Marxist conception of the personality in general, and of the outstanding personality in particular, permits a proper appreciation of the real person and his place in society or in the military collective, and allows correct comprehension of the military leader and his role as the direct organizer and leader of armed struggle.

As a result of the restrictions imposed by their class outlook and as a consequence of their idealistic and metaphysical interpretation of the life of society, pre-Marxian philosophy and sociology proved unable to give a scientific definition of personality. Contemporary bourgeois ideology has proven unable to resolve this problem for the same reasons.

From the viewpoint of idealism, personality is a spiritual essence which makes history autonomously. The objective idealist Hegel regarded personality as something incorporeal, as a personification of the universal spirit. Schopenhauer, an adversary of both materialism and dialectics, interpreted personality as the incarnation of a "universal spirit." Bourgeois philosophers and sociologists, infected by the poison of nationalism and racism, have tried and are still trying to portray personality as a manifestation of a "national spirit" or "racial soul." Misinterpreting the

nature of personality, the idealists regard it as something isolated from social conditions, lying beyond a person's material and mental attributes as their mystic, individual consciousness.

Representatives of the so-called "psychological school" of contemporary bourgeois sociology interpret personality as a "biological phenomenon." Thus, Austrian psychologist Sigmund Freud believed that an individual's actions are determined by subconscious biological instincts. Psychosociologists say personality is the sum of various immutable traits.

Gabriel Marcel, exponent of "religious existentialism," making a report to the 13th International Philosophical Congress in Mexico City in September 1963 on "the existential aspect of human dignity," spoke of the fact that in modern society no practical human activity can serve as an object of genuine esteem, and that man himself, as an individual pursuing and attaining assigned goals, does not possess genuine dignity.

Thus, contemporary bourgeois sociology and psychology are misrepresenting the problem of personality and its interrelationship with society. This is being done to please the imperialist bourgeoisie, which has a vested interest in proving that personality formation is a process which takes place in isolation from the life and work of society.

An authentic scientific solution to the problem of personality is provided by Marxism-Leninism. The philosophy of Marxism proceeds from the premise that an individual is a real person, living under specific social conditions, having personal peculiarities and needs, entering into relationships with other people, and acting in a purposeful manner.

An individual is a social creature and is a product of social development. His awareness, interests and volitions are determined by economic conditions. Work has a strong influence on personality. Actively participating in socially useful work and in the life of his collective, an individual blends with society, reflecting its life and culture. Marx emphasized that an individual is a social creature, contending that any manifestation whatever of an individual is therefore a manifestation and an affirmation of the life of society. Criticizing Feuerbach for treating the essence of man as an individual too abstractly, and for letting his attention be deflected from society, Marx wrote in his famous *Theses on Feuerbach* that "... the essence of man is neither abstract nor characteristic of a particular individual. In reality it is the aggregate of all social relationships."²

The personality of a serviceman is formed under the influence of the military environment, the military collective. This process is based on the acquisition of knowledge, including military science and skills, is stimulated by combat traditions, and depends definitively on the serviceman's

patriotic sentiments and on his attitude toward his compatriots, his homeland, its armed forces, and the combat missions he is called upon to fulfill. In other words, the forming of a serviceman's personality is strongly influenced by those motives and inner forces which prompt him to vigorous, purposeful activity and, in particular, to fulfillment of the missions confronting the armed forces.

Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the premise that political leaders, commanders, and major military leaders have always played, and continue to play, an enormous role in the history of society and in the course and outcome of conflicts between armed masses. Their role may be two-sided: by their deeds and decisions they may either **accelerate** or **retard** the course of events, **facilitate** or **hinder** the struggle of their people and armed forces. The individuals directing a war may organize it so as to avoid unnecessary casualties, or, by their mistakes and unwise actions, they may incur heavy losses, setbacks, and even defeats during the war.

An outstanding individual is outstanding precisely because he plays a positive role in the campaign being conducted by the people or the war being waged by their armed forces, knowledgeably organizing the masses, inspiring them and directing their activities, and seeking new methods for reaching the assigned goal.

There are always talented and gifted people in a society. However, only the need for public figures with particular abilities, intellectual qualities, and traits of character brings such people to the forefront and creates the conditions necessary for their advancement. By virtue of their inherent qualities, outstanding individuals come forward in various spheres, including the military sphere. Moreover, they do not advance of their own accord, but are promoted by a people, class or political party.

Outstanding individuals usually make their appearance at the turning points in historical development. At just such moments, a social need arises for talented people. There is a special need for talented leaders when oppressed social classes rise in revolt. "Not one class in history," wrote Lenin, "achieved supremacy without first putting forth political leaders and progressive representatives capable of organizing the movement and directing it."³

A **social need** arising in wartime likewise results in the appearance of talented military leaders in the historical arena. However, while social need is necessary for the advancement of individuals, it is not sufficient. There must be individuals who possess the **abilities, talents, and endowments** required by society at the given moment. Great personalities, i.e., commanders, to take over command of major field forces, or the armed forces as a whole, will be forthcoming only if the requisite talents and

endowments of personality are exhibited or can be developed under the given social conditions.

Exemplary personal qualities enhance a military leader's authority, which plays an important role in leading the military masses. Engels emphasized that **the authority of a commander, of a military leader**, promotes unity, solidarity, order and discipline among his troops. Authority is an objective necessity which manifests itself wherever the masses are active, especially where there is danger.⁴ According to Engels, rejection of authority is tantamount to adventurism, to advocating confusion, and to sheer betrayal of the masses.

The works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin contain profound scientific arguments which substantiate the objective necessity of having talented, authoritative military leaders put in command of masses of armed people, the rank and file of a nation's armed forces.

In a letter to Marx dated 5 October 1860, Engels writes warmly of Garibaldi, who had a fabulous influence on his troops by virtue of his mastery of the art of commanding. Garibaldi's legendary authority was based on such qualities as bravery, selflessness and martial valor. His troops boldly followed their talented commander into battle, defeating a strong enemy.

Engels indicated that wise, competent military leaders are needed not only when their troops are on the offensive and winning, but also during setbacks, when they are on the defensive and are obliged to withdraw. Engels said that "a general's common sense [may] frequently spare his army the worst of the possible consequences of its defeat. . . ."⁵

Lenin also repeatedly indicated the importance of the leader's role in the attainment of an assigned goal. The masses can be victorious only where there is singleness of purpose, i.e., where the wills of many are subordinated to the will of one, namely, the leader of the struggling masses. In military affairs, this is especially important.

Characterizing the importance of outstanding commanders it is appropriate to quote a passage by G. V. Plekhanov which applies to any outstanding individual. According to Plekhanov, a great man "sees *farther* than others and desires *more strongly* than others. He is a hero, not in the sense that he could halt or alter the natural course of things, but in the sense that his activity is a conscious and free expression of that necessary and unconscious course. In this lies all his importance and all his strength, but this importance is highly significant. . . ."⁶

Thus, the direction of an armed struggle requires discerning, experienced leaders whom the troops trust and will follow to victory over the enemy.

The strength of talented military leaders consists in the fact that they see, better and sooner than others, the goals, character and peculiarities of a war, correctly identifying the means needed to attain victory, and knowing how to use these means most effectively.

A military leader is the chief organizer and the leader of a battle, operation or engagement. The larger the scale of military operations on which he can and does exert his influence, the greater will be his role. Victory in operations or engagements, or in the war as a whole, is possible only where the fighting masses are led by courageous, valiant leaders possessing perspicacity and professional knowledge, a faculty for rapid analysis of a changing situation, a flair for making correct decisions, and the perseverance to see them implemented.

No army, no matter how well armed and trained, can win without experienced military leaders. The history of warfare teaches that a prerequisite for victory is unity of the wills and actions of hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of men, subordinated to a single command. This is a law of armed struggle.

Gifted military leaders play an important role not only in wartime, but also in peacetime. Their task includes implementation of extensive and complex measures to prepare their army for war. They also participate in the formulation of military doctrine and specific war plans of their state, and they take special steps to strengthen their country's military might, to ensure its preparedness to repel enemy attack. Moreover, they maintain constant combat capability and readiness among the troops. Outstanding leaders also play an important role in the generalization of combat experience and in the further development of military affairs. Without their creative activity, there could be no progress in military science or in military art.

In the bourgeois world, there is an extensive literature on the role and significance of the commander. [Field Marshal Alfred, Graf von] Schlieffen, German bourgeois military theorist, called one of his books *The Commander*.^{*} This work, published not long before the outbreak of World War I, is still of interest. In it, Schlieffen enunciates a number of valid propositions. He indicates, in particular, that where a king, president or prime minister is head of his country's armed forces, such an office does not make him a commander in the full sense of the word. A commander cannot simply be nominated as such, but must have relevant talents, knowledge, and experience. However, the above-mentioned book reveals Schlieffen's limitations and his inability to approach the problem of evaluating the military leader's role from a genuinely scientific standpoint. In a commander, he says, "there must be something super-

^{*} [Apparently *Der Feldherr*—U.S. Ed.]

human, something unearthly. . . . A commander must believe that he is under the patronage of some higher power."⁷

Contemporary bourgeois military figures and theorists also misconstrue the significance of the military leader. For example, in his book *A Soldier's Story*, U.S. General Omar N. Bradley underestimates the role of the troops and overestimates that of the military leaders. There is a clearly idealistic ring about the following conclusion drawn by Omar Bradley: "Usually, the course of history depends on outstanding personalities who, by their persistence, endurance and valor, change events in the desired direction, thus determining the fate of others."⁸

In the previously mentioned book by British Air Vice-Marshal E. J. Kingston-McCloughry entitled *The Direction of War*, the requirements which a top-ranking military leader must meet are quite convincingly catalogued. However, he too evaluates the commander's role idealistically. Bernard Brodie, the American military theorist, stands on much the same ground. In his opinion, it is neither peoples nor troops, but rather "the President's conviction, will, and decision which chiefly" determine the issue of war and peace.⁹ Endless examples of this kind could be cited.

Why does modern bourgeois military thinking so exaggerate the role of commanders? This is done for a definite political purpose: to belittle the role of the people in the winning of World War II.

As for the West German *revanchists*, they are doing their best to make it look as if Hitler alone were responsible for Germany's defeat. The West German historian Ricker* so entitled his book: *One Man Lost a World War*. In the preface to that book Lieutenant General Kurt Dittmar, eminent West German military figure, writes, "Hitler, and only he, led Germany to an unprecedented defeat. . . ." ¹⁰

That Adolf Hitler was to blame for Germany's defeat is obvious. However, the whole tragedy for Fascist Germany consisted in the fact that German political and military circles, experiencing a compulsive urge toward aggression, saw in the person of Hitler the "strong personality" who could, in their opinion, lead the army to the achievement of their aggressive goals. Hitler himself, with characteristic madness, said to a conference of Wehrmacht leaders on 23 November 1939, ". . . In all modesty, I must nominate myself, because I am irreplaceable. No one, soldier or civilian, could replace me."¹¹ Many West German military figures and theorists now see Germany's defeat as due to the fact that Hitler failed to justify the hopes of the German people.

* [Research has failed to disclose the identity of this writer and thus to confirm the spelling of his name—U.S. Ed.]

Thus, Marxism-Leninism alone can answer the question as to the role of the commander (great leader) in the winning of a war. Only Marxism-Leninism can give a genuine scientific interpretation of the role played by the outstanding personality in the life of society, including, in particular, the role of outstanding military leaders (commanders).

2. The Historical Epoch and the Commander

In order to assess scientifically the life and work of a given military leader, it is necessary to examine it from a historical viewpoint, taking into account the sociopolitical conditions under which his contribution was made. From the Clausewitz work *On War*, Lenin extracted the following propositions: "... The only people in a position to understand and assess a commander are those who can project themselves into each epoch, not so much by a scrupulous study of minor circumstances as by a penetrating scrutiny of major events." Commenting on this proposition, Lenin wrote in the margin, "The peculiarities of each epoch must be taken into account in order to understand a commander."¹²

Any statesman or military figure not only affects the course of social development, but is himself affected by the life he leads and the social class to which he belongs. This thought was expressed earlier by the Russian revolutionary democrats Chernyshevskiy and Dobrolyubov. The latter, criticizing subjectivistic views on history, noted, "They do not wish to understand that a historical figure, even a great one, is no more than a spark, which can ignite gunpowder but not stone, and will promptly become extinguished unless it encounters readily combustible material. They do not wish to understand that such material is always prepared by the circumstances of the people's historical development, or that, as a consequence of some historical event, personalities are forthcoming who implicitly express the needs of society and of the times."¹³

Let us now attempt to clarify the "commander" concept. Some are of the opinion that this concept is obsolete, and should not be used in scientific research. In our view, this is incorrect. To be sure, there is little resemblance between the "commander" of World War II and his counterpart of the feudal epoch. However, one must not forget the proposition of Marxist dialectics that all concepts are fluid, and are constantly being replenished with new, richer content.

It is, of course, not by chance that the term "commander" was used repeatedly by Lenin himself. For example, in "The Main Task of Our Days," Lenin spoke of the commander who stands at the head of an army, doing his duty to his country and choosing the way to win victory over the enemy.¹⁴ In an article entitled "The Fall of Port Arthur," Lenin wrote of tsarist generals and commanders.¹⁵

The concept "commander" is not infrequently encountered even in contemporary Soviet military literature. It was used, for example, by Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy in his book *Vigilantly We Stand on Guard Over the Peace*. Also relevant is the work *Military Strategy*, written by Soviet military theorists under the editorship of Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy. In it there is a special paragraph headed "The Role of the Commander in the Leadership of Armed Forces."

Consequently, the "commander" concept is not outdated. It is now taken to mean a military leader heading major operational field forces, or a country's armed forces as a whole, and leading them in war.

However, in our view it would be incorrect to confine the scope of the "commander" concept to the aforesaid content. It is not enough to fill an important military post to be considered a "commander," which is neither a rank nor a post, but a term for a military leader who has mastered the art of preparing and conducting strategic operations and knows how to use combat experience creatively for further development of the military art and for selecting those forms and methods of waging war which best correspond to given conditions and can be used with greatest effect in specific combat situations. A broad operational-strategic outlook, the ability to lead subordinate troops skillfully, and knowledge and observance of the dictates of military science, are all characteristic traits of the genuine commander.

A. Svechin, the eminent Soviet military theorist, emphasized that "... strategy is the art of the commander, and for the most part, the art of those whose vocation is to resolve the basic problems presented by the war situation. . . ." ¹⁶ No prominent military leader can lead troops without clear strategic thinking, or without a knowledge of operational art.

However, even this is not all. We take for granted that a commander possesses personal qualities, gifts, and talents which set him apart from other military leaders. The "commander" concept began to be ascribed such broad content during the recent period of military history. Formerly, the concept was very much narrower, the term mainly denoting a military leader's ability to lead his troops into battle.

The history of warfare knows many illustrious commanders, such as Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, Alexander Nevskiy, Peter the Great, A. V. Suvorov, and M. I. Kutuzov, and others. Each stood at the head of the great army of his state, possessed rare talent, brilliantly chose and used the most highly perfected weapons of his time, and organized his troops' combat formations accordingly. Each

of these commanders made a significant contribution to the development of the military art.

Each historical epoch demands and creates such military figures as most closely correspond to the character and special features of the given epoch and can correctly resolve the problems associated with the leadership of the state's armed forces. No eminent military leader, whatever his gifts, can afford to ignore the sociopolitical conditions under which he lives and acts, for it is on these conditions that the army, its character, armament, organizational principles, and the moral-combat qualities of its men depend. Even the commander himself is completely dependent on the historical situation. His contribution is based on those methods and means of armed struggle which correspond to the given epoch. In other words, a commander cannot, by his own talents, create anything for which the appropriate material conditions have not yet matured.

History testifies to the fact that prominent military leaders achieved greatness because their thinking and practical activities were directed toward developing and introducing those methods and forms of armed struggle which were in most complete accord with the new weapons and human material engendered by prevailing sociopolitical conditions. Engels wrote, "Every great commander who creates a new epoch in military history by using new combinations [of new methods and means of waging war—*M.S.*] is either the inventor of new material means or the first to find out the correct method of using new means invented before his day."¹⁷ This is why a commander should be evaluated concretely and historically from the viewpoint of the epoch to which his contribution pertains.

Let us now turn to the contributions of such commanders as Napoleon Bonaparte and Kutuzov. Napoleon was the outstanding commander and statesman of his epoch. He evolved new methods of waging war, and he created new strategy and tactics corresponding to the conditions created by the French bourgeois revolution and by the development of industry and military equipment. The wars which France waged under Napoleon swept away much feudal, medieval rubbish from Europe. However, pursuing the aggressive policy of France's grand bourgeoisie, Napoleon strove to deprive many European peoples of their national independence and waged a piratical war against Russia.

The Russian troops under M. I. Kutuzov put to rout the army of Napoleon which invaded our land. Kutuzov's greatness as a historical figure and as a commander consists primarily in the fact that he was fully aware of the liberational nature of the Great Patriotic War of 1812 and knew how to make the most of the Russian people's patriotism, valor, heroism, and rich combat traditions. Kutuzov was close to the

troops, knowing the way to a warrior's heart and how to inspire heroic deeds. He chose the methods and forms of combat most suited to the conditions of the war and most conducive to the attainment of victory over the French commander's troops.

Thus, Marxism-Leninism requires that the contribution of any military leader be evaluated concretely and historically, from the viewpoint of the epoch in which he lived. From the same vantage point, consideration should be given to what he did for his country, its people, and its army, and to how skillfully he utilized the strength and military creativity of the masses.

Ancient history provides many examples of outstanding individuals who served as heads of state and at the same time as successful leaders of their armed forces. During the period covered by modern history, however, the situation has become so complex that one would have to be a genius in order to combine the wisdom of the political leader of a state with the gifts of a great commander.

Vladimir Il'ich Lenin was just such a genius in the modern historical epoch. Lenin was founder and leader of the Communist Party, inspirer and organizer of the October Revolution and the socialist reforms in our country, renowned leader and teacher of all the world's workers, and at the same time the outstanding military leader of our people and the young Red Army during their conflict with foreign intervention and internal counterrevolution.

Characterizing Lenin as a military leader of the new type, one of his pupils and comrades-in-arms, M. I. Kalinin, wrote, "Lenin was the greatest military leader in the history of wars waged by the toiling masses to secure liberation from their oppressors, and he founded the Soviet regular army on the basis of modern science and technology."¹⁸

Lenin's greatness as a military leader became evident even during the October armed uprising in Petrograd. Lenin's own plan for the uprising was executed under his direct leadership. "During the October armed uprising," wrote K. A. Mekhonoshin, an active collaborator, "Lenin was never without a complete, true mental picture of the conflict. Reports came in from the outposts to him as the center, and he always gave prompt, valuable, precise directives, together with timely indications of danger to threatened sectors. Comrade Lenin was indeed the veritable commander in chief of our armed forces in the October Revolution, and under him worked a staff such as no military leader ever had. . . . Lenin may confidently be called our first Red Marshal."¹⁹

The greatest credit is due to Lenin as a military leader of the new historical epoch for rousing our entire nation to join the campaign against

the interventionists and White Guards, skillfully utilizing the revolutionary enthusiasm and energy of the general populace. "His leadership," said M. V. Frunze, "was exemplary, reflecting a genius for leading the masses into battle."²⁰

As a political and military leader of a new type, Lenin relied upon the revolutionary practice and military creativity of the masses. Lenin firmly believed in the strength of the people, while the general populace and the soldiers of the young Red Army had boundless faith in him. Even the most outstanding commander and statesman of the past could not have aspired to such esteem from the troops as was expressed, for example, in the numerous letters to Vladimir Il'ich from the front. "Dear Comrade Lenin," reads one such letter, "Remember that we, the soldiers, as one man, are ready to follow you anywhere, and be assured that your ideal really is an expression of the will of the workers and peasants."²¹

Using revolutionary methods of waging war in defense of our socialist homeland, Lenin turned in the most trying situations to the general populace, seeing in them a decisive force for victory. Lenin noted that in the campaign against the foreign interventionists and the White Guards, in our most dangerous or menacing moments, we resorted to the mobilization of the best of our workers, thus seeking reinforcements where the deepest root of our dictatorship lay. We know of many appeals by letter for such reinforcements which were made by Lenin. These letters show how deeply he believed in the creative energy of the masses, and above all, in the progressive workers who cemented the ranks of the young Red Army, strengthened its discipline, fortitude and combat capability. Noteworthy in this regard is a message sent by Lenin to a Petrograd organization emphasizing that we would surely perish unless we made a desperate effort and mobilized thousands of Petrograd workers to save the situation at the front.²²

In political and military matters, Lenin consistently adhered to the principle of collective leadership, relying on the experience of his companions-in-arms. All strategic plans and momentous decisions associated with the conduct of the war were reviewed and ratified at sessions of the Central Committee of the Party. At the same time, Lenin gave specific instructions to the general officers commanding the fronts and armies, and actively participated in the formulation of the Soviet command's principal operational plans. He faultlessly determined both the direction and the timing of attacks, and found methods of armed struggle which suited the combat situation and were not expected by the enemy.

S. S. Kamenev, former Commander in Chief of the Red Army, wrote that Lenin was not only well acquainted with the situation at the fronts, but he rapidly made the most responsible decisions, and organized their

prompt implementation. Kamenev emphasized, "The question as to where the Red Army should strike first, and where second, undoubtedly had to be answered by the country's political policymaker. . . . Under the leadership of Vladimir Il'ich, this difficult decision was made."²³

Lenin was both an eminent military theorist and outstanding military practitioner, who headed the revolutionary campaign of the masses. He developed and crystallized the fundamental problems of Marx's teaching on war and the army: the essence of warfare and its economic base during the epoch of imperialism; the main types of wars and the character and peculiarities of wars waged in defense of a socialist homeland; the decisive role of the general populace in modern warfare; the socio-economic, moral-political and military factors which determine the outcome of a war; the dependence of military organization and methods and forms of armed struggle on the sociopolitical regime, the goals of the war and the development of armament; and the importance of the political and military leadership as a factor in the winning of a war. Lenin introduced and first substantiated the concept of the defense of a socialist homeland. Lenin not only posed the theoretical question of creating an army of a new type, but in practice he solved this most difficult problem.

Lenin managed to win over eminent specialists of the old army to the revolutionary side. He indoctrinated talented, military commanders who emerged from among the people and were dedicated to the cause of revolution, and united them around the Party's Central Committee and the Soviet government. In the campaign against the White Guards and interventionists, many of them rose to be outstanding Red Army leaders i.e., commanders of the new type.

An outstanding commander of the Lenin school was M. V. Frunze, who combined the qualities of statesman and military figure in an exemplary manner. Frunze possessed an exceptional faculty for scientific foresight and had a creative approach to the planning and conducting of military operations. Frunze analyzed the situation in depth, soberly assessed the enemy's strength and divined his intentions, and then made bold, sound decisions.

In 1918, when the threat of Admiral Kolchak hung over the young Soviet Republic, the Party decided to send Frunze to the Eastern Front as commanding general of the Fourth Army. In his very first battles, Frunze proved himself competent to maneuver his troops and demonstrated the ability to mount surprise attacks against a strong enemy.

Frunze's talent as a commander was, however, manifested most markedly on the Southern Front. His defeat of Wrangel's forces in Severnaya Tavriya and the famous Perekop-Chongar operation were

models of creative application of new methods and forms of military operations.

In 1925, a year after Lenin's death, the Party put Frunze at the head of the Armed Forces of the Soviet State. There he dedicated all his strength, knowledge and experience to the defense of our motherland.

Frunze emphasized that the Soviet State's system of defense "is built on three basic factors: first, on a clear conception of the character of future warfare; second, on a correct and exact calculation of the manpower and resources at the disposal of potential enemies; and third, on such a reckoning of our own resources." ²⁴

An excellently educated Marxist-Leninist, Frunze skillfully applied the principles of dialectic materialism to military affairs. He became one of the founders of Soviet military science. M. V. Frunze was an eminent military theorist of the socialist state, and in his numerous treatises, articles and lectures he profoundly generalized the experience of World War I and set forth important principles of Soviet military art. Frunze left us a rich theoretical legacy and a valuable practical heritage of experience in the training and indoctrination of enlisted men and in the preparation of officer personnel.

3. The Personal Qualities of the Commander

Each historical epoch creates its own type of commander with particular personal qualities. A decisive influence on the formation of these qualities is exerted by the actual sociopolitical conditions, the nature of war, and the methods of waging it.

The commander of the army of a socialist state is a true son of the people and a champion of communist ideology and state policy among the troops. His personal qualities include: a cultivated intellect, flexibility of thought, the faculty of foresight, military erudition, organizational ability, readiness to rely upon the knowledge and experience of subordinates, strength of will, valor, resoluteness, a willingness to take calculated risks, and preparedness to take full responsibility for his actions. A Soviet commander is also distinguished by special moral qualities: ideological conviction, political maturity, love of Motherland, ability to identify with the troops, ability to penetrate into the soldier's heart and inspire him to heroic deeds, and, finally, justness, integrity and modesty.

The aforementioned qualities should not be separated from one another; they constitute a unified whole. If a military leader is strong-willed, courageous and capable of making decisions, but lacks a cultivated intellect, then his actions will inevitably lead to errors fraught with

serious consequences. Conversely, if he is capable of deep theoretical thought, but lacks a strong will, courage and decisiveness, then he is no more likely to succeed. This is why we say that a military leader who successfully fulfills the complex function of leading his troops in an armed struggle is a **gifted, talented commander**.

By a commander's gifts or talents are meant those personal qualities and aptitudes which permit him to direct military operations most effectively. A characteristic feature of a commander's talent is the ability to make sound decisions quickly and to put them into effect with the maximum benefit for the attainment of the assigned goal. For this he needs more than mere knowledge. He must be able to apply his knowledge, think creatively, have foresight and the special intuition required for rapid reorientation in complex combat situations.

A talented commander can successfully direct combat operations regardless of the difficulties and dangers of armed struggle, while fully conscious of the great responsibility conferred on him by the government and the people. The dangers and adversities of war and the responsibility for decisions and their results stimulate him still more to vigorous and resolute action.

The talent of a given commander cannot be assessed without taking into account the goals in the striving for which this talent is manifested. We categorically reject the assertion of the bourgeois theorists that a gift or talent is something bestowed once and forever and does not depend on the environment which engendered the individual in question or on the character of his activities or specific social conditions. We deny the very thought that the gift of commanding is confined to "a chosen few," and that it is a gift of nature or a gift from God. This bourgeois theorists' conception of a commander's talent is motivated by their class interests, i.e., by a desire to prove that the military figures who represent the interests of an exploiter class are especially talented.

In reality, the individual peculiarities and personal qualities characterizing a given military leader take form and develop under the socio-political conditions prevailing where he was born, grew up, and was formed as an individual. It is just such conditions which promote or retard development of the natural, innate inclinations of a person, and his individual traits.

We have already said that a prominent military leader needs also to be a **statesman**, and cannot stand apart from state policy. He can successfully carry out the missions assigned to him only if he thoroughly understands what the politics of the governing class require of him and knows the goals in whose name he leads his troops. Being imbued with these goals and acting in accordance with state policy, a commander emerges

not just as the military leader, but also as the political leader, of the military masses. The world outlook and political views of a military leader are important factors in his activities.

Wars of the present epoch, more than ever before, have turned commanders into statesmen. Fulfilling his leadership role in peacetime and training his troops for a future war, a military leader proceeds from the postulates of state policy and the sociopolitical essence of such a war. And from the moment of the outbreak of hostilities, he directs the entire course of the armed struggle toward the attainment of particular political goals. A military leader's world outlook and political views determine his entire activity, including that in the field of moral-political preparation of the personnel under his command.

In an antagonistic society, the world outlook and political views of a military leader are based, as a rule, on idealistic and metaphysical philosophic conceptions, and constitute a unified whole with the political aspirations of the ruling class and party. The governing circles of an imperialist state see in the person of such a military leader an obedient doer of their bidding and a trustworthy protector. The imperialist bourgeoisie not infrequently gives a reactionary military figure very wide powers, even to the extent of vesting in him the state's power in its entirety, thus permitting establishment of an overt military dictatorship of the Fascist type.

The military leader in a socialist state, is unswervingly guided in the performance of his duties by a just government policy which expresses the interests and will of the peoples. He is unwaveringly dedicated to the people at large and enjoys their respect and trust.

The military leader's duty in a socialist state is dictated by the requirement to defend his socialist homeland against imperialist aggression and by the need to fulfill his international obligations to the peoples of other socialist countries.

In a socialist state, the military leader's ideological convictions find expression in his dedication to the cause of communism. He has a profound understanding of the justness of wars waged in defense of a socialist homeland, and is ready to devote all his knowledge, energy and strength so that the ideals of socialism and communism may triumph. In a socialist country the military leader is strongly motivated by his sense of social duty. The commander, in fulfilling his function, protects the interests of the general populace, his own country, and the socialist commonwealth as a whole.

The tasks of troop leadership and troop control require that a leader shall have **a cultivated intellect, a strong will, and the courage of his convictions.**

It would be difficult to name another field of human thought comparable in complexity and responsibility to the mental activity of a commander in the process of analyzing the situation and making his decision. After all, this decision is a matter of life and death for tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands, of men, and on it the question of victory or defeat largely depends. Even in his day, Clausewitz wrote that "in the highest position, in that of commander in chief, the mental activity is to be reckoned among the most difficult which there is for the human mind."²⁶ This activity has become still more complex in modern warfare.

A characteristic trait of the thinking of a genuine commander is the aptitude for analysis and the ability to single out the essential, i.e., to segregate what may be of decisive importance. Only a flexible, analytical mind is able to make sense of the huge amount of information which a military leader now receives. And, of course, before making a decision and giving an order, the commander must not only soberly assess what is happening, but must also foresee what situation the future will bring. While still in the process of analyzing available information, he mentally sketches his future plan. Here distinctly emerges a second characteristic trait of a military leader's thought process closely associated with the first one. This is a faculty for synthesis, namely, the ability to see the whole behind the details, and to draw a coherent picture of the situation from sometimes incomplete data.

The mental activity of a genuine commander is distinguished by clarity, definiteness, concreteness and simplicity. Without this, he cannot lead his troops. Only ultimate precision, clarity and simplicity of decisions permit a battle or operation to be successfully directed. The celebrated Soviet Commander, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, pointed out the need to make the mission of each formation simple, understandable and performable. The more simply a mission is expressed, the better the chances that it will be quickly and correctly understood and successfully fulfilled by the subordinates.

Troop control in a nuclear war demands of a military leader a clear, accurate, and brief formulation of his thought. Ultimate clarity, simplicity and concreteness of a military leader's thought, and its expression in understandable terms, go with objective truth, the depth of his knowledge, his combat experience, and precise presentation of missions to the troops and to his immediate subordinates.

As with any other thought process, in the mental activity of a military leader we can distinguish theoretical and practical thinking, corresponding to different degrees of association with military practice. A commander's practical thinking is directly related to the combat operations

of his troops, and is directed toward solving specific problems arising in the process, let us say, of elaborating and finalizing the plan for a combat operation. His theoretical thinking, on the other hand, is directed toward discovering the laws of armed struggle and trends in its development, and toward perceiving the principles underlying military art, so that he may act in accordance with them.

A special feature of a commander's practical thinking consists in the fact that he is able to make correct and responsible decisions under the complex conditions of the combat situation. This ability permits the military leader to avoid gross errors and to make decisions which are performable and which will yield positive results. All manner of difficulties arise in the course of military operations. Every so often, a commander encounters real-life contradictions which he has to resolve. This is why his thinking must be exceptionally flexible.

A military leader's **flexibility of thought** is an indispensable condition for successful troop control in the course of an armed struggle. This flexibility is expressed in his ability to react rapidly to changes in the situation, to form new ideas, and to discard old ones based on obsolete data. Flexibility of thought, however, must be combined with relative stability of decisions which are developed and made and which remain valid as long as they are in accord with the situation. To display flexibility of thought does not mean to retract a decision because its implementation turns out to involve the surmounting of fresh difficulties. A decision arrived at earlier is retracted by a military leader only when it ceases to correspond to a drastically changed situation, for example, a change in the correlation of forces of the belligerent parties.

The advent of new war materiel has complicated troop combat operations considerably. The volume of situational data which must be analyzed and generalized in order to make a correct decision has increased many fold. The spatial scope of combat operations has increased incomparably, whereas the time available for collecting and processing information and making a decision has diminished markedly. This has complicated the mental activity of the military leader beyond belief.

In the future, the military leader will not have the opportunity to thoughtfully observe the whole live battle picture, as he could in the past. Decisions will often have to be made merely on the basis of a logical generalization of data obtained from the troops, from reconnaissance, and with the aid of technical apparatus. In order that he may be equal to the demands of nuclear missile warfare, a commander must have an aptitude for scientific imagination and must be able to visualize the course of an operation or engagement, quickly making sound decisions, and assigning his troops their missions without delay.

The making of sound decisions and their implementation are both facilitated by the military leader's will, courage, self-confidence, cool-headedness and stamina. If a military leader lacks a strong will and decisiveness, then uncertainty and delay are bound to affect both his decision-making and his practical actions. Such a condition is easily transmitted to subordinates and has a very adverse effect on the troops.

What do we understand by a commander's **will**, and what content do we ascribe to this concept? A commander's will is his self-mastery, his ability to control his own behavior, his faculty for exercising the authority conferred on him over the troops entrusted to him, and his capacity for concentrating all his energy on attainment of the assigned goal. If, in the complex and rapidly changing situation of a nuclear missile war, the commander lacks self-control, this will have a most adverse effect on troop control. On the other hand, the complexity of the combat situation rouses resolute, persistent, energetic people with initiative to still more effective mental activity, and mobilizes all their spiritual powers.

The commander's exceptional volitional qualities, his self-possession and courage are manifested in his decisiveness, i.e., his ability to make bold decisions, to assume unhesitating responsibility for these decisions and to take risks for the sake of victory. Only strong-willed, courageous individuals can overcome the doubts and vacillations arising in difficult moments, taking upon themselves full responsibility to their army and their country. This happened with *unusual force in Kutuzov* when he made his decision to abandon Moscow. He took this step against the advice of the majority of his closest associates, and against the advice of the Tsar. Nonetheless, he made this, the only correct, decision, showing that he had exceptional strength of will, decisiveness, and the courage of his convictions.

If a military leader is irresolute, lacks enterprise, and does not have the urge to forestall and to impose his will on the enemy, and if, moreover, he is slow in his decision-making and in his practical actions, then even superiority in forces and resources may not assure him success in armed struggle. Let us recall the conduct of Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet at the beginning of World War II. He was largely to blame for the losses sustained by the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. Having at his disposal information that a large Japanese naval task force had put to sea, Admiral Kimmel failed to enact the appropriate measures, neither ordering reconnaissance and observation of the Japanese squadron nor bringing his own fleet to a state of combat readiness. As a result, the U.S. lost nineteen large warships, including eight battleships, three cruisers and three destroyers, as well as 219 aircraft. This caused an abrupt change in the correlation

of forces at sea in Japan's favor, and created the prerequisites for her subsequent offensive operations.

The great strength of Soviet military leaders consists in the fact that together with other attributes of a commander they possess an unwavering will to win. An outstanding Soviet military leader with a strong will is Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov. In some of the most exacting and dangerous situations of World War II, he distinguished himself by the composure, firmness and resoluteness which he displayed when making responsible decisions and implementing them. When Moscow was directly threatened at the beginning of October 1941 Marshal Zhukov, then in command of the Western Front, exhibited exceptional courage, calmness, sobriety, and flexibility of thought. His resolute, confident actions played an important role in the execution of General Headquarters' order to create an organized defensive front at the approaches to Moscow, and to hold our capital.

A military leader's volitional qualities manifest themselves in his creativity and in his ability to forestall the enemy and impose his will on them. Only the military leader who possesses these qualities can successfully command troops. Experience has long since proven that a true leader, standing at the head of a strategic formation of troops, cannot hope for success in combat unless he surpasses the opposing general in mastery of military art. The history of wars teaches that in addition to personal bravery a military leader must possess the self-assurance to make responsible decisions in any situation, however complex. This is attainable only through a high level of theoretical preparedness, rich practical experience, and decisiveness.

The will, courage and decisiveness of a commander are manifested in his faculty for overcoming the feeling of fear in warfare, and in his ability to preserve composure, clarity of thought, and an acute sense of responsibility for making the necessary decisions in good time. Without these most important qualities, he cannot lead his troops successfully, especially in a future nuclear war, which will be an unprecedented test of a military leader's volitional qualities, courage and fortitude.

From the book *Napoleon's Thoughts*, Lenin noted for himself: "In every engagement there is a moment when the bravest soldiers, after great stress, feel a desire to flee, this panic being engendered by a lack of confidence in their courage. Any trivial incident will suffice to restore this confidence. The quintessence of the military art is to create such incidents."²⁶ It is in just such cases that a military leader needs a strong will, self-possession, stamina and decisiveness.

If a military leader proves unable to overcome the awareness of danger and the feeling of fear under nuclear warfare conditions, and if

he cannot keep his self-possession in the complex and rapidly changing situation, then his analysis of the data on the changed combat situation and the correctness of his decisions will be adversely affected. Only a strong will and composure can ensure logical, creative thinking. On the other hand, a complex combat situation intensifies the mental activity of a resolute, self-possessed military leader, and mobilizes all his spiritual strength in his pursuit of the assigned goal.

A commander in the true sense of the term, is a military figure who combines thorough theoretical knowledge with combat experience and who contributes to the development of military science and practice.

One of the most outstanding Soviet commanders nurtured by the Communist Party during the years of foreign military intervention and Civil War was M. N. Tukhachevskiy. He combined a thorough knowledge of theory with the ability to put his ideas into practice brilliantly during military operations. An order issued by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on 22 May 1920, appointing him to the General Staff, reads, in part: "Daily acquiring new theoretical knowledge in military affairs, M. N. Tukhachevskiy has skillfully conducted planned operations and has led troops in an exemplary manner, not only within the Army staff itself, but also commanding armies on all the fronts of the Republic."

Subsequently, being one of the eminent leaders of the Red Army, Tukhachevskiy did strenuous scientific and pedagogical work. Together with other Soviet commanders and military theorists, he did much to reequip our army technically, to improve its organizational structure, and to evolve new methods and forms of waging war. His works such as *Problems of Modern Strategy*, *High-Command Questions*, *Campaign for the Vistula*, and his lecture "National and Class Strategy," and others, have played an important role in the development of Soviet military strategy and operational art.

Under contemporary conditions, it is especially important for a commander to be not merely a good military practitioner, but a theorist as well. Radical and rapid changes in military affairs demand constant creative work on many new problems. And the more the military leaders know about military theory, the better will they resolve these problems.

The current scientific-technological revolution necessarily demands that troops be led by a military leader with a broad outlook and a fund of knowledge: military, scientific, technical, political and economic. Only extensive knowledge in all these fields, that is to say, an encyclopedic mind, permits a military leader to meet the demands of the times, to fulfill his complex functions successfully, and to make his own contribution to the theory and practice of military affairs.

A study of many commanders shows that the majority of them had an innate **propensity for taking calculated risks**. This and the aforementioned qualities were especially strongly manifested in the contributions of the great Soviet commanders during the Great Patriotic War. These qualities will also be needed in a future war. Of course, leadership of troops in combat operations, the decision-making, and the decisions themselves in a nuclear war will differ markedly from what they were in the past. However, military ingenuity, the ability to penetrate the enemy's plans, a propensity for taking calculated risks, as well as other attributes of a commander, are nontransitory in nature, although they manifest themselves in new forms.

Not to be afraid of taking risks, but to do so confidently, is a sign of good leadership. However, in armed struggle a risk should be based mainly on a commander's military erudition and on the ability to foresee the course of events.

One of the most outstanding Soviet commanders nurtured by the Communist Party, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovskiy, possessed just such talents of a commander and administrative ability, which were vividly exhibited during the trying years of the Great Patriotic War. It was his lot to play a most difficult role in the famous Smolensk engagement of 1941, and in the defensive battles on the close approaches to Moscow, Marshal Rokossovskiy was in command of the Don Front during the Stalingrad siege, and he brilliantly liquidated the encircled grouping of German Fascist shock troops.

In 1943, on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, Marshal Rokossovskiy, commanding the Central Front, faced a formidable problem: What was to be done about the civilian population inhabiting the front zone? The hypothesized enemy attack, its goal being to liquidate the Kursk Bulge, could cause heavy casualties among the local inhabitants. Sure that the outcome of the impending engagement would be favorable, Rokossovskiy considered it feasible to leave the local inhabitants where they were. Reminiscing about this in his book *A Soldier's Duty* he wrote: "Evacuation of the civilian population would inevitably have had an adverse effect on troop morale. Our soldiers built field fortifications, and prepared to hold at any cost what they had gained. We did everything we could so that no one would even think about the possibility of a withdrawal. My command post, administration, staff and rear were all situated in the center of the Kursk Bulge. We made sure that all the supplies needed to fight a long battle were also concentrated here. Even if the enemy had succeeded in cutting us off, we could have held the Kursk salient. The population believed in our strength, and gave no thought to evacuation."²⁷ This decision was proven by subsequent events to be the only correct one. It fully justified itself.

The history of warfare confirms that a military leader's ingenuity, resourcefulness, ability to foresee the course of events, and faculty for divining the enemy's plans and for concealing one's own intentions, are based on his mastery of the military art. Such mastery gives the military leader a profound understanding of the essence of the phenomena and processes of armed struggle, and permits him to make and implement those decisions which will most surely lead to victory.

Two or three months before Hitler's attack on the Kursk Bulge the enemy's plans and his forces and resources were known to the Soviet command. In order to disrupt these plans, the Supreme High Command General Headquarters decided to prepare a number of offensive operations. In particular, according to the General Headquarters plan, the Eleventh Guards Army was to break through the enemy's defensive front south of Kozel'sk and exploit its successes due south in the direction of Khotynets, in order to join with the troops of the Central Front in that region.

The commander of the Eleventh Army, I. Kh. Bagramyan, having profoundly analyzed the situation in the given direction, came to the conclusion that an advance toward Khotynets involved unnecessary risks for our troops. If the forces of the Western and Central fronts were to be pinned down by defensive engagements, then the emergence of the Eleventh Army in the vicinity of Khotynets would be ineffectual. In view of this fact, General Bagramyan prepared an alternative decision: to seek coordinated action not with the shock grouping of the Central Front, but with the Sixty-first Army of the Bryansk Front, which was to mount an independent attack in the direction of Bolkhov.

Although more modest in scale, this was a more realistic mission, namely: by coordinated attacks of the Eleventh Army and the Sixty-first Army on Bolkhov, to encircle and destroy the enemy's Bolkhov grouping. In the opinion of Eleventh Army command, destruction of the Bolkhov grouping would effectively disrupt the stability of the enemy's defense on the entire northern face of the Orel salient, thus providing ample opportunity for subsequent rout of the Orel grouping in its entirety. Being well founded, this plan of General Bagramyan was approved by General Headquarters, and in due course was successfully implemented.

However, analysis of the performance of military leaders and General Headquarters' representatives shows that not all of them displayed resourcefulness and a sense of personal responsibility in the complex situations of the last war. This is clearly indicated in General of the Army S. M. Shtemenko's book *The General Staff in the War Years*. Revealing the causes of the setbacks on the Crimean Front in 1942, he writes that our intelligence precisely established the day on which the enemy would shift to active operations. However, neither the General Headquarters

representative, L. Z. Mekhlis, nor the commander of the front, D. T. Kozlov, took the appropriate steps to repel the attack. The enemy broke through our defense, and began to develop his offensive.

In his telegram to the Supreme High Command, Mekhlis not only failed to reveal the reasons for the serious setbacks, but, more important, he passed over his own errors in silence. So it was not by chance that he received the following noteworthy reply: "On the Crimean Front you are not an outside observer, but the responsible representative of General Headquarters, responsible for all successes and failures of the front, and obliged to correct the Command's mistakes on the spot. You, jointly with the Command, must answer for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be inordinately weak. If 'the entire situation indicated that the enemy would attack at dawn' and you took no steps to organize resistance, confining yourself to passive criticism, so much the worse for you. It means you did not yet understand that you were not sent to the Crimean Front as a State Inspector, but as the responsible General Headquarters representative."²⁸

Troop control during military operations is a real art. The task of troop control consists in defeating the enemy in the shortest possible time with a minimum of casualties, without compromising one's own troops' capacity for further combat. During an armed struggle, two fundamentally opposite potentialities are striving for realization: the possibility of victory and the possibility of defeat. Which of these possibilities will become a reality depends not only on the objective conditions, e.g., on the correlation of the forces and resources of the belligerent parties, but also on the personal qualities of one's military leader, and on his **administrative ability**. Lenin indicated that "any engagement whatever contains the abstract possibility of defeat, and there is no way of *minimizing* this possibility except by orderly preparation for the engagement."²⁹ However, preparing for engagements and directing them is precisely the role of the military leader.

Armed forces participation in the large-scale operations of nuclear missile warfare will include the various Services and branches of Services equipped with highly sophisticated combat equipment, and huge numbers of ground troops. Because this complex war machine must be skillfully managed, a military leader must have the administrative talent needed to organize the coordinated action of formations and field forces of the various Services and branches of Services in rapidly changing situations. The absence of continuous fronts, the fast pace of engagements, and abrupt changes in the situation will make it more difficult for the military leader to determine the whereabouts of the enemy's main forces, to decide when and where to concentrate his own forces, and to choose the right moments for mounting surprise attacks.

By his orders and instructions, a military leader organizes control of his troops in such a way as to ensure their effectiveness. Through his staff and the appropriate aides, he arranges collection and processing of information on friendly and hostile troops, analyzes and generalizes the data on the entire combat situation, carefully selects the targets, assigns his troops their missions, ensures the secrecy of preparations made and the surprise of blows inflicted, and maintains the morale of his troops at a high level.

Troop control is a continuous cognition process on the basis of which a military leader makes his decisions, assigns his combat missions and achieves the designated goal. His mental and administrative activity is directly dependent upon the actual situation, which is complex and very dynamic. The situational data are subject to logical processing in the military leader's cognition process. Moreover, the raw data will be complex, contradictory and changeable.

Troop control demands of a military leader outstanding administrative ability and intense mental activity. Moreover, one must not lose sight of the fact that the control processes will take place under conditions where the military leader and his subordinates are in constant mortal danger. A military leader's courage, however, must not fail him even for a moment. Besides, he shoulders the responsibility for protecting his troops from weapons of mass destruction.

A military leader's superlative administrative ability enables him to fulfill successfully the missions assigned under existing conditions to the Armed Forces by the Communist Party and the Soviet government, to maintain a high level of combat readiness and combat capability among his troops, and to create the kind of military order which ensures unity of the wills and actions of tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands, of men and efficient control of his troops at all levels.

In modern warfare only the military leader who possesses the **faculty of scientific foresight** will prove equal to the demands which such warfare makes of him. To foresee in the course of an armed struggle is very difficult. This is due to many circumstances: its spatial scope; the dynamic nature and complexity of combat operations; the large number of diversified random events arising as a result of the fact that the belligerent parties conceal their forces, resources and plans; and the lack of accurate, comprehensive data on the enemy. Other factors impeding a military leader's foresight are also operative in warfare. Nonetheless, such foresight exists. Not in vain did Lenin, himself a master of foresight, say, "Miraculous prophesy is a myth, but scientific prophesy is a fact."³⁰

A commander's foresight finds expression in his ability to penetrate the essence of a combat situation; to catch the basic meaning and the

main trend of its intrinsic phenomena and processes; and to divine in what direction they are developing and to what end result they will lead. Most important in a military leader's foresight is his ability to detect the basic tendencies in the development of an armed struggle. This permits him to foretell with the required accuracy the moment when the correlation of forces should be changed.

Scientific foresight is the basis on which strategic operations are planned and conducted. During the Great Patriotic War, for example, the Soviet command, foreseeing on the eve of the 1944 Belorussian operation the scale and nature of possible combat operations, made an unusual decision: the Sixty-fifth Army was given the principal front reserves, namely, five corps, one of which was an artillery corps. This was a grave risk, but our command foresaw that only such a measure would permit us to break through the enemy's Dvina River positions and that this would in turn lead to disruption of Hitler's defense in the Central Front zone. This prediction came true, for as early as the second day, the Sixty-fifth Army emerged into an open operating space and on the sixth day seized an important center of enemy resistance, the town of Rechitsa.

All the value of scientific foresight lies in its practical importance, in the practical realization of what has been conceived in the military leader's head. Translating into reality that which was desired and foreseen, a military leader attains the assigned goal by leading his troops vigorously and creatively, and by skillfully utilizing the energy, knowledge and experience of his subordinates.

Underlying Soviet military leaders' foresight is their knowledge of the objective laws of society, and one of its particular manifestations such as warfare, including analysis, from the standpoint of dialectic materialism, of the necessary, repetitive, cause-and-effect, substantial and nonsubstantial, temporary and permanent associations, phenomena and events of armed struggle, and its real and formal potentialities. In other words, the deeper a Soviet military leader's mastery of scientific and philosophical methodology, the better will he foresee the development of events.

Correct methodology, however, merely makes scientific foresight possible. In order that this possibility become a reality, the military leader must have a thorough knowledge of military theory, combat experience, knowledge of the enemy, the ability to divine the enemy's intentions, the faculty of putting himself in the enemy's place, a skill in soberly reckoning the correlation of forces, the ability to impose his will on the enemy, and an unwavering faith in his eventual attainment of the assigned goal.

It is desirable that a military leader should have a clear idea of the correlation of forces, should be sure that he will achieve his goal, and not allow himself to vacillate. Just how important the above factors are may be judged from the following example. On 17 November 1942, at a meeting of the State Defense Committee, just twenty-four hours prior to the onset of our Stalingrad counteroffensive, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevskiy's attention was invited to a letter from General V. T. Vol'skiy, commander of the 4th Mechanized Corps, which was destined to play a decisive role in that operation. In his letter, which was addressed to Stalin personally, General Vol'skiy wrote that given the existing correlation of forces and resources the planned offensive, far from offering any hope of success, was patently doomed to failure, with all the emergent consequences for us, and that he, as an honest Party member, knowing his opinion to be shared by other responsible participants, requested that Stalin deal with the matter immediately, carefully verifying the soundness of all decisions made in connection with the impending operation, and giving due consideration to its postponement or cancellation.

Marshal Vasilevskiy thought quite the opposite. Knowing the correlation of forces precisely, he foresaw that the counteroffensive would be successful and confirmed, at this meeting, his unwavering faith in the victorious outcome of the operation. This forecast came true.³¹

Foresight is also of great importance in the development of military theory. It permits solutions to be found for new theoretical problems in the fields of military science and practice, in methods and forms of conducting armed struggle, and in the education and training of personnel.

A person's ability to peer into the future and forecast it, is based not only on a knowledge of natural science and sociology, but also on the faculty of **imagination, or scientific vision**. When a commander analyzes and generalizes situational data and thinks over diverse variants of his decision, he sees in his imagination what is not yet there, but could become so in reality. In this case vision becomes a special form of the oneness of generalization and imagination. Not in vain did Lenin write that even "in the simplest generalization, in the most rudimentary general idea . . . there is a certain element of **vision**."³² Emphasizing the great role of vision in human thought, Lenin wrote in his *Philosophical Notebooks*, "It would be absurd to deny the role of vision even in the most rigorous science."³³ He considered a person's faculty for scientific vision "to be a quality of the greatest value."³⁴

With the aid of a creative imagination, and vision, a military leader strives to realize his dreams and plans, anticipates the future, and this inspires him to heroic deeds, and motivates him to creative, purposeful activity. A rich, creative imagination guards against trodden paths, in-

grained habits, and the commonplace, facilitating a fresh look at familiar facts and recurrent phenomena.

A commander's foresight is the result of an extremely complex and contradictory thought process usually associated with great physical, mental and moral stress, when there is little time for detailed analysis or decision-making. A military leader equal to the demands of modern warfare is one who, under the difficult conditions of military operations, can formulate a hypothesis mentally, recreating the state of affairs at the front, and can conceive the course of an operation, making the correct decision and assigning appropriate missions to his staff and his troops.

However, it is not enough to foresee the future: one must also conquer it. A commander capable of foreseeing the occurrence of a given phenomenon must be able to influence skillfully the course of events in the desired direction. Moreover, it is extremely important to be able to determine the right moment for practical actions and to make due allowance for, and correct use of, the time factor. This is especially important in nuclear warfare.

The experience of training exercises, maneuvers and war games confirms that under contemporary conditions a military leader has very little time to assess the situation, to analyze current phenomena, and to make sense of the information reaching him. All the more palpable becomes the principal property of time, namely, its irreversibility. To lose time means to miss the most propitious moment for maneuvering one's troops or for mounting an attack, whereas to gain it means to forestall the enemy and to create the most favorable conditions for oneself.

Today the successful leading of troops largely depends on widespread introduction and skillful use of automation, mechanization, remote control, electronic computers, and other specialized equipment. To use all these facilities effectively, a military leader must know the elements of cybernetics and modern computer technology, which in turn requires that he be flexible, capable of creative thinking, and able to interpret computer output and supervise algorithm preparation.

A commander's foresight is inseparably associated with his intuitive faculty. **Intuition** is by no means a sort of supernatural faculty peculiar to outstanding individuals. It embraces both immediate and mediate knowledge. One of the forms of mediate knowledge is direct discernment of truth with the aid of our sense organs. As a matter of fact, this is the etymological source of the word "intuition," which means contemplation, discernment or seeing of truth. However, a military leader's direct knowledge is not confined to sensory intuition. His intuition in the form of immediate discernment of truth, and in the form of foresight, is based on scientific scholarship, on precise calculation and on experi-

ence, and is inseparably associated with logical thinking. Marxian philosophy regards intuition as the product of an individual's cognitive activity, a reflection of reality. Intuition is an intimate blend of thought, feeling and sensation.

Intuition is neither a mystical act nor a God-given talent, as bourgeois theorists declare. For example, the French philosopher Henri Bergson understood by intuition the antithesis of reason, human thought and truth, a manifestation of his enigmatic "life force" concept, i.e., a person's subconscious volitional compulsions, supposedly giving rise to absolutely sound decisions. Bergson maintained that an individual's volitional, intuitive actions are not subject to any natural law or causation whatever. Modern irrationalists take the same stand. Denying the ability of the human mind to penetrate the essence of phenomena and processes, or to cognize them in a logical way, the West German philosopher Karl Jaspers, for example, maintains that one may be cognizant of them in a special manner and in special situations, namely, by a mystical intuition. Such an antiscientific conception of intuition belittles the human mind. In reality, as far as military affairs are concerned, intuition is the result of much preliminary theoretical-cognitive and practical activity, including the commander's experience in military operations. Logical processes accomplished by the military leader in the past are stored at various locations in the cortex of his brain. In similar combat situations, under the stimulus of strong nervous tension, the old logical links are momentarily reactivated, prompting correct decisions.

Emphasizing how valuable intuition can be to a military leader, Frunze wrote, "To be a good strategist, in pure politics as well as in military affairs, one needs certain personal qualities, the most important of which is the so-called faculty of intuition, or the ability to orient oneself among the myriad surrounding phenomena, recognizing what is essential and outlining a specific campaign or a plan of action on the basis of it."³⁵

Many generals and other officers, watching an eminent military leader at work in a complex and dangerous situation, are delighted by the way in which he makes his rapid and responsible decisions, "fielding" the various contingencies as if he had prior notice of them. This is a case of a commander's intuition being based on profound knowledge and a flair for theoretical generalization.

Life requires that our military leaders constantly improve their faculty for theoretical generalization, so that their thinking may always be distinguished by its logic and great breadth, and in order that they may be both inquisitive and discerning. The Communist Party and the Soviet government are constantly concerned that the process whereby our military leaders are trained should guarantee that their power of abstract

thought is developed in every possible way. Of great importance to the military leader in developing this power is analysis of war games, exercises and maneuvers, when the experience gained is generalized, and the foundation is laid for reliable prediction of the future.

As a rule, an outstanding commander is distinguished not only by his military talents, but also by his **moral qualities**. Exemplary moral qualities strengthen a commander's authority, and make him loved and respected by his troops and by the people at large. And in our time, a military leader should not forget a former military theorist's dictum: "General! The higher the post you occupy, the bigger the army you command, the more strictly will you be judged." Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov was correct in saying, "No leader, military or otherwise, may count on authority among the masses if he does not possess such qualities."³⁶

Sterling moral qualities in a commander serve as an example for his subordinates, inspiring them to great deeds and motivating them to follow him in combat, whatever the difficulties to be surmounted. It has long been known that a leader's example evokes heroism and encourages his troops along the road to valor and to feats of arms.

A truly great commander always notices officers of demonstrated ability and distinguished service, earmarks them for advancement, and promotes them. He does not take for himself credit due to others, keeps his word, and expects his subordinates to do likewise. Moreover, a distinguished military leader is modest. Sterling moral qualities are characteristic of great Soviet commanders born among the people and nurtured by the Communist Party.

Illustrative of the foregoing is what was said of Marshal K. K. Rokossovskiy by General of the Army P. I. Batov, who served under this outstanding commander from the autumn of 1942 until the end of the Great Patriotic War:

All command personnel regarded serving with Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy as a most educational experience. He disliked solitude, much preferring to mingle with his staff. . . . He would come in, ask what the comrades were working on, what difficulties were being encountered. He would help with a word of advice, offering to think over some situation or other. All this created an astonishingly pleasant working atmosphere in which one felt neither constraint nor fear of expressing an opinion different from those of one's superior. On the contrary, everyone was motivated to think, act and speak more freely. One of the marshal's finest traits was that even under the most exacting conditions he not only appreciated useful initiative on the part of his subordinates, but he even evoked it by his tireless energy and by his demanding, but humane, treatment of people. To this should be added the personal charm of a man with broad and profound military knowledge and a great heart.³⁷

An instance of a prominent Soviet military leader possessing exemplary moral qualities and enjoying the profound love and respect of his sub-

ordinates was General of the Army I. D. Chernyakhovskiy. "He was a splendid commanding general," wrote Marshal Rokossovskiy, "young, cultured, full of a love for life, an amazing man! Anyone could see that he was dearly loved in the army. This was immediately apparent. If those reporting to a commanding general do so not with a tremor, but with a smile, then you realize that he has achieved a great deal. Commanding officers of all ranks are acutely conscious of the attitude of their senior commander, and probably the dream of each of us is to become the kind of person whose orders will be carried out with love. This is just what Chernyakhovskiy achieved. . . ." ³⁸

The moral makeup of a Soviet military leader is vividly expressed in his humaneness, in his paternal care for his officers and men, in his close association with them, and in his knowledge of their needs, wants and moods. Lenin taught that the art of leading the masses consists in knowing the masses "inside out; in being able to determine faultlessly their attitude toward any question at any moment, their real needs, aspirations and thoughts; and in being able to assess, without the slightest false idealization, to what extent they are socially conscious; . . . in being able to win their complete confidence by one's comradely attitude toward them, and by solicitous satisfaction of their needs." ³⁹ Lenin insisted not only that the masses should be taught, but also that one should learn from them, imbibing their experience and wisdom.

Constant close contact with his officers and men, his getting to know them, enhances a **commander's authority** in the eyes of the masses of troops.

A commander's authority is that great force which helps him lead his troops successfully. Setbacks sustained by a military leader and the troops he leads are not infrequently attributable to lack of authority. A commander's authority depends largely on his personal qualities. These qualities are formed under the direct influence of the social order in which he lives and the class interests which he serves.

Behind our commander is the authority of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, which entrusted him with the leadership of troops assigned to defend our socialist Motherland. The Communist Party enhances the authority of the Soviet military leader in every way possible.

The splendid qualities characteristic of great Soviet commanders were shared by General of the Army N. F. Vatutin, who, in October 1942, was appointed commanding general of the newly formed Southwestern Front, which was assigned an exceptionally important mission in the Stalingrad counteroffensive. During his first days in this post General Vatutin won the deep respect of staff and troops alike. His personal qualities included Bolshevik businesslike efficiency, operational ability,

personal valor, a knack for sizing up his subordinates, and a tactful attitude toward them. All these qualities inspired faith in his talent as a commander.

General Vatutin's talents as a commander were even more fully revealed when he commanded the Voronezh and 1st Ukrainian Fronts. As an eminent military leader, he displayed exemplary leadership of major strategic field forces. N. F. Vatutin thoroughly studied the enemy's plans and cleverly guessed them, always imposing his will on the enemy. With due regard to the situation, he quickly made responsible decisions and undeviatingly carried them out.

General of the Army Vatutin was strong-willed, resolute, and persistent in pursuit of the assigned goal. No matter how complex the circumstances in which he or his troops found themselves, he never lost his self-possession nor his tenacity. When leading troops, General Vatutin relied upon his immediate subordinates, neither performing their functions nor trying to do everything himself. He well understood that a military leader can count on successful fulfillment of his intentions only if his subordinates and staff know what must be done in the given situation at any given moment.

Mention should be made of yet another trait characterizing N. F. Vatutin as an outstanding commander. His military abilities were combined with high political maturity and dedication to Party principles. Like many other eminent Soviet military leaders, he was always closely linked with the troops in general, who believed in their commanding general and felt great love and respect for him. M. I. Kalinin spoke of just such commanders when he said, "The renowned commanders were not merely masters of strategy and tactics: they knew the way to a soldier's heart. They were masters of troop morale and knew how to gain a soldier's complete confidence."⁴⁰

It goes without saying that military talent, mental flexibility and creativity, a strong will and administrative ability are attributes possessed by many military leaders of bourgeois states. However, the great commanders of the socialist countries have indisputable advantages over them. In the countries of socialism, such commanders are distinguished primarily by profound communist conviction and by the ability to persuade and lead people. The military leaders of socialist armies are public figures and statesmen. They evaluate facts and phenomena from the Party's position, expressing the interests of the general populace and championing communist and workers' party policies in the armed forces, enjoying the confidence and comprehensive support of the people and the troops. This engenders in the commanders of socialist states an acute sense of responsibility to their motherland and their people.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government are constantly directing the efforts of our military leaders toward the principal tasks confronting our Armed Forces. They require our military leaders to generalize theoretically the particular results which have been obtained in practice and to engage in day-to-day perfection of military art. Of course, it is not possible in peacetime to verify postulates of military art or military science with complete certainty. However, as a criterion for the correctness of military theory, and as a basis for its further development, there is operational and combat training, during which new methods of using weapons and combat materiel are evolved.

It is most important that Soviet military leaders be capable of approaching the evaluation of troop training and education objectively and in accordance with Party principles, analyzing not only the positive aspects, but also the negative ones, disclosing errors and persistently eliminating them. Analyses of the results of exercises or maneuvers and critiques on them are beneficial only when they are not confined to a superficial description of facts or phenomena, but are raised to the level of theoretical generalizations, permitting scientific conclusions to be drawn for the purpose of further improvement in methods and forms of combat. This is the essence of the process whereby the latest experience is generalized and disseminated.

A creative contribution by a Soviet military commander, or by a person in command at any level, for that matter, is impossible without constant reliance upon political organs and Party organizations. To the extent that a military leader is closely associated with such organs and organizations, his troops will be better disciplined, better trained for combat, better indoctrinated politically, and better led. The political organs and Party organizations in the Armed Forces motivate the men to fulfill the requirements of Party and government, and to carry out the orders of their superiors. Moreover, they reinforce the principle of unity of command, this principle being a vital necessity in the life and work of our troops. Furthermore, they support the military leader's authority in every possible way.

At the same time, the CPSU teaches that military leaders who are Party members should strictly observe the standards of Party conduct and Leninist principles of military leadership. The Communist Party teaches that a military leader should never put on airs, nor pride himself in his position, always remembering that while occupying a high post he is carrying out the will of the people and the Party who vested him with his great powers.

4. Necessity and Free Will in a Military Leader's Activities

The diversified phenomena of military operations develop according to laws of an objective nature. Victory or defeat in battles, engagements,

or the war as a whole, depends on the objective conditions in which the belligerent parties and their commanders find themselves. At the same time, we distinctly discern in troop activities a subjective aspect as well as the objective aspect, the two being interrelated and mutually conditioned, the former being necessarily subordinate to the latter. This warrants the assertion that a commander's activities cannot be absolutely free or arbitrary. Such activities must be based on a sober reckoning of the demands of the objective laws of armed struggle and the emergent principles of military art which express necessity in military affairs.

To reveal this necessity means to make a correct assessment of those important internal, reiterative connections and relationships which govern the character of military development, the organization of the armed forces in peacetime and wartime, the correlation of the belligerent parties' forces and resources, the course of combat operations, etc. This is of great importance as far as the military leader's contribution is concerned.

Necessity is manifested, for example, in the fact that the revolution which has taken place in military affairs during recent years has obliged us to make changes in the structure of the armed forces and to evolve new methods of training and novel forms of armed struggle. The burden of performing these tasks has lain primarily on the shoulders of military leaders, whose contribution has affected the manner of their fulfillment. However, the fact that a military leader's decisions and actions are dictated by objective necessity does not at all mean that he is completely restricted in his choice of alternatives. For the purpose of our example, he is free insofar as he knows the essence of the revolution in military affairs, the causes which engendered it, and the resultant consequences.

One should not make a fetish of the impact of natural laws on armed struggle. From the viewpoint of Marxian philosophy, a battle or an operation is an objective process which is continually being directed by the subjectivity of the top military leadership and command personnel of all ranks. A military leader is not powerless before the impact of objective necessity. Having experienced it in armed struggle, he acquires free will and freedom of action. In other words, he is at liberty to choose from among the various alternatives of possible solutions the one which, in his opinion, is most appropriate to the given conditions.

However, if the combat situation presented only one possible course of action, there would be no question of evaluating the commander's decision, his responsibility, or his creative approach to military art. In actual fact, of course, this is not so. Lenin noted that "the idea of determinism, establishing the necessity of human acts and refuting the absurd tale of free will, by no means nullifies a person's mind, nor his conscience, nor the evaluation of his actions. Quite the contrary. Only where there is a deterministic view is a rigorous and correct evaluation

possible, as opposed to dumping anything and everything onto free will. . . . The real question arising in connection with evaluation of an individual's social contribution is: Under what conditions does the contribution in question have assurance of success?" ⁴¹

The freer, in the philosophical sense, the judgment on a given problem in the course of working out its solution, the greater will be the objective necessity with which the practical realization of this solution is determined. A military leader's uncertainty about his judgments, due to ignorance of the situation, lack of needed information, etc., expresses his constraint, and engenders vacillation and indecision. One cannot but agree with General Friedrich von Bernhardi, who wrote that ". . . only complete knowledge of the means with which a war is waged will permit a commander to enact his strategic will. If he has not made himself familiar with the material conditions under which the war is being waged, then he risks becoming dependent on them, and consequently risks losing a certain portion of his freedom." ⁴²

On what does the degree of freedom enjoyed by a commander in his selection of solutions and actions depend? It depends primarily on how well the commander has learned to know objective necessity, how he takes into account the demands of the laws of armed struggle, and how he observes the principles of military art. It also depends on his knowledge of the conditions under which his decision is made and will be implemented, on the forces and resources which he has at his disposal, on the completeness of his information concerning the enemy, etc. A great influence on the degree of free will enjoyed by a military leader is exerted by the higher command's directives, with which he may not agree, but which nonetheless determine the nature of his decisions and actions.

Thorough understanding of necessity still does not make a military leader completely free. Freedom should be regarded as identity of theory and practice, or as identity of aspirations and practical actions. A military leader's free will emerges as a conscious and purposeful realization of objective necessity in the form that corresponds to the real requirements for the attainment of victory.

The conflict between objective necessity and a commander's free will is vividly exhibited when he makes a decision. At such moments, a military leader must have a precise knowledge of the combat situation and of the conditions prevailing on both sides and must be able to find the best variant of a decision which will ensure victory.

Let us take but one example. According to Supreme High Command General Headquarters plans, the main thrust of the Jassy-Kishinev operation was to be made in the Kishinev Sector. The commander of the 3rd

Ukrainian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union F. I. Tolbukhin, having sized up the concept of the operation and having correctly assessed the accrued situation, came to the conclusion that the main thrust should be made not in the Kishinev Sector but in the Kitskan' Sector. This alternative ensured surprise and a rapid advance culminating in encirclement and destruction of the enemy's major forces. General Headquarters, finding Marshal Tolbukhin's suggestion sound, approved it. The operation was duly conducted in accordance with the front commander's decision, and ended, as is well known, in a major victory for the Soviet forces.

The above example shows that a commander's free will does not contradict objective necessity, but, on the contrary, emerges from it. Only by being thoroughly familiar with the objective situation can a commander make decisions and implement them freely and competently. Thus, the conflict between objective necessity and a commander's subjective contribution is resolved. If, however, a military leader is not familiar with the aggregate of conditions under which military operations develop, then objective necessity acts for him like a blind force, fettering his will. Such blind domination by necessity is fraught with negative consequences.

A commander's free will, like that of the entire collective of military leaders constituting the organ for directing the war, is enhanced by the ability to penetrate the enemy's plan and to impose on him those methods and forms of combat which will lead most directly to victory. An ability to understand and divine the enemy's plan has long been considered the great virtue of a commander. This quality was displayed by Soviet military leaders during the Great Patriotic War.

In the spring of 1943, the Soviet Supreme High Command was faced with an important mission: timely disclosure of the German Fascist command's concept and plans, particularly in the vicinity of the Kursk Bulge. Hitler, striving to restore his badly shaken prestige after his defeat at Stalingrad, resolved to change the strategic situation markedly in Fascist Germany's favor. He boastfully declared, "Our victory at Kursk must be a torch for the whole world."⁴³

Soviet military commanders did fathom the Fascist command's plans. At the bidding of General Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov arrived in the vicinity of the Kursk Bulge and, having studied the situation together with the commanders of the Central, Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts, reported to the Supreme High Commander, "It is clear that in the initial stage the enemy, with all the forces he can muster, including 13-15 tank divisions and strong air support, will deliver a convergent, eastbound attack in which his Orel-Kromy grouping will bypass Kursk on its northeastern side, and his Belgorod-

Khar'kov grouping will bypass Kursk on its southeastern side. It is to be expected that this year the enemy will rely mainly on his tank divisions and aviation when on the offensive. . . ." "

It was further proposed to wear down the enemy by our stubborn resistance, and then, committing fresh reserves, to take the general offensive, smashing the enemy's shock groupings with massed blows inflicted by air forces in coordination with tanks and rifle formations. Consideration was given to Marshal Zhukov's inferences and recommendations regarding the plan and nature of enemy operations and the operational methods of our forces, when pertinent decisions were made by the Soviet command and duly implemented. This is a vivid example of the ability to divine the enemy's probable plans, an ability which preordains free will for the military leader.

Superiority in forces and resources is, of course, an important prerequisite for a commander's freedom of action, for his freedom to choose the method of combat, to select the sector and timing of the main thrust, to determine the initial objective and the subsequent mission, etc. But again, this very superiority emerges as a necessity which gives scope to the commander's actions.

While emphasizing the importance of the correlation of forces as a factor determining the degree of freedom enjoyed by a military leader in the course of an armed struggle, Soviet military science proceeds from the premise that possession of freedom is essentially identical with a military commander's judicious exercise of initiative and with his ability to impose his will upon the enemy. Display of this latter quality of a commander by a military leader has always exerted a strong influence on the course of combat operations or engagements.

Here is one of numerous examples from the Great Patriotic War. On the night of 4 July 1943 Soviet reconnaissance scouts captured two German combat engineers who were clearing minefields laid by us in the Kursk Bulge. When interrogated, the prisoners revealed that a German offensive would begin at 2 a.m. on 5 July. As it was already 1 a.m. when this became known to Marshal K. K. Rokossovskiy, commander of the Central Front, so little time remained prior to the onset of the formidable enemy forces that Supreme High Command could not be consulted.

Marshal Rokossovskiy therefore had to take the initiative and make a prompt decision. Such a decision was made. The marshal imposed his will on the enemy, who was subjected to the full impact of the Central Front's artillery. The German troops, concentrated for their offensive, sustained heavy casualties, and their control system was disrupted. The Fascist command had to postpone the attack for several hours.

This time was used to bring our troops to full combat readiness. Having successfully repulsed the enemy's attack, the troops of the Central Front, together with those of other fronts, mounted a counteroffensive, winning an outstanding victory over the enemy.

It goes without saying that for a variety of reasons a commander may, on occasion, make a decision which is not entirely correct. He may even make several mistakes. However, if he leads his troops competently and can foresee the course of events, he may correct his errors in time.

Evidently, given combat experience, good generalship and deep theoretical knowledge, a military leader can resolve the conflict between the objective and the subjective which arises in the course of an armed struggle. The mental surmounting of this conflict in a military leader's decisions is simply a matter of the correlation of necessity and the freedom of his will. When, in the decision-making process, a military leader achieves coincidence of the objective and the subjective, he makes the decision freely, without hesitation, being sure that it best suits the *objective conditions of the combat situation* and that it will guarantee attainment of the assigned goal.

Present-day military operations will unfold in a complex and rapidly-changing situation, where *essential links rather frequently break down*, being replaced by what yesterday was secondary. The number of random events of all kinds will increase markedly. The chance phenomena which a commander encounters will also be such as do not emerge from the regular course of things. They are not characteristic of the given situation. It will therefore be difficult, and at times impossible, to foresee them.

Random events not emerging from the normal course of combat operations might be an unexpected breakdown of combat equipment, seizure of important documents from the enemy, or loss of one's own documents, or a sudden natural calamity. Each of these events is fortuitous from the viewpoint of the overall course of combat operations, and from the standpoint of the war as a whole.

Not to reckon with the random phenomena that always arise during military operations is, of course, unthinkable. A military leader must envisage the possibility of random phenomena in the course of an armed struggle, allowing for them in his decisions. Qualities conducive to this are initiative, resourcefulness, and readiness to assume responsibility for actions dictated by emergent conditions.

Can random events be foreseen in troop combat activities? To a certain extent, yes. A commander must therefore envisage the possibility of their occurrence when making his decision. Otherwise, his leadership

will be mediocre. To utilize favorable random events for the attainment of victory and, at the same time, to limit or avert the occurrence of unfavorable random events: such is the task of the military leader. It is not without interest to recall, in this context, Napoleon's maxim that an enterprise may be considered well conceived if two-thirds of it is planned and one-third is left to chance. If a person is not prepared to leave anything to chance, then he had better not undertake anything. Napoleon noted that a talented person utilizes everything, overlooking nothing that would improve his chances of success. Making the most of an opportunity is always a mystery to the mediocre but is the main strength of those who are above average.

Much is said and written by today's bourgeois military theorists about chance as a factor in the course of an armed struggle. Moreover, they often overestimate the role of random events, interpreting them fatalistically, as inevitable phenomena. They deny the possibility of combating unfavorable random events, regarding a commander as being powerless before them. In the opinion of bourgeois military theorists, only good luck and good fortune afford protection against random events. This idea was expressed, in particular, by General Dwight Eisenhower when he wrote in his book *Crusade in Europe* that when his troops took the offensive they entered the realm of wishful thinking as to what could happen if fate did not constantly smile on them.

Soviet military leaders, armed with Marxist-Leninist teaching, correctly resolve the problem of regularity and chance or necessity and freedom. The surmounting of unfavorable random events and elemental spontaneity in troop combat operations, as well as deeply thought out and profoundly purposeful measures effected in accordance with the objective tendencies and potentialities of the combat situation, characterize our military leaders' solution to the problem of necessity and freedom in the leading of troops on the battlefield.

Thus, a military leader's free will finds concrete embodiment in his wise decisions and actions and in his ability to accomplish purposeful activity as it depends on the following: the natural laws of armed struggle, the principles of military art, and his ability to foresee the subsequent course of events and impose his will on the enemy. This is especially important under nuclear warfare conditions, which demand of a military leader exceptional flexibility of thought, profound penetration into the processes of armed struggle, as well as initiative, decisiveness, an acute sense of responsibility, and the ability to think and act quickly.

The experience of contemporary exercises and maneuvers confirms that only comprehensive analysis of the conditions under which a military leader functions will permit a correct understanding of the compulsions imposed upon him by objective necessity. Being aware of the dictates

of necessity, a commander may choose the alternative and the mode of action most likely to succeed under the given conditions.

In the Great Patriotic War, Soviet military leaders, nurtured and guided by the Communist Party, demonstrated the outstanding generalship which contributed so much to our epoch-making victory over the enemy. In their artful generalship, the Soviet military leaders turned out to be a head taller than their capitalist counterparts in strategy, tactics, and operational art. The brilliant operations conducted under their leadership were the quintessence of military art.

Paying tribute to these Soviet military leaders for their part in our historic victory over Hitler's army, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, said, "In the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces surpassed the mightiest army of the capitalist world not only in a moral-political sense and in means of combat, but also in military art and in the administrative ability of line officers and senior officers in specialist fields.

"Supreme High Command General Headquarters, the commands of fronts and armies, commanders of formations, units and subunits, skillfully led our troops in far-reaching operations and fierce battles. In the forge of war, the Party prepared splendid officers and produced a whole pleiad of commanders whose names are well known to our people."⁴⁵

Military affairs are progressing rapidly. The revolutionary transformations which have taken place in military affairs, as well as the nature and peculiarities of modern warfare, make greater demands on military leaders. The problem is primarily one of troop control. In present-day operations, with the possible use of nuclear weapons and with troops moving rapidly in all directions, armed struggle will assume a mobile, transient and focal nature, and the commander of a front, army or formation will have a very much more exacting task. In the absence of continuous fronts, the transient quality of the battle or engagement and rapid changes in the situation will make it considerably more difficult for a military leader to determine where the enemy's main forces are, when and where to concentrate his own forces, and what is the most suitable moment to mount a surprise attack. This is why the Minister of Defense of the USSR is insistent that special attention be paid to mastery of the art of controlling large contingents of troops.

Under the inconceivably complex conditions of a future nuclear war, a military leader must make bold, purposeful, sound decisions in accordance with the concept of the operation and the accrued situation. Under these circumstances he must not be afraid to assume responsibility for the boldest of judicious decisions made.

A military leader exercises control of troops so as to achieve the following: to ensure their decisive and highly mobile activity; to maintain continuous, organized collection and processing of information on both hostile and friendly troops; to select skillfully the targets on which blows will be inflicted; to make a rapid reckoning of the correlation of forces and resources; to observe security precautions when preparing for, and mounting, the main attack; to maintain contact with adjacent units; etc. All this reveals a complex dialectic interdependence between the actions of a military leader and those of his subordinate generals and other officers, who are also engaged in troop control on their own scale.

Widespread use of missile-mounted nuclear weapons, submarines and supersonic aircraft, as well as a high level of troop mechanization, will require a military leader to carry out tactical, operational and strategic missions with the utmost dispatch. In a future war, gaining time may have a decisive influence on the course of an operation or of the war as a whole.

Under nuclear warfare conditions, it is extremely important to pick the right moment to begin a troop combat operation and the right moment to commit second echelons and reserves to the engagement. One must not be late, nor must one act prematurely. In nuclear missile warfare there will often be insufficient time to correct oversights or errors.

In order that they may always be equal to the occasion, our military leaders must untiringly improve their command of military theory and their administrative ability, mastering genuinely scientific troop leadership methods. The CPSU and the Minister of Defense of the USSR expect military leaders of all ranks to develop Soviet military theory and practice on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology, taking cognizance of the contemporary state of military affairs and trends in their development.

The Party teaches that a military leader's contribution will be effective only if he relies upon the experience of the masses in all matters and utilizes collective experience. The point is that because a military leader's own experience is limited, his individual background cannot always serve as a criterion of truth. It may contain an element of subjectivity or a biased approach to the evaluation of his personal contribution or that of the team which he leads. Only by taking into account collective experience can he correctly assess the state of the troops' combat training and political preparation, evaluate exercises, or draw conclusions having the weight of objective truth.

To perceive the experience of the masses means first of all to rely constantly upon political organs and Party organizations. The closer the ties between them and the military leader, the more successful will be

the combat training and political preparation of the troops, and the more successfully will they be led.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin, XVI, 23.
2. Marx and Engels, III, 3
3. Lenin, IV, 375.
4. See F. Engels, "Ob avtoritetakh" [On Authority], in Marx and Engels, XVIII, 302-304.
5. Marx and Engels, XVII, 19.
6. G. V. Plekhanov, *Izbr. filosof. proizv.* [Selected Philosophical Works] (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1956), II, 333.
7. *Strategiya v trudakh voyennykh klassikov* [Strategy in the Works of Military Classics], 1924, I, 345.
8. Omar N. Bradley, *Zapiski soldata* [A Soldier's Story]. Translated from English (Moscow: Izd-vo inostr. liter., 1957), p. 229.
9. Bernard Brodie, *Strategiya v vek raketnogo oruzhiya* [Strategy in the Missile Age]. Translated from English (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1961), p. 261.
10. As quoted in *Protiv fal'sifikatorov istorii vtoroy mirovoy voyny. Sbornik statey* [Against the Falsifiers of the History of World War II: A Collection of Articles] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1959), p. 11.
11. *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* [Military-Historical Journal], No. 10 (1965), 82.
12. V. I. Lenin, *Zamechaniya na sochineniya Klauzevitsa 'O voyne'* [Remarks on *On War* by Clausewitz] (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1939), p. 29.
13. N. A. Dobrolyubov, *Izbr. filosof. soch.* [Selected Philosophical Works] (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1945), I, 125.
14. See Lenin, XXXVI, 80-81.
15. See Lenin, IX, 155
16. A. Svechin, *Strategiya* [Strategy] (Moscow: Izd-vo Voennoy vestnik, 1927), p. 19.
17. F. Engels, *Izbrannyye voyennyye proizvedeniya* [Selected Military Works] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1957), p. 638. [Footnote 12 of Chapter 1 gives the date of publication as 1956—U.S. Ed.]
18. M. I. Kalinin, *O kommunisticheskoy vospitanii i voynskom dolge* [Communist Indoctrination and the Soldier's Duty] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1967), p. 576.
19. *Lenin vozhd' Oktyabrya. Vospominaniya petrogradskikh rabochikh* [Lenin, Leader of October: Recollections of Petrograd Workers] (Moscow: Lenizdat, 1956), p. 191.
20. M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya* [Selected Works] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1957), II, 198.
21. *Lenin Vladimir Il'ich. Kratkaya biografiya* [Vladimir Il'ich Lenin: A Brief Biography], 2nd ed. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1955), p. 175.
22. V. I. Lenin, *Voyennaya perepiska 1917-1922 gg.* [War Correspondence, 1917-22] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966), p. 74.
23. *Etapy bol'shogo puti. Vospominaniya o grazhdanskoy voyne* [Stages of a Long Journey: Recollections of the Civil War] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962), p. 25.
24. Frunze, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya*, II, 342.
25. Karl von Clausewitz, *O voyne* [On War] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1941), I, 118.
26. *Leninskiy sbornik* [Lenin Collection], XII, 383.
27. K. K. Rokossovskiy, *Soldatskiy dolg* [A Soldier's Duty] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), p. 212.

28. S. M. Shtemenko, *General'nyy shtab v gody voyny* [The General Staff During the War Years] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), p. 51.
29. Lenin, VI, 137.
30. Lenin, XXXVI, 472.
31. See *Stalingradsкая epopeya* [The Stalingrad Epic] (Moscow: Izd-vo Nauka, 1968), pp. 89-90.
32. Lenin, XXIX, 330.
33. Ibid.
34. Lenin, XLV, 125.
35. Frunze, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya*, II, 198.
36. M. V. Zakharov, *O nauchnom podkhode k rukovodstvu voyskami* [Scientific Approach to Troop Leadership], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1967), p. 64.
37. P. I. Batov, *V pokhodakh i boyakh* [In Campaigns and Battles] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962), p. 8.
38. Rokossovskiy, *Soldatskiy dolg*, pp. 211-12.
39. Lenin, XLIV, 348.
40. Kalinin, *O kommunisticheskoy vospitanii*, p. 418.
41. Lenin, I, 159.
42. Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Sovremennaya voyna* [Modern Warfare] (St. Petersburg, 1912), II, 299.
43. As quoted in *Sovershenno sekretno! Tol'ko dlya komandovaniya!*, p. 494.
44. *Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* [Military-Historical Journal], No. 11 (1966), 35.
45. A. A. Grechko, *Pyat'desyat let na strazhe zavoyevaniy Velikogo Oktyabrya* [Fifty Years Guarding the Achievements of the Great October Revolution] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), pp. 21-22.

Conclusion

The foregoing findings of Marxism-Leninism regarding the roles of the general populace, the political and military leadership, and the personality in the course and outcome of a modern war, warrant a number of inferences to which we ascribe definite theoretical and practical importance.

First, the decisive role played by the general populace in modern warfare is manifested in their daily activity contributing to a buildup of the country's economic, moral-political and military potential, and to a transformation of this potential into the reality of victory in the event of an outbreak of war. The general populace also exerts, in the final analysis, a decisive influence on the forms of war and on the methods of waging it. Besides, the military creativity of the general populace contributes to the development of the military art.

Second, the general populace's influence on the course and outcome of a modern war depends on the social conditions governing the level of its pertinent activity in peacetime and wartime. Only under socialism, where there is monolithic unity of the working class, the peasantry and the working intelligentsia, does a people cohere into an amicable family and do all toilers unite around the Communist Party and the government, acting in an especially organized, conscientious and decisive manner, and manifesting mass heroism and the unswerving will to win.

Third, a most important condition for attaining victory over the imperialist aggressors is the presence of a highly developed economy supplying the latest achievements of science and technology to strong, technically equipped, well-trained armed forces fighting for the vital interests of the people. This is why constant growth of the military-economic might of the socialist states is a top-priority task as far as their defensive capability is concerned. The political leadership of the socialist countries is constantly mobilizing the general populace to perform this task. The rich experience gained by the Soviet Union's political and military leadership during the last war when organizing the defeat

of the German Fascist aggressors, and also during the postwar period, is of great theoretical and practical importance for the countries of the socialist commonwealth in their joint struggle against the forces of imperialism.

Fourth, the objective process constituting the growth of the role of the general populace in modern warfare increases still further the role and responsibility of those leading the masses in their struggle to win a war. Consequently, a most important factor for victory is the correctly organized direction of the nation's whole life, the activities of the people, as well as skillful control of the armed forces.

Fifth, in connection with the fact that an immensely important role in the attainment of victory belongs to the military leader, an extremely pressing problem is the purposeful and effective training of our command personnel, giving consideration to the nature and peculiarities of modern warfare and to current trends in the development of military affairs. Our generals and other officers, while mastering modern military methods, must reap the benefit of all past experience which has retained its importance, making a thorough study of the creative contribution of our outstanding commanders who displayed exemplary leadership of combat operations in the Great Patriotic War. Under modern conditions, no officer can lead his troops successfully, nor can he train and indoctrinate his subordinates, unless he has a thorough knowledge of everything underlying the development of military affairs, a deep, philosophical comprehension of the processes involved in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, a mastery of the methodological foundations of Soviet military theory, and an ability to apply its theoretical propositions skillfully in practice. This is why the CPSU is doing its utmost to ensure that our trained military cadres are not found wanting in political convictions, moral fiber, or the ability to get things done.

The requirement to enhance our country's defensive capability also dictates attentive study of the military theory and practice of the imperialist states, including all means of combat used in their armies.

The strength and invincibility of the Soviet people and their army are attributable to the leadership of the wise and battle-seasoned Communist Party. Fulfilling Lenin's behests, the Communist Party and the Soviet government are tirelessly increasing the military might of our Armed Forces, ensuring that they are equipped with the latest weaponry, and taking care that their organization, combat readiness and morale are always in accord with the character of a possible future war.

Underlying the day-to-day measures adopted by the CPSU and the Soviet government to strengthen the defensive capability of the Land of the Soviets is their concern to ensure a continuous rise in the economic,

moral-political and military potential of the USSR, and to consolidate the friendship which prevails between the peoples and armies of the socialist states. It is precisely in these areas of concern that our true guarantee of victory over any aggressor lies.

Lenin urged us to cherish the defensive capability of the Land of the Soviets as the apple of our eye, to display the utmost vigilance and constant readiness to bear arms in defense of our socialist homeland, and to give a crushing rebuff to any aggression by imperialist forces. Lenin's behest concerning vigilance and constant readiness to defend the gains of October signifies for Soviet servicemen primarily a requirement for constant enhancement of their combat capability and for persistent improvement in their mastery of weapons and combat equipment.

Contemporary conditions impart a special relevance to Lenin's observation that capital is an international force, and that in order to conquer it, an international workers' alliance is necessary. Today, as never before, adherence to Leninist principles of internationalism is imperative. A special responsibility is borne by the peoples and armies of the socialist states. They see their international duty as defending their revolutionary gains by their joint efforts, and as countering any imperialist intrigue with a devastating blow.

Led and inspired by the Communist Party, the Soviet Armed Forces stand vigilantly and dependably on guard to defend the interests of our socialist homeland. Their might and combat readiness are rising incessantly, and they are always ready, at the call of the Party and the government, to bring down their strength upon any enemy who infringes on the sovereignty of our socialist Motherland.